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AB STRACT 
This dissertation seeks to unfold a conception of selfhood that affrrrns the 
active, formative role of the other in the demarcation and constitution of the 
self. Taking the strong position that one is not able to know oneself in any sort 
of determinate way without the interacting presence of an other, it is argued 
that the self is a dialogical achievement. In arguing for a dialogical conception 
of the self, this work draws largely on the writings of Mikhail Bakhtin, the 
Russian literary theorist, philosopher of language, and preeminent apologist for 
the wide-ranging significance of dialogue in human existence. Following an 
Introduction, which considers the central themes and arguments presented herein, 
Chapter 1 examines aspects of the modern phiiosophicai tradition that are 
antithetical to the dialogical view put forth by Bakhtin. Among the themes 
considered in this chapter are the modemist privifeging of the epistemic 
activities of the individual subject, the denial or devalorkation of this subject's 
dependence on the other, and the representationd mode1 of Ianguage and 
cornrnunication that reinforces this modemist subject's presumed sovereignty and 
self-suficiency. Also included in this chapter is a consideration of the rnodernist 
assumptions underlying contemporary portrayals of the self, particularly those 
informed by the Piagetian, structural-developmental fiamework. Chapter 2 
explores the status of Bakhtin's ccdialogism" as a general perspective on the 
nature of knowledge and subjectivity. It is shown that in contrast to modernist 
conceptions, Bakhtin acknowledges the constitutive significance of social- 
communicative relations with the other for the subject's perception of the 
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world and itself In keeping with this dialogical conception of the subject, this 
chapter also considers the constitutive importance of language for human 
subjectivity. Chapter 3 examines Bakhtin's metalinguistic theory of the 
utterance with a view to highlighting the notion that any individual use of 
language necessarily implicates the other, and more specifically, the word or 
discourse of the other. Chapter 4, in turn, considers the more specific implications 
of Bakhtin's account of the utterance for a dialogical conception of the self. 
Working from the assurnption that the vicissitudes of the self parallel those of the 
utterance, it is argued that the dialogical self be regarded as an unrepeatable 
event of meaning which implicates both the previous and anticipated 
utterances of others. Also included in this chapter is a detailed consideration of 
the ontological significance of the other's recognition or responsive 
understanding for the constitution of selfhood. In Chapter 5, critical aspects of 
the dialogical view are brought further into relief through a comparative analysis 
of the writings of Bakhtin and George Herbert Mead. This chapter argues that 
while both theorists espouse a social ontology that stresses the relation between 
self and other as it defines and manifests itself in human communication, only 
the Bakhtinian conception of dialogue, and of inner dialogue in particular, 
recognizes the endunng importance of the othemess of the other for the 
communicative process of self-formation. Among the more specific features of 
the Bakhtinian approach to be considered in this regard are its emphasis on 
difference as an enabling condition for dialogue; its resistance to formulations 
which see dialogue as a dialeaical process that tends progressively toward the 
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eradication of othemess; its depiction of the self s multiplicity as a non-systemic, 
aggregate of voices in interaction; and its provision of an account ofthe 
internalization process that preserves the sense of the particulanty, and hence the 
othemess, of the voices that populate Our imer speech. In an effort to illustrate 
the rnethodological and analytic utility of the view presented herein, Chapter 6 
offers a dialogical reading of the autobiographical utterances of three children. 
Upon describing the nature and content ofthese self-relevant utterances fiom the 
vantage point of the structural-developmental tiamework, they are reconsidered 
in light of some of the ideas and assumptions associated with the Bakhtinian 
dialogical perspective. More specifically, the possible social origins of 
autobiographical discourse are considered, as are the ways in which such 
discourse betrays an active, "double-voiced" orientation to the otherys word. 
Chapter 7 attempts to move beyond a conception of dialogism simply as an 
ontological given, that is, as a description of how language invariably operates. It 
is argued that dialogue, over and above this descriptive dimension, is an ethical 
ideal for development, one that suggests a particdar vaiorized way of engaging 
the word of the other. rn this regard, the dialogical self ernerges as sornething 
worthy of advocacy. Finally, in the Conclusion section, dialogism is considered 
in terms of its potential status as a metatheoretical discourse for developmental 
psychology, and more specifically as a framework which, by virtue of its reliance 
on an open sense of time, has paiticular implications for the way we 
conceptualize the process of change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A single person, remaining alone with himself, cannot make ends meet 
even in the deepest and most intimatc spheres of his own spiritual Iife, he 
cannot manage without another consciousness. One person can never find 
complete fiilIness in himself alone. 
- Mikhail Bakhtin 
This dissertation is about the self, a construct that has inhabited a place within 
the discowse of acadernic psychology since the discipline's inception as a 
science over a century aga.' At least since James' (1950a) pioneering work in 
the area, in which he insisted that the "personal self' be considered "the 
immediate datum in psychology" (p. 226), the self-along with the multitude of 
constmcts (e-g. self-concept, self-esteem) in which, through hyphenation, it has 
been implicated-has variously emerged as the source and subject of defensive 
apologias, as the target of academic derision, or, more recently, as the object of 
unqualified celebration2 Certainly, recent years have witnessed a dramatic 
upsurge in the extent of psychological scholarship devoted to the issue of the 
self and related processes. One group of investigators, for example, estimates 
that in the period fiom 1974 to 1993 over 3 1,000 pubIished articles addressing 
the subject have appeared in the scholarly psychological Iiterature (Ashmore & 
Jussim, 1997). The fact that the self appears increasingly as the subject of speciai 
syrnposia and associated proceedings (e-g., Ashmore & Jussim, 1997), as the 
topic of books and edited volumes (e-g., Snodgrass & Thompson, 1997; Suls, 
1993), and as the focus of articles in such major publications as the Amual 
Review (Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Markus & Wu* 1987) and the Handbook of 
Child Psvchology (Harter, 1983, 1998) certaidy leaves IittIe doubt that the self 
has become, in accord with James' initial aspirations, a legitimate and integral 
concern for psychological scholanhip. 
Outside the groves of academe, too, and perhaps most conspicuously in 
popular culture, Our fascination with the self proceeds apace. The proliferation 
of self-help texts and technologies, many prornising access to a stronger, deeper, 
more actualized self, clearly suggests this much. In a11 of its protean popular 
guises-as the "child" or "giant" or "hero" within-there is little denying that the 
self has become a focal concem and defining feature of modem Western 
sensibilities, a sort of secular god (Sass, 1992), not to mention the celebrated 
cultural object of a veritable growth industry. 
Working within this rather hospitable climate, psychologists in 
particular have proposed an impressive array of selves, a very partial listing of 
which might include actual, ideal, and ought selves (Higgins, 1987), possible 
selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986), true and faIse selves (Harter, 1997), 
ecological selves (Neisser, 1988), and existential and categoncal selves (Lewis 
& Brooks-Gunn, 1979)-wÏth the latter two variants captured more familiarly 
in the enduring distinction between the "1," or self-as-subject, and the "Me," or 
self-as-object (James, 1950a; Mead, 1934). Equally diverse are the guiding 
metaphors that psychologists have offered in their efforts to define and 
delineate the self In some of the classic writings in the area, for example, we 
find the self being likened to a portion of a Stream (James, 1950a), to a looking 
glass (Cooley, 1902), to a theatrical performance (Goffman, 1959), and to a 
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central region of a Iarger structure (Allport, 196 1). This "fondness for metaphor" 
(Pratkanis & Greenwald, 1985, p. 3 1 1) is no Iess evident on the contemporary 
scene. Among the suggestive metaphors proffered in recent decades are those 
that liken the self to a narrative or story, containing plot, motivation, and 
character development (Gergen & Gergen, 1988; McAdams, 1985); to a theory 
containing postdates that can be appraised in terms of their interna1 consistency, 
hierarchical organization, testability, and parsimony epstein, 1973); to a 
computer or information processor with input, output, and storage capacity 
(Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Markus, 1977); and to a multidimensional galaxy 
(Knowles & Sibicky, 1990). 
With increasing scholarly attention devoted to issues of self and 
identity in the psychological literature, the number of conceptions and 
metaphors proposed for the self is süre to increase, a prospect that is not 
without its critics. Reflecting on this proliferation of selves, one contemporary 
investigator remarks that psychologists seem to "'find' and collect 'selves' 
like ornithologists find strange species of birds. Or . . . like God, they create 
the species (of 'selves') they wish to discover" (Wolf, 1994, p. 128). More 
criticall y, Harré (1 998) argues that contemporary psychological scholarship 
on the self is characterized by much obscurity and confbsion, the multiplicity 
and imprecision of its extant terminology amounting to what he sees as "a 
mass of ambiguities" (p. 1). It is very easy to be sympathetic to such daims. 
The interpretive multiplicity surrounding the self c m  be bewildering and 
ovenvhelming at times, certainly enough to suggest that despite the volumes 
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of literature devoted to its exploration, the basic meaning or definition of the 
se!f remains a subject of contest and consternation-' 
On a more charitable reading, however, it might reasonably be argued 
that the conceptual, metaphoncal, and terminobgical multiplicity in which the 
self is entangled is perhaps less a reflection of theoretical imprecision, 
muddled thinking, or the creative aspirations of individual investigators, than 
a testament to the semantically open and generative character of the term 
"self' itseIf As some have argued, notions Iike self and icientity "point to large, 
amorphous, and changing phenomena that de@ hard and fast definitions" 
(Ashmore & Jussim, 1997, p. 5). Like the pronoun "1," whose meaning and 
referent changes with the various contexts in which it is uttered, so too does 
the meaning of "self' seem to shift, often unpredictably, with its usage in 
different discursive domains-social-scientific, literary, philosophical, folk- 
popular, and so om4 What it means to be a self, moreover, varies both across 
cultural contexts and historically within cultures (e.g., Baumeister, 1997; 
Danziger, 1997). In short, "self' is a term that is so pliable and friendly to 
discursive nuance, so open to cultural-histoncal variation, that it would seem 
to invite precisely the sort of interpretive multiplicity that surrounds it. On yet 
another count, however, perhaps the self s rnultiplicity is only to be expected, 
even warranted, given the richness and diversity of the human experience of 
the world. What more adequate and human way to make sense of this 
experiential complexity than to propose an equally complex array of 
constmcts and metaphors for the self? 
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Toward a Dialoaical Conce~tion of  Self 
It is within the horizon opened up by this rhetorical question that 1 invite the 
reader to consider the airn ar.d content of this dissertation. Given, more 
specifically, that part of the rich and complex human experience of  the world is 
the experience of other selves, this dissertation seeks to unfold a conception of 
the self which, in the spirit of the opening epigraph, &rms the formative role 
of others in the constitution of the seIf 
At first view, and certainly when set forth in such broad strokes, the 
notion that the self is in some measure a social-relational achievement would 
hardly seern to warrant an elaborate defence. The c l a h  that the self is dependent 
on the participation of others for its formation is a familiar one in the present 
intellectual climate, with discussion centring largely on the foms o f  this 
participation (Kharash, 1991). From the time of Baldwin's (1897) early writings 
in the area, according to which consciousness of self was seen to arise in tandem 
with the awareness of and recognition by the other, developmentd theorists- 
whatever their particular intellechial aIIegiances-have acknowledged the 
importance of social relationships to the child's emergent understanding of self. 
Whether we look to investigators drawing on the psychoanalytic tradition (e.g., 
Mahler, 1968), to investigators appealing to stxuctural-developmental principles 
(e.g., Harter, 1988), or to those who approach the subject matter from an 
attachent-theoretical perspective (Bretherton, 199 l), the idea that social 
experience contributes crucially to the formation of a child's sense of self stands 
out as a common, overarching, theme-one that is generally in keeping with 
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Baldwin's early metaphorical daim that just as a river is defined in relation to 
its banks, so too does the self develop in relation to others. 
Despite this recognition of the formative role of social relationships in the 
child's developing sense of self, however, received theories of the ontogeny of 
selihood remain in many respects committed to an individualistic conception of 
self-formation. As Mintz (1995) States, "Despite a rich tradition of thought that 
highlights the self as a relational entity, research in child development has 
historicaIly reflected a highly individualistic notion of the child 's emerging 
u n d e r ~ t ~ d i n g  of self' (p. 6 1). Kharash (1 99 1 )  similarly argues that in the 
context of received psychoIogical theory, the other occupies a rather marginal 
or "disenfianchised position . . . in the conceptual table of ranks" (p. 48). So, 
while existing theories may be attuned to the fact that Our communications with 
others are formative for us, ultirnately their cornmitment to the individual subject 
as the seat and origin of meaning-their reliance, in other words, on a 
"rnonosubject" or "intrasubject" approach (Kharash, 1991)-means that the 
other's contribution to the life of the self is invariably subordinated to the 
individual subject's own self-constituting activity. On such a view, the active role 
of the individual in his or her own self-formation and self-understanding is 
stressed at the expense of the other, who remains "a self-evident background, a 
superfluous satellite of the concept of self that, when the dynamic transformations 
occumng within the 'self are analysed, is inevitably reduced to a parenthetical 
status" (Kharash, 1991, p. 48). And it is in keeping with suck a construal that 
modem psychology has traditionally relied heavily on concepts that seem to be 
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articulated primarily in terrns of  an unrnediated 'present-at-hand' mode of 
engagement with the world and with others, notions like self-efficacy, self- 
esteem, and self-concept being exemplary in this regard (Richardson, Rogers, 
This dissertation represents an effort to rnove beyond this single-subject 
fiamework. More specifically, 1 aim to put forward a view of the self which, 
while acknowledging the activeness of the individual subject in his or her own 
self-formation, recognizes the equally active, formative role of the other in the 
life of the self. 
But what more precisely do we mean by the claim that the other serves 
a formative or constitutive roIe in the life of the self? And why, moreover, 
must the other play such a role? These are two of the central questions that 1 
address in this work. At this point, however, I want to offer an initial 
elaboration of my claims about the constitutive link between self and other. For 
this purpose, 1 draw on an exarnple fiom the literary realrn. Consider, if you 
will, that early scene in Shakespeare's King Lear in which the play's 
eponymous protagonist asks: 
Doth any here know me? This is not Lear: 
Doth Lear walk thus? speak thus? Where are his eyes? 
Either his notion weakens, his discernings 
Are lethargied-Ha! waking? 'tis not so. 
Who is it that can tell me who 1 am? (1. iv. 246-250) 
At the point in the tragedy where he utters these words, Lear seems barely to 
know hirnself, if he is dreaming or awake. Questioningly, he turns to objective 
criteria of his physical and mental existence-to his demeanor, voice, sight, 
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"discernings"-hoping but ultimateiy failing to find in them a reliable due  to 
his identity. His identity no longer outside of doubt or  question, no longer 
complete unto itself, Lear's predicament clearly illustrates an ego in crisis. For 
Lear, this crisis is attendant on what he is being forced to acknowledge about 
himselE that he is but a "shadowY7-as the Fool, Lear's looking-glass, darkly 
reminds him-of a once familiar image of strength and self-possession. He is 
no longer the sovereign that once commanded al1 things. His loss of  power and 
position, both vis-à-vis his subjects and his family, have made him, like a child 
or a rnadman, dependent on the chance and contingent kindness o f  those who 
had once been dependent on him. In his apostrophic plea-"Who is it that can 
tell me who 1 am?"-there is more than a note of infantile desperation, 
however ironically it might be intoned. He no longer knows who he is. His 
authority eclipsed by a growing sense of his own fallibility and finitude, he 
needs others to te11 him who he is, indeed even to confirm that he exists. And 
these others, Lear is forced further to recognire, refuse to be contained in the 
conceptual fiameworks he may have otherwise prepared for them (Bruns, 
1988). They speak to Lear fiom their own peculiar horizons of intelligibility, 
h m  their own sense of the world, and fiom their o m  sense of Lear- Others 
confront him in al1 their irreducible and inescapable otherness, an otherness 
that within the context of the play finds its perhaps most paradigrnatic 
expression in Cordelia's "Nothing, my Lord" (I. i  89).* And it is this otherness, 
for better or worse, which Lear must draw upon for his own self-formation and 
self-understanding. Whether the movement of his identity manifests itself as 
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tragic self-alienation or creative self-realization, the ot her, syco p hant ic or 
sympathetic, is inescapably there, taking up permanent residence in his social 
and psychological worlds. 
Now, gauged fiom the standpoint of the everyday life of the self, Lear's 
predicament cannot help but strike us as truly exceptional, even epic, in its 
scope. It has al1 the markings, too, of what can be described as a hermeneutical 
experience (Bruns, 1988; Gadamer, 1989): the pain of negativity, the 
disappointment of hstrated expectations, the tragic awareness of one's 
tinitude in the face of the othemess that the world offers up to us, and, finally, 
and more positively, the openness to otherness-that is, to fiirther 
experience-that this sobering self-realization occasions. Nlegorically, Lear's 
hermeneutical insight into his own limitations and need for the other seems to 
speak only to those rare moments of personal upheaval and self-loss, to those 
moments when, standing before a mirror, scrutinizing the image before us, we 
find ourselves asking the terrible question: "Who am I??I is in moments Iike 
these, when wrenched out of our habitual, concernfUl engagement with the 
world and with others, that we are most enfeebled, that Our sense of ourselves 
as the source and ongin of meaning is eclipsed by a growing awareness of the 
Iimits and iliusions of self-possession.6 And it is in moments like these, too, 
that our efforts at self-recovery impel us toward others, toward the consolation, 
sympathy, affirmation, and even challenge that others p rov ide in  short, 
toward some point of support outside of ourselves and f?om the standpoint of 
which we might refashion ourselves. '"Finding oneself,"' as Bellah and his 
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colleagues (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985) have noted, "is 
not something one does aione" (p. 85). 
But it is not to highlight what is exceptional in the life of the self that I 
draw on the example of Lear. Rather, it is to point up what remains tnie of the 
self even in its most prosaic, uncomplicated manifestations. I have two points 
in mind here. First, I take in Lear's failure to establish his own sense of his 
existence from objective critena a sign of the fundamental inadequacy at heart 
of self-perception. Our inescapable epistemological predicament is that as 
conscious subjects-and not solely as egos in crisis-we are never fully 
present to or identical with ourselves. Second, and attendant on this inadequacy 
or weakness, we need others to help constitute our sense of self; not only in 
moments of self-loss or self-recovery, but always, we are dependent on the 
other for Our own self-formation. 
In keeping with the theme of these preliminary remarks, this 
dissertation seeks to develop a way of talking about the self that highlights the 
active role and contribution of the other in the demarcation and constitution of 
selfhood. Indeed, this work takes the strong position that one is not able to 
know oneself in any sort of deterrninate way without the interacting presence of 
an other. 1 will argue, accordingly, that the experience of self or identity is a 
dialogical achievement. Our sense of ourselves-our understanding of both who 
we are and we a r e i s  delineated and embodied in our dialogical encounter 
with the other, where, for present purposes, we can take the ''other" to mean the 
m l ,  concrete others that inhabit our lives and with whom we are in 
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communication, or the range of others whose voices and correspondhg values we 
have imbibed and which resonate on the plane of our intemal, self-reflection. On 
the dialogical view, this other, whether physically present o r  absent, real o r  
imagined, concrete or abstract, singular o r  multiple, participates actively and 
constitutively in the determination of our sense of self. 
The Relevance of Mikhail Bakhtin 
In arguing for a dialogicd conception of the seIf, I am guided foremost by the 
writings of the Russian literary theorin and philosopher of language Mikhail 
Bakhtin (1968, 198 1, 1984, 1986, 1990, 1993) and the "Bakhtin Circle" 
(Medvedev & Bakhtin 1978; Volosinov, 198 1, 1986, 1987), in whose work the 
notion of dialogue is developed in unique and wide-ranging ways that touch upon 
ontological, episternological, ethical, linguistic, literary, and psychological 
conte~ts .~  The Iiterary scholar Tzvetan Todorov (1984), arnong the first to 
introduce Bakhtin to the West, prodaims Bakhtin "the most important Soviet 
thinker in the hurnan sciences" (p. ix). As his biographers similarly note, Bakhtin 
has emerged-posthumously-as one of the most important thinkers of the 
twentieth century (CIark & HoZquist, 1984). Whether or not Bakhtin is deserving 
of such acclaim, there is little doubting that his writings, and those of the Bakhtin 
Circle more generally, have had a notable and rapidly increasing impact on a 
number of disciplines within the humanities and social sciences. Though 
Bakhtin's writings have been most widely appropriated by literary theonsts and 
critics (lodge, I 990; Kershner, 1 989; Hermann, 1 989; Macovski, 1 994; Pearce, 
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1994; Vice, 1997), their increasing influence on other academic disciplines is no 
Iess pronounced, a fact that is hardly surprising given the breadth of Bakhtin's 
concerns8 Over the course of his long weer, Bakhtin wrote on a wide array of 
subjects, including ethics and aesthetics, linguistics, historical poetics, literary 
criticism and theory, and the dialogic nature of language. 
Most important to the present work is the fact that many of Bakhtin's 
writings reflect an orientation to human psychology that is especially attuned to 
the ongoing importance of the other in the constitution of self From a Bakhtinian 
standpoint, selfhood is the process and product of the dialogic interplay between 
self and other, and hence is essentially social. Never an in-itself, never an 
accomplishment enabled solely by the self s own primordial materials and 
activities, the experience of self is an event of relatedness. Bakhtin's 
biographers put it in the following terms: "The BaWitinian self is never whole, 
since it can exist only dialogically. It is not a substance or essence in its own right 
but exists only in a tensile relationship with al1 that is other and most important, 
with other selves" (Clark & Holquist, 1984, p. 65)' 
It is important at the outset to consider what a Bakhtinian understanding 
of dialogue entails- Certainly, dialogue is an embracive notion in Bakhtin's 
writings, a key conceptual pivot around which the various facets of his 
philosophy turn. What is also cIear in these writings is that dialogue and 
dialogic relationships speak to "a much broader phenornenon than mere 
rejoinders in a dialogue laid out compositionally in the text" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 
40). Dialogue, in other words, connotes something more than verbal tum- 
12 
taking. Dialogue, writes Bakhtin (1984), is "an almost universal phenornenon, 
permeating al1 hurnan speech and al( relationships and manifestations of 
human l i f e i n  general, everything that has rneaning and significance" (p. 40). 
In its most global sense, then, we might Say that Bakhtin's "dialogism" reflects 
an epistemology and an ontology, a broad philosophical perspective on the 
nature of knowIedge and human existence. 
Dialogism is also a feature of Bakhtin's philosophy of language, and it 
is in this context that two parîicular senses of dialogue-often confiated in 
Bakhtin's own writings-can be discemed (Hirschkop, 1986; Morson, 1986). 
More specifically, dialogue is both the natural condition or being of Ianguage 
as such and a particular stance toward the other's discourse. In the first sense- 
as a description of language-dialogism holds that any individual utterance is 
dialogic in that it is inescapably implicated in a web of sociality, consisting in 
part of the previous and anticipated words of others on the subject at hand. 
Accordingly, under this definition, monologue is impossible: the speaker (or 
writer) is never the sole author of his or her utterance. In contrast, dialogism in 
the second sense, that is, as "a particular discursive stance of speakers" 
(Morson, 1986, p. 83), does admit the possibility of monologue. Within this 
second sense, it is useful to make a further distinction between a practical and 
an ethical dialogical stance. First, dialogue can represent an individual's more 
or less conscious practical stance or disposition toward the words of others-a 
stance of agreement, disagreement, polemic, resistance, and so forth. Second, 
dialogue may suggest a more expressly ethical stance toward the other's word: 
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a conscious openness or willingness to engage in dialogue, a willingness to 
Iisten to what the other has to say. In this Iatter sense, dialogue is a normative 
notion, a stance worth advocating-an ethical imperative, if you will. Each of 
these senses of d i a logueas  a descriptive notion, and as a practical and ethical 
stance toward the other-will be relevant to my efforts to set forth a dialogical 
conception of the self 
In the remainder of this introduction, 1 provide an overview of the 
dissertation's general itinerary and a broad sketch of the major themes and 
conclusions that are treated in greater detail in the ensuing chapters. 
Chapter Overview 
As Bakhtinian clairns about the dialogical nature of the self are inscribed 
within a particular philosophical understanding of knowledge, subjectivity, and 
language, it is important to begin my exposition of Bakhtin's work by 
elaborating this understanding. 1 approach this task, first, by pursuing a via 
neeativa, that is, by describing elernents of the modem philosophical tradition 
that are antithetical to the dialogical fiamework. More specifically, Chapter 1 
examines several aspects of the epistemological individualism that 
charactenzes the modernist philosophical project: its privileging of the 
epistemic activities of the individual subject; its denial or devalorization o f  this 
subject's reliance on the other in the quest for knowledge; and its adherence to 
a representational, instrumental view of language and communication, a view 
which in effect reinforces the individualistic conception of the subject at the heart 
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of the modemist tradition. Following this exposition of the modemist 
philosophical enterprise, 1 consider some of the ways that modernkt assumptions 
about the individual subject, the other, and language are reflected in 
contemporary portrayals of subjectivity and the sefc and most notably in those 
informed by the Piagetian, stnictural-developmental explanatory framework 
As an epistemological fiamework, Bakhtin's dialogism presents an 
alternative to the modernist view. One of the purposes of Chapter 2, 
accordingly, is to elaborate a dialogical conception of knowledge, according to 
which knowledge is an inescapably social phenornenon, something that 
transpires between people and that does not reside exclusiveiy, as the 
modernists argued, within the confines of an individual mind. Part of this 
discussion will entai1 unfolding a conception of subjectivity that acknowledges 
the constitutive significance of the other for our perception of the world and 
our selves. As 1 wiIl argue, Bakhtin's subject is not a self-present subject that 
establishes its own faundations for knowledge, but rather a dialogic subject, 
one who finds and achieves a provisional and dynamic meaning in interaction 
with and reliance upon others. In keeping with this conception, Chapter 2 also 
establishes the constitutive importance of language for human subjectivity. On 
Bakhtin's social ontology, the self is not conceived as some core, imer essence 
that exists prior to communicative practice and that is merely expressed or 
brought to the surface in speech. Rather, both selfhood and subjectivity are 
constrained, shaped, and enabled by linguistic-communicative practices. 
Accordingly, the dialogical view presupposes a conception of subjectivity as a 
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linguistically constituted prclcess of inner speech. In short, it is in and through 
our individual use of language that we corne to know and constitute ourselves 
as selves and that our self-relevant experience cornes to assume a specificity of 
form and meaning. 
Bakhtin's dialogism finds its most specific expression in his approach to 
language. Indeed, one of the most unique aspects of the Bakhtinian view is that 
its claims about the social, dialogical nature of the self are inscribed in a 
rigorously dialogical approach to language and communication. As 1 intimated 
above, this approach suggests that any individual use of language necessarily 
implicates the other, and more specifically, the word or discourse cf the other- 
Language use is always a social affair. Chapter 3 elaborates these claims in some 
detail by considering Bakhtin's metalinguistic theory of the utterance. Arnong the 
more specific themes to be addressed in this chapter are the "eventness" OF the 
utterance, the constitutive import for the individual utterance of the pior and 
acticipated words or discourse of others, the function of "speech genres" as social 
constraints on the individual use of language, and the "superaddressee" (or ideal 
listener) as a defining feature of the individual utterance. 
One of the guiding assurnptions of this dissertation is that the nature and 
vicissitudes of the self parallel those of the utterance. Accordingly, Chapter 4 
charts out some of the more specific implications of Balditin's theory of the 
utterance for a dialogical conception of the self. In addition to elaborating a 
conception of the self as an unrepeatable event of meaning, and as an event 
that, like the utterance, implicates both the previous and anticipated utterances 
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of others and assumes particular generic foms, Chapter 4 will include an 
extended discussion of ontological significance (for the self) of the other's 
(addressee's) recognition. 1 argue that the other's recognition (response) heIps 
to establish one's sense of self as a determinate entity. Drawing on literary and 
everyday examples, 1 also pursue the implications for the self o f  the lack of the 
other's responsive understanding. Finally, the function of the superaddressee is 
also reconsidered in light of the fùndamental hurnan need for recognition. 
In Chapter 5, critical aspects of the diaIogica1 view of self are brought 
fùrther into relief through a comparative analysis of the writings of  Bakhtin and 
George Herbert Mead. I argue that while both theorists espouse a social ontology 
that stresses the relation between self and other as it defines and manifests itself 
in human communication, oniy the Bakhtinian conception of dialogue, and of 
inner dialogue in particular, recognizes the enduring importance of the othemess 
of the other for the communicative process of self-formation. Among the more 
specific features of a Bakhtinian approach to dialogue that distinguish it from the 
Meadian view are its emphasis on difference as an enabling condition for 
dialogue; its resistance to formulations which see dialogue as a dialectical process 
that tends progressively toward the eradication of otherness; its depiction of the 
self s multiplicity as a non-systemic, aggregate of voices in interaction; and its 
provision of an account of the intemalization process that preserves the sense of 
the particularity, and hence the otherness, of the voices that popuiate our inner 
speech. 
In what is perhaps the most "applied" moment of the dissertation, Chapter 
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6 explores the analytic, methodological potentiaf of the dialogical framework 
through an examination of the autobiographical utterances of three children. 
Upon describing the nature and content of these self-relevant utterances from the 
vantage point of the structural-developmental framework, they are reconsidered 
in light o f  sorne of the ideas and assumptions associated with the Bakhtinian 
dialogical perspective. More specifically, this chapter examines the social origins 
of children's self-utterances and, drawing on Bakhtin's typology of novelistic 
discourse, reconsiders the three verbal self-portraits in terms of the degree to 
which they are "double-voiced" or betray an active orientation to the other's 
discourse. 
Moving beyond a conception of dialogue as an ontological given-that is, 
as a phenornenon that describes what invariably happens in human 
communication-Chapter 7 explores the moral or normative dimensions of 
dialogue. 1 argue that dialogue, and hence the dialogical self, may be understood 
not only as a description of what we invariably are, but also as an image of what 
we should be. Accordingly, one of rny major aims in this chapter is to delineate a 
pôrticuIar valorized way of engaging the word of the other. Toward this end, 1 
have occasion to consider Bakhtin's distinction between authoritative and 
internally persuasive discourse, a distinction that speaks to the ways we 
experience others' words and voices in our verbal consciousness. As authoritative 
discourse is a less valorized category than internally persuasive discourse, 1 also 
spend some time considering the conditions that might support the erosion of a 
word's authoritativeness, and thaf wrrespondingly, might facilitate a dialogical 
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sensibility vis-à-vis the other's discourse. 
1 conclude the dissertation with a brief discussion of the utility of 
Bakhtin's dialogism as a metatheoretical discourse for developmental 
psychology. More specifically, 1 argue that by virtue of its reliance on a temporal 
fi-amework that highlights the unpredictability and eventness of existence, 
dialogism has implications for how we conceptualire the nature of change; how 
we understand the vicissitudes of individual development and the question of 
"maturity" or "adulthood;" how we conceive ofthe role of the past in the 
development of sele and how we envision the relation between individual and 
cultural-historkal development. 
CHAPTER 1 
MONOLOGUES OF MODERNlTY 
The dialogical account of the self proposed in the present work rests on an 
epistemoIogica1 and ontoIogica1 fiamework that acknowledges the constitutive 
significance of linguistic communication in the acquisition of knowledge and 
formation of subjectivity. This fiamework argues that it is in our communicative, 
diaiogic encounters with others that Our knowledge of the world is formed and 
transformed and that subjectivity itself cornes to assume a cognitively 
determinate shape. In its claims regarding the social nature of subjectivity and the 
role of language (qua communication) in its constitution, this dialogical view is at 
odds with some of the most fundamental tenets of the modem philosophical 
tradition as it finds expression fiom Descartes through to Kant. Pursuing the y& 
neeativa, this chapter examines elements of this philosophical tradition that 
diverge from Bakhtinian daims about knowledge, subjectivity, and language. 
More specifically, it considers the epistemic prionty accorded the self-suficient 
individual subject in modem philosophical thought, the image of the other to 
which this pnviieging gives rise, and the view of Ianguage that both reflects and 
reinforces the modem subject's presumed self-suficiency. Following this 
exposition of the modernist view, 1 consider how these related philosophical 
commitments are played out in contemporary psychological analyses of the self, 
and in particular in those informed by Piagetian, structural-developmental 
pnnciples. 
The Monolorric "I" 
The modern philosophical tradition, which 1 here associate with the foundational 
projects of Descartes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, upholds a monological 
conception of knowledge and consciousness. Such a conception is reflected more 
specifically in the modernist cornmitment to "epistemological individualism," a 
philosophical doctrine which "asserts that the source of knowledge lies within the 
individual" (Lukes, 1973, p. 107). However diverse and conflicting the 
epistemologies and philosophies of mind articulated by these central modern 
figures, they converge in their assumption that epistemological problems are to be 
framed in terms of how the individual, in and of himself (or herself), can 
construct and know the world. The general assumption is that lcnowable aspects 
of the world are inscribed into consciousness in the forrn of mental contents or 
structures that, in effect, consitute the only immediate, self-present objects of 
knowledge. Accordingly, it argues that human knowledge of the world must take 
the analysis of the contents of the individual human mind or consciousness as its 
starting point. This tradition, in short, is one that sees knowledge as the product of 
the workings of a single, self-contained, self-sufficient, and unified 
consciousness. 
Descartes and the Co&o. René Descartes, the c'godfathei' of 
philosophical modemity, laid much of the groundwork for this individualistic 
epistemological orientation. Indeed, Descartes' innovation consisted precisely in 
his posing the problem of knowledge firmly in terms of the categories of a 
unified individual subjectivity. The prirriacy that Descartes accordeci the 
individual subject was parîicularly evident in the conclusions he reached in the 
course of his methodical efforts to secure indubitabIe foundations for the new 
science of Gaiileo. Using the so-cdled method of doubt, Descartes set out to 
"reject as if absolutely false everything in which Che] could imagine the least 
doubt" (1988, p. 36).1° For Descartes, this amounted to a rejection of the evidence 
of his senses, and al1 the beliefs and opinions founded upon either them or his 
upbringing, including, most notably, the otherwise comrnon sense belief that he 
was embodied in the material universe. Descartes articulates this Iofty effort to 
wipe the slate clean and establish a new, certain foundation for knowledge, in one 
place, in the following terms: 
1 will now shut my eyes, stop my ears, and withdraw al1 rny senses. 1 
will eliminate fiom my thoughts al1 images of bodily things. . . -1  will 
converse with myself and scrutinize rnyself more deeply; and in this 
way I will attempt to achieve, little by little, a more intimate knowledge 
of myself. (1988, pp. 86-87) " 
Descartes believed that his foundationalist aspirations were ultimately 
achieved by appealing to intemal mental processes. More specifically, in the 
course of his methodical doubting, Descartes concluded that he could not doubt 
his own existeocehis 1-for the very act of doubting, he reasoned, entailed that 
existence: cogito. erg0 sum (1 think, therefore 1 am) was his celebrated 
conclusion. As to the nature of this indubitable 1, Descartes claimed that it was in 
essence a thing that ttiinks (res cogitans): "A thing that doubts, understands, 
affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory 
perceptions" (1988, p. 83).12 The bcdy, on this account, was part of the material 
world (-s_-ellsa), a substance distinct fiom that of mind or reason, and hence 
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ultimateIy inessential to his self-definition. It was the self-conscious and self- 
present thinking mind, a mind possessed of an intenority that distinguished it 
from al1 else in the world, which was to be the pnvileged and indubitable starting 
point for philosophic and scientific inquiry.'3 Endowed by a non-deceiving God 
with innate knowledge of essences and of findamental principles used in the 
interpretation of experience, the individual subject could know the world and 
itself reliably, directly, and incontestably from within. Through its own 
primordial resources, the individual subject could form clear and precise ideas 
about the extemal world, ideas whose conformity to truth was guaranteed 
precisely by their intelligibility to the individuai, that is, by their self-evidence. 
For Descartes, as for those who inherited his legacy, the subject is 
primarily a subject of representations, a thinker of thoughts. The subject's 
acquaintance with objective reality, on this view, is indirect: the subject makes 
contact with this reality only through the mediation of the mental contents and 
structures housed in consciousness and which, in effect, constitute its only 
immediate objects of knowledge. In this respect, the Cartesian subject is a self- 
contained centre of consciousness. It inhabits a bounded, imer realm of 
representations that constitute its only source of contact with the external world. 
On the Cartesian account, therefore, the mind's access to reality requires that the 
latter become an object of thought, a process that can be "constmed as the 
mentalization of the world: the translation of the object into an intnnsically 
representational mental medium" @akhurst, 199 1, p. 205). Taylor (1 99 1) 
articulates a similar sentiment in his description of the self-contained modem 
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subject: 
This subject is a monological one. She or he is in contact with an 
ccoutside" world, including other agents, the objects she or he and they 
deai with, his or her own and others' bodies, but this contact is through the 
representations she or he has "within." The subject is frst of al1 an 
"inner" space, a "mind?" to use the old terminology, or a mechanism 
capable of processing representations, if we follow the more fashionable 
computer-inspired models of today. The body, other people, may form the 
content of my representations. They may also be causally rasponsible for 
some of these representations. But what 'T' am, as a being capable of 
having such representations, the inner space itself, is definable 
independently ofbody or other. (Taylor, 1991, p. 307). 
Locke's Ideas. To be sure, empiricists such as Locke presented a 
challenge to the Cartesian framework More specifically, in contrast to the 
rationalism of Descartes, Locke (1997) derived an inductive philosophy of mind 
which claimed that it was expenence that furnished the mind with ideas. The 
information received fiom our senses was basically tnistworthy, capable of 
presenting us with a reliable version of the external world. Of course, this 
emphasis on sensory experience as the foundation of knowledge presented a 
challenge to Descartes' view that Our howledge was the product of the mind's 
inherent content and activity, with Locke asserting instead that the mind was at 
birth a tabula rasp an "empty cabinety' or "white pape? containing no ideas. 
However, like Descartes, Locke posited that the fundamental basis of 
knowledge was the individual subiect's conscious "ideas" of th ing~ . '~  With this 
emphasis on ideas, Locke, like Descartes before him, embraced a representational 
theory of perception (Hamlyn, 1 987) wherein the mind is established as an 
interior domain of mental contents which map ont0 the extemal world. In his 
consideration of the specific ways in which individual expenence furnishes the 
mind with ideas, Locke appropriated the subjedimer-objecvouter distinction 
popularized by Descartes. For Locke, sensation and reflection-corresponding to 
the object and subjea poles, respectively-were the two "fountains of 
knowledge, fiom whence al1 the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring7' 
(1997, p. 109).15 Sensation is the means by which the senses "from extemal 
objects convey into the mind what produces there those perce~tions" (p. 1 10).16 
Throligh sensation, "we corne by those ideas, we have of yellow. white. heat 
cold. sofi. hard, bitter. sweet, and al1 those which we cal1 sensible qualities" (p. 
109).17 On the other hand, there is reflection, that is, "the perception of the 
operations of our own minds within us" (p. 110)" which provides us with Our 
ideas of those operations (e.g., perception, thinking, doubting, etc). 'This source 
of ideas," writes Locke, "every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not 
sense, as having nothing to do with extemal objects; yet it is very Iike it, and 
might properly enough be called intemal sense" (p. 1 10). l9 Hence, while 
devising an account of knowledge that, in contrast to Descartes' view, paid more 
attention to the extemaVobject pole of the dichotomy, the dichotomy itself, the 
language of inner and outer, and the ontological asnimption it carried, remained 
uncontested in the Lockean paradigrn.20 
Subiectivitv in Kantian Pers~ective. Although Descartes certaidy 
established the I as an epistemological centre of awareness, it was in the writings 
of Immanuel Kant, and most notably in his Critique of pure reason, t hat the 
glorification of the Cartesian 1 reached its apotheosis. Kant (1997) radically 
transformed the problem of knowledge b y establis hing a synthesis of rationalist 
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and empiricist doctrines which, in effect, undermined them both. While, in accord 
with the empiricist thesis, he acknowtedged the role of sensory experience, 
granting that there is no knowledge without such experience, he affirmed that it 
does not therefore follow that it arises out of experience alone. Kant differed fiom 
both his rationalist and empiricist predecessors in his provision of a radicaily 
transcendental basis for the claims of human subjectivity. Kant emphasized the 
mind's inherent capacity to impose form and structure on experience. The rnind 
was able to accomplish this task by way of a systern of a priori mental structures 
or "categories of understanding" which, derived from traditional logic, included 
such things as space, time, quality, quantity, and reIation. On Kant's view, the 
nature of  the world we know is an active construction of the mind, every 
perception bearing the imprint of the mind's inherent stntauring capacity. One 
implication of this is that we can never know things in their own reality, things in 
and of  themselves. This "noumenal world," as Kant put it, cannot be known 
precisely because al1 knowledge is mediated by the constructive, form-imparting 
activity of the mind. Reality is always qualified: it is reality of the "phenomenal 
world," reality as we experience and know if that is, as it is represented to us 
through the senses and structured by the categories of understanding. For 
example, expenencing the world in terms of objects situated in space and time, or 
discerning causal relations between events in the world, are activities that result 
not fkom the way reality is in fact stnictured but in the possibilities for knowing 
that inhere in the structures of our mind. In short, the order we find in the world 
is the order we impose on it by way of innately given ways of understanding. 
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In asserting that the Nnd imparts to experience the very properties in 
virtue of which it is accessible to us, Kant raised the primacy of subjectivity to a 
new Ievel. As we saw earlier, for Descartes the clarity and distinctness of 
perception which he sought to attain with regard to ideas were believed to reflect 
the order that inhered in the things themselves. On his account, although we, as 
thinking beings, can know ourselves more easily and clearly than the corporeal 
world, a clezr and distinct understanding of the latter, via the intellect, is ail1 
possible given the existence of a veracious God who is responsible for the ideas 
that we have. In Kant there is a more radical severing of minci from nature and 
the cosmic order than is found in Descartes, with cognition now seen to (CO- 
)originate in the constructive or knowledge-constitutive capacities of rational 
consciousness. With Kant, we move away from concems about the validity of 
perceptions, to concerns about the nature and structure of those perceptions and 
of the perceiving agent. 
Modernitv7s Other 
The fate of the other within the modemist epistemological framework is in many 
respects already inscribed in the tendency to fiame the problem of knowledge in 
terrns of what the individual can know or construct on his or her own. In the 
following section, 1 explore this claim in greater detail by examining the attitude 
toward the other reflected in the writings of Descartes, Locke, Rousseau, and 
Kant, 
Descartes' Solitary Knower. Descartes' individualistic epistemology 
encourages the view that if 1 am to understand, 1 must understand for myself; or, 
as Descartes puts it, "no one can conceive sornething so well, and make it his 
own, when he iearns it fiom someone eIse as when he discovers it himself' 
(1988, p. 5 I ) . ~ '  The individualistic ethos in Descartes' work is no less evident in 
the comments he offers his readers regarding the value and virtues of individual 
invention. He wrïtes, for example, 
that there is not usually so much perfection in works composed of several 
parts and produced by various different crafismen as in the works of one 
man. Thus we see that buiIdings undertaken and completed by a single 
architect are usually more attractive and better planned than those which 
several have tried to patch up by adapting old waIls built for different 
purposes. (1988, p. 2512' 
One must, in short, establish one's own foundations for knowledge, not someone 
else's. Descartes enjoins us to be self-reliant in Our thinking. Our capacity to heed 
this injunction, as we have seen, tends to be presented "less as an ideal than as 
something that is already established in our constitution . . . [a] reification of the 
disengaged first-person-singular self' (Taylor, 1991, p. 307). The Cartesian ego 
is, after all, present to itself as a pure extensionless consciousness with no 
constitutive ties to the other (to Ianguage, culture, or community). "Tt is a center 
of monologkal consciousness" (TayIor, 1991, p. 307). One could argde, 
accordingly, that Descartes rejected dialogue between people in favour of self- 
examination and self-questioning as the ground of truth. Descartes' theatre of 
the mind is filled with spectators and not interlocutors. f i s  epistemology is 
founded not on dialogue but on the inspection by the eye of an 1 of the world. 
As a Cartesian subject, what 1 know and who 1 essentially am can be explained 
without reference to other subjects. 
Reason and the Enliahtenment Suppression of the ~ t h e r . ~ ~  Though 
Descartes is not typically seen in terms of his imrnediate influence on the 
Enlightenment project-that roIe is more often ascribed to Locke-the 
Enlightenrnent's ideal of reason and its insistence on a universal, inherently 
rational human nature certainly hearkens back to central aspects of Cartesian 
thought, and particdarly to its findamental individualisrn. The Edightenment 
dream of escaping dogrnatic metaphysics and the influence of tradition, dong 
with its related airn of grounding al1 knowIedge in pure, unprejudiced reason, is 
premised on the radical self-reliance and epistemic autonomy accorded to the 
individual subject. Of course, in view of its more explicitly empincist 
cornmitments, Enlightenrnent thinking may have cast the Cartesian injunction to 
"think for oneself' in terms of a metaphor more appropriate to the age: rather 
than trust others (our teachers, say), we rnust sec for ourselves. Moreover, 
although Enlightenment thinkers reaffirmed the propriety of Descartes' search for 
an absolute epistemological starting point purged of al1 presupposed belief or 
opinion, in other respects the Enlightenment was a reaction against Descartes 
(Cassirer, 1951). RecaIl that Descartes' subjective 1 that could not be doubted 
knew the world and itself according to divinely implanted innate ideas. From 
an Enlightenment standpoint, such theological appeals continued to betray the 
constraints of dogma in matters of knowing, constraints which the 
EnIightenment saw as inimical to truth. Enlightenrnent thought was more 
explicit and unrelenting than Descartes in the urgency and optimism with which 
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it heralded humanity's emancipation frorn religious superstition through the 
~ ~ O ~ O U S  exercise of a universal human reason. 
Locke's Diseneaaed Sub-iect. Iust as Descartes argued that seeing the 
world and ourselves clearly and distinctly required a prior (methodical) 
disengagement from our normal way of expenencing the world, so too did 
Locke's Enlightenment view propose that we must overcome the influences of 
passion, custom, and authority-what we have uncriticaily learned fiom others 
in the course of living in the world-if we are to satis% Our aspirations to 
tmth. And with Descartes, Locke argued that knowledge is not valid unless 
fashioned through one's own methodical efforts, as the following passage from 
his Essav suggests: 
For, 1 think, we may as rationally hope to see with other men's eyes, as 
to know by other men's understandings. So much as we our selves 
consider and comprehend of tmth and reason, so much we possess of 
real and true knowledge. The floating of other men's opinions in our 
brains, makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to 
be true. What in them was science, is in us but [opinionatedness], 
whilst we give up our assent onIy to reverend names, and do not, as 
they did, ernploy Our own reason to understand those truths, which gave 
them reputation. (1997, p. 1 0 5 ) ~ ~  
So while it is certainly tme that Descartes and Locke arrive at different 
conceptions of knowledge-Descartes locating its origins in the self-evidence of 
methodical reflection and Locke in the realrn of sensory experience-it is clear 
that each adheres to the belief that the path toward scientific truth is ultimately 
one that the individual subject must traverse alone. No less than in Descartes' 
stance, Locke's epistemology and psychology is premised on an "ideal of 
independence and sel f-responsibility" (Taylor, 1989, p. 67). Moreover, each 
agrees that the ability to comprehend the truth about the world for ourselves is 
something built into our very natures. For neither thinker is reason, nor the truth it 
brings to Iight, to be regarded as a necessarily collaborative, interlocative 
phenornena, something that exists and is constituted in the space of 
communicative practice. Indeed, on the rnodernist view espoused by Descartes 
and Locke, thinking is rationai oniy when it is premised on our detachment both 
from others and £kom Our habitual engagements with the world (Taylor, 1989) .~~ 
Rousseau: Reclaiming: Our Natures. In keeping with the individualistic 
epistemology of the rationalist-empincist tradition, the eighteenth century in 
particular is replete with images of solitary figures, of lone wanderers developing 
"naturally" in some iocale free of cultural influence-on a deserted island 
perhaps. Defoe's Robinson Crusoe, of course, comes to mind here. In him we 
find the paradigrnatic c'solitary man" who, living in the state of nature, f5ee of the 
concems and demands of the civilized world, has the lone preoccupation of 
assunng his own preservation. Perhaps more than any other Enlightenment 
thinker, Rousseau steadfastly prornoted this image of human self-sufficiency, 
erecting around it a detailed history of the human species (Rousseau, 1986) and, 
later, a pedagogical Bildun~sroman (Rousseau, 1979a). Rousseau's 
autobiographical wntings (Rousseau, 1953, 1979b), too, stress the essential 
goodness that is to be found in self-sufficiency, a goodness potentially 
disfigured by the ills and artifices of modern society. Through detachment, 
however, one could rediscover inner peace and tranquillity, contentment, and a 
natural expansiveness and love of others. Similarly, as far as knowledge was 
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concerned, one could only trust oneself. In true Cartesian fashion, Rousseau 
argued that i t  was not through Socratic discourse with others but through 
monological introspection-through solitary, reflection-filled walks in the 
woods-that tmth could be revea~ed.'~ Indeed, it was precisely during one of 
his solitary expeditions through the woods of St. Germaine that Rousseau 
(1979b) discovered-in a sort of epiphanic insight-what he called the 
cc~entiment of existence," a sense of one's being that he describes in the 
following terms: 
What do we enjoy in such a situation? Nothing extemal to ourselves, 
nothing if not ourselves and Our own existence. As long as this state 
lasts, we are suficient unto ourselves, like God. The sentiment of 
existence, stnpped of any other ernotion, is in itself a precious 
sentiment of contentment and of peace which alone would suffice to 
make this existence dear and sweet to anyone able to spum al1 the 
sensual and earthly impressions which incessantly come to distract us 
fiom it and to trouble its sweetness here-beIow. (p. 69) 
Rousseau understood this "sentiment of existence" not psychologically, that is, 
not as a mere feeling or particular experience, but rather metaphysically, that 
is, as something that actually revealed and constituted Our true being and in 
which resided the source of our authentic happiness. Like the Cartesian cogito 
OC '1 think," Rousseau's sentiment of existence was suprernely indubitable, but 
it was also much more fundamental than Descartes' "1." More specifically, 
Rousseau's epiphany contained a simple truth: somehow a person existed not 
through his or her relation to God, nor through our social relations with others, 
nor even-as Descartes would have it-through a relation to some defining 
essence (such as thinking), but rather through a direct, unmediated relation to 
oneself. What defines our being most definitively and indubitably is precisely 
this self-presence and self-sufficiency. In the sentiment o f  existence, we sense 
what is most authentic about ourselves: namely, that each of us is an integral, 
self-defining subject; that each of us is the self-contained, self-enclosed source 
of his o r  her own happiness (Solomon, 1988). 
In his educational treatise, Emile, Rousseau (1979a) offers a pedagogical 
mode1 whose aims are consistent with this philosophy of natural self-reliance. Iri 
the writings of many Enlightenment thinkers (most notably the French 
philosophes), early education came to be seen as a practice that filled the mind 
with stubborn prejudices (Schouls, 1989). Moreover, it was agreed that this 
bondage to prejudice was unnatural. The pedagogical implication ofthis belief 
was that a child might, if allowed to develop "naturally," achieve a capacity for 
thinking that was uncorrupted by the impositions of civilized exper ience  
unburdened, that is, by a dependence on the opinions, recognition, and example 
of others. It is no wonder, then, that Etnile, the eponyrnous protagonist of 
Rousseau's educational novel, was to be raised and educated in a manner that 
would protect hirn fiom the corrupting ifluences of civilized society and 
preserve in him the independence and self-sufficiency that was in any case part of 
his natural inheritance. " AS Rousseau (1979a) put if the goal of Emile's 
education was "the very same as that of nature" (p. 38), that is, "to rais[e] a man 
for himself' (p. 39). In the countryside, isolated from his peers and from 
teachers, and through the carefully plotted "lessons" of his tutor and a guiding 
plan of "negative education," Emile would l e m  to stay within himselt to think 
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for hirnself, to depend only on things but not on others, and in this way would, 
upon his eventual entry into the social world, be immunized against the vice- 
engenderïng features of modern, civilized society. 
Dare to Know: Kant's Motto for Enlightenment. Given that Kant read and 
admired Rousseau, it is not surprising to find in his writings a similar emphasis 
on the Enlightenrnent ideal of  self-reliance. Indeed, he defines a conception of 
Bildune, or self-formation, that reflects precisely this ideal. In his essay, "An 
Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" he offers the following view: 
Enlightenment is man's emeraence from his seIf-imposed immaturitv. 
Immattirity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance 
fforn another. This immatunty is self-imposed when its cause lies not in a 
lack of understanding, but in a lack of resolve and courage to use it 
without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! pare to know!]: "Have 
courage to use your own understanding!"-that is the motto of 
enlightenment. (1 983, p. 4 1) 
As this passage suggests, Kant's version of the Enlightenment project is one that 
stresses Our liberation from self-incurred tutelage, and more generally from any 
kind of extemal constraint-social, political, traditi~nar~." Matunty is defined as 
a critical, self-determining stance, a stance that suggests a sdf-transparency (of 
self-reflection) in the ability to bracket off habit and custom. Ln enjoining us to 
have the courage to "think for ourselves," Kant is urging us not to be  led by 
extemal authority, to look within for the standard of truth. And the ever-present 
possibility of doing so inheres, according to Kant, in the fact that we are by 
nature, if not by habit, autonomous, rational selves, selves whose existence is 
logically pnor to interpersonal relationships, to cultural traditions, and to the 
social collective we inhabit. What Kant's view ultimately suggests is that as 
rational selves we are ready-made, and social-communicative existence is in no 
way constitutive or enabling of subjectivity. Kant's stance is therefore one of 
abstract individualism, one that fai 1s to acknowledge the constitutive 
importance of people's embeddedness in communities and cultures. For Kant, 
this cultural situatedness-the specific demands and commitments of social 
life-is appraised largely as the source of extemally imposed constraints, 
constraints which, while not fatal for the individual subject's autonomy, stand 
only to compromise and obscure the ineluctable freedorn we inherently possess 
as rational beings-a fieedom we always stand to reclaim, again, if we only have 
the strength and courage to do soW2' 
By way of this all-too-brief and partial sketch, I hope to have shown how 
the modern philosophical enterprise orients us to a conception of the individual 
cognizing a d o r  feeling subject as the uitimate source, master, and arbiter of 
meaning, value, and authenticity. The monological, self-contained self that 
emerges in the writings of Descartes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant is a self that 
enjoys an epistemic transparency to itself and that, correspondingly, owes 
nothing or ought not owe anything to the other for its own constitution and 
understanding of the world. Neither the meaning of the world nor of my own 
essential identity is, on this view, something that exists in or is fashioned out of 
my communicative encounters with others. As Dunne (1 995) summarizes the 
implications of the modem perspective, "1 can never corne to discover or 
realize myself in a new way through interaction with the other; for I am 
already securely given to myself as my self prior to interaction and al1 that can 
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be at stake in the latter is success or  faiiure in realizing my antecedently 
established ends" (p. 139)." Indeed, the modem subject exists at least ideally, 
in a state of disengagement from the sociaI world, its freedom and rationality 
defined crucially and precisely by such disengagement (Taylor, 1989). 
Lanmage and Communication in Modem Perspective 
Supporting the epistemological individual ism of the modernist views is a 
particular conception of language and communication. As 1 argue below, it is a 
conception that reaffi~rms the pnmacy or sovereignty of the individual subject 
and that reinforces the isolation of selves fiom one another and of the self fi-om 
what, in effect, is its own essence (see Chapter 2). 
We have seen that part of the legacy of Cartesian thinking requires that 
the individual subject's intentions, plans, and ideas be transparent to itself. 
Experience, truth, or meaning is laid bare in thoughts or intuitions offered up 
directly or self-presently to subjectivity. The "clear and distinct" ideas of 
which Descartes writes are not mediated by or  refracted through the lens of 
social signiQing practices, nor are they inhabited by the words and voices of 
others. On the Cartesian view, Ianguage is but a neutral, transparent medium 
with which to describe the inner world of ideas, a means of externaking 
thoughts contained in an othewise nonlinguistic cogito. As Descartes himself 
puts it, "Whenever 1 express something in words, and understand what I am 
saying, this very fact makes it certain that there is within me an idea of what is 
signified by the words in question" (1985, p. 1 13). 
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This conception of language, while barely intimated in the writings of 
Descartes, receives a substantial elaboration in Locke's (1997) Essav. For 
Locke and the empiricists, as for Descartes, the basis of knowledge is the 
individüal's "ideas" of things. These ideas, whether derived fiom sensory 
experience or, as for Descartes, Eorn the mind's stockpile of innate ideas, are 
the mind's only immediate objects. And for rationalists and ernpiricists alike, 
words are seen simply to hnction as external signs or labels of thesr 
essentially non-linguistic intemal conceptions or ideas. Language, in short, is 
conceived as standing in a purely externaf and ancillary relation to thougtit. 
Again, the purpose of words and language is simply to represent (re-present), 
with as little corfision as possible, a speaker's ideas.)' 
Allied to this modem conception cf language is a particular view of the 
communicative process. This process is understood by Locke as one involving 
the conveyance of ideas from one mind to another. "When a man speaks to 
another," writes Locke, "it is, that he rnay be understood; and the end of speech 
is, that those sounds, as marks, rnay make known his ideas to the hearef' (1997, 
p. 364).32 Moreover, if words are to serve this communicative fùnction 
effectively, it is 
necessary . . . that they excite, in the hearer, exactly the same idea, they 
stand for in the mind of the speaker. Without this, men fil1 one another's 
heads with noise and sounds; but convey not thereby their thoughts, and 
lay not before one another their ideas, which is the end of discourse and 
language. (1997, p. 426)." 
This notion that communication is an act of individuals sharing thoughts is, at 
least according to the estimation of one commentator (Peters, 1989), a notion 
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invented by Locke. 1t is also a notion that inforrns Rousseau's own discussion of 
language and communication (Rousseau, 1953, 1986). For Rousseau, as for 
Locke, the aim of communication is seIf-expression and the reduplication of a 
spoken o r  written idea in the mind of another person. The point of a spoken 
message is ultimately to make of the other a sort of double. For neither o f  these 
modem thinkers does the communicative moment pIay a constitutive or  
formative role in the life of the idea or feeling. The communicative ideal 
upheld by these and other modem thinkers is one that accords primacy to the 
independent, self-suEcient speaker (to his or her preexisting ideas, feelings, 
and so forth). Accordingly, language use is conceived as a monological act, as 
an act govemed by the communicative intentions of a single person: the 
speaker. 
The Weakness of  the Logos. To reiterate, on the modern view language 
is of little epistemological import, existing simply in the service of 
representing and communicating ideas. As it occupies the realm of the social, 
however, language is also the potential site of the distortion and corruption of 
the idea, a potential source of aIienation from otherwise unspoken, 
immediately given ideas and feelings. A weakness inheres in language. Indeed, 
a recumng theme in modem thought concerns the inadequacy of language in 
representing or naming the world. Again, let us consider Descartes in this 
regard. Although Descartes does not deal at length with the issue of language, 
in at least one place he conveys his uneasiness about the epistemological 
fitness of words to stand for ideas: 
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1 am amazed at how [.weak and] prone to error my mind is. For dthough 1 
am thinking about these matters within myself; silently and without 
speaking, nonetheless the actual words bring me up short, and 1 am 
almost tricked by ordinary ways of taking. We Say that we see the wax 
itself, if it is there before us, not that we judge it to be there from its 
colour or shape; and this might Iead me to conclude without more ado 
that knowIedge ofthe wax cornes from what the eye sees, and not fiom 
the scrutiny of the mind aione. (1 988, p. 85) 34 
More deIiberateIy than his rationalist counterpart, Locke also argues that 
language is often the site of errors in thinking. Concemed, as were other 
empiricists, that knowledge could be impeded by the imprecision of everyday 
language, Locke rails against the "use and misuse of words" and advocates the 
adoption of a "plain style": a clear and distinct use of words and language 
apposite to the clear and distinct ideas they signifieda3' Only when language is 
properly employed and assumed the appropriate style-a style purged of 
distorting, ambiguous, or umecessariIy omate foms-can it reveal the natural 
associations and connections between ideas. Anything less and language risks 
compting and misrepresenting the natural purity of thought and thereby 
distorting the natura! relations between ideas and objects found in nature and 
reflected in human knowledge of that nature? 
Atienatine: Speech. Scepticism about the capacity of language 
adequately to convey ideas and feelings assumes an even more pointed forrn in 
the writings of Rousseau (1953, 1986). As Starobinslq (1988) observes, 
throughout much of his work Rousseau exhibits a constant preoccupation with 
the dangers and abuse of language, in particular in its capacity to express 
subjectively experienced truth. Indeed, on Rousseau's account, language stands 
out as one of  the entities responsible for self-alienation: "Glittering Iike gold, 
language itself becornes a currency of exchange that renders man a stranger unto 
himself' (Starobinsky, 1988, p. 3 1 1). Because language insinuates itself between 
reality and our immediate experience of if there is an essential cleavage between 
outer expression and inner feeling, between language and subjectivity. Ever the 
romantic naturalist, Rousseau dreams o f  a self or a truth capable of preserving its 
integrity in the face of the distortion it may suffer through its communication to 
an audience of listeners or readers. In his autobiographical writings, for example, 
Rousseau frequently enjoins his readers to look beyond appearances, to the pure, 
infallible intentions of his true, imer self, and in the process often "excuses 
himself for using language as he might excuse himself for cornmitting a crime" 
(Starobinsky, 1988, p. 272). Rousseau wants his readers to see behind the smoke- 
screen of his words, to see behind them a truth beyond the deceptions and 
distortions of language. The communicative ideal for Rousseau is one that we 
have already rnentioned: the reduplication of the ideas (or, rather, the feelings) of 
the speaker in the mind of the hearecs7 
Modernitv and Psvcholoev 
En many respects, psychology is a child of philosophical modernity. 
Psychology's allegiance to modernist assumptions is especially evident in the 
explanatory primacy it accords the individual mind. Received psychological 
paradigms, such as the information-processing and cognitive-structurai 
perspectives, have formally entrenched the individual at the centre of their 
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explanatory and methodological fiarneworks, the individud tout court becoming 
the fundamental unit of analysis for psychological inquiry and the presumed 
locus and origin of psychological function and meaning. Contextual, social, 
cultural, and historical aspects of existence, though perhaps acknowledged as 
"factors" impinging on the individuai, remain for the most part extemai 
impositions, in no way internallv related to individual functioning, and hence 
outside the purview of psychological explmation properly conceived. In other 
words, a dualistic rendering of the individual and the social is maintained. Such a 
view establishes a firrn boundary between the individuaI, constmed as the locus 
and container of intemal menta1 structures and processes, and the social, 
conceived as that which stands apart fiom, and in an extemal relation to, 
individual functioning. And psychology, traditionally at least, is argued to have 
corne down squarely on the side of the abstract and abstracted individual. 
The Piaaetian Epistemic Subiect. Within developmentai psychology more 
specifically, the legacy of philosophical modemity is clearly sensed in the 
enduring explanatory value attached to the Piagetian epistemic subject. In 
Piaget's epistemic subject we are afforded the image of the child as a rational 
inquirer endowed with an inherent repertoire of skills by which the child 
methodically makes his or her way about in the world, uncovering its mystenes 
and the structure of reality. In what amounts to a genetic or developrnental 
version of Kant's transcendental ego (Jardine, 1992; Wartofsk  l983), the 
epistemic subject actively interprets the world via emergent categories and 
schemas. Within contemporary developmental analyses of  the self in particular, 
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the epistemic subject is fiequently irnplicated as the proximate source of the age- 
related changes that have been observed in the structure and content of children's 
self-understanding-changes characterized, more specifically, by a decreasing 
reliance on concrete, physical descriptors and an increasing reliance on abstract, 
psychological descriptors (Broughton, 1978; Damon & Hart, 1988; Keller, Ford, 
& Meacham, 1978; Livesley & Bromley, 1973; Montemayor & Eisen, 1977; 
Rosenberg, 1986; Selman, 1980). What enables this appropriation of Piaget's 
structural-developmental tenets is the assumption that the self is a concept which, 
in a manner analogous to concepts pertaining to aspects of the physical world, 
undergoes a predictable developmental transformation in a direction consonant 
with increasing logico-mathematical competence. Rosenberg (1986)' for 
example, argues that if we conceive of the self-concept as a body of self- 
knowledge, we can stress "the degree to which the self-concept . . . is govemed, 
controlled, and constrained by the processes of cognitive development" 
(Rosenberg, 1986, p. 108), that is, by the developmental vicissitudes of the 
epistemic subject. On this view, cognitive development represents a sort of 
limiting condition on a child' s construction of a self-concept. In other words, the 
nature of a child's self-concept reflects the nature of her emergent and intrhsic 
cognitive abilities. 
In a recent application of this logic, Harter (1996) argues that the 
Piagetian epistemic subject is "the epitorne of James's 1-self' (p. 9) or self-as- 
knower. In her effort to bnng clarity to what she considers to be the otherwise 
intractable "H' of James' account, Harter reasons that Piaget's emphasis on the 
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universal cognitive activity of the epistemic subject allows us to account for how 
the "I" cognitively constmcts the "Me," that is, the objective, empirical self or 
self-as-object. Following Epstein's (1973) model, which conceptualises this 
empirical self as a theory that one holds about oneself Harter contends that the 
predictable growth of the epistemic subject can account for the development we 
observe in the specific ccpostulates" that comprise the child's self-knowledge or 
self-theory: their increasing logical order and hierarchical arrangement; their 
increasing arnenability to empirical testing and validation; and their increasing 
interna1 consistency. Echoing Rosenberg's (1986) earlier remarks, Harter 
advocates that "a carefirI consideration of the abilities as well as the limitations at 
each stage of cognitive development wilI reveal how the particular features of the 
1-self at each penod necessarily dictate the very nature of the Me-self, the self- 
theory, that can be constructed" (Harter, 1996, p. 9). In other words, changes in 
children's self-descriptions are the necessary social-cognitive manifestations of 
universal cognitive-structural changes, changes embodied precisely in the 
epistemic subject. 
While the appropriation of Piagetian insights by investigators interested in 
explaining age-related shifts in self-understanding has made for a picture of a 
very active individual, this appropriation is also beset by the individualism of the 
cognitive-structural view. An explanatory model erected around the activities of 
the epistemic subject neces=ily overshadows or circumscribes the role that the 
other plays in the formation and constitution of self-understanding. Indeed, a 
perennial cnticism of Piaget's genetic psychology is precisely that it 
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underestimates the contribution of others to a child's cognitive development. In 
the Piagetian fiarnework, the explanatory force of the role of the other in the 
child's mental growth is subordinated to the self-constituting powers and 
resources of the epistemic subject, a subject whose active encounter with an 
increasingly demanding range of problems stimulates the unfolding of 
increasingly sophisticated and adaptive ways of knowing the world and the self 
It is no wonder, then, that the Piagetian view consistently downplays the 
significance of what children learn from their social-communicative dealings 
with others. Moreover, the universality and developmental necessity that 
characterizes the chitd's movement through the four Piagetian stages of cognitive 
growth practically ensures that what children hear and l e m  from others, along 
with the various socioculturally specific discourses to be which they are exposed, 
will be of little explanatory importance, except perhaps as a supplemem to the 
epistemic subject's own self- and world-constituting activity. 
That Piaget is not tùndarnentally interested in what children learn from 
others is in keeping with the more fundamental assumptions of the structuralist 
view. This view is premised on a form of psychological realism which holds that 
the minci consists in real and culturally invariant cognitive structures (Williams, 
1989). These structures and capacities are the deep psychological realities that 
underlie surface or contextual variations in human thought. Piaget's focus, afier 
all, is not so much on the content of concepts as on "the common instruments 
and mechanisms of their constmction" (Piaget & Garcia, 1989, p. 26). These 
common instruments and rnechanisms can be described independently of the 
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real, concrete, social, practical circumstances in which a child finds itself. In this 
regard, Piaget's epistemic subject is a rational ideal similar to Descartes' 
coeto, an ideal that stresses the power of deductive logic and mathematical 
reasoning. As the other bears no constitutive significance for the workings of 
the episternic subject, it is not surprising that the concrete, content-filled voices 
and discourses that the child hears and imbibes are not, on this Piagetian view, 
what give rise to particular forms of reasoning, scientific or  otherwise-except 
perhaps indirectly, that is, insofar as they cause children to review their own 
direct experiences or help them get their own thoughts straight. Still, these 
other voices and discourses remain subordinate to the univocal, content-Iess 
voice of reason. The fact that Piaget turns to arithrnetica1 logic to unravel the 
formal character of cognitive organization-to the progressive order structures 
of arithmetical group transformations (similarities, familiarities, subsuziing 
orderings, groupings, classifications, coordinations)-is consistent with the 
preceding claim. It is the universal, structural, logico-mathematical language of 
development, and not the socially and culturally specific discourse of the 
child's everyday existence, that constitutes the true hero of the Piagetian 
perspective. 
On a more charitable reading, of course, one might Say that despite the 
Iack of prominence accorded sociaI experience by the structural-developmental 
view, it cannot be accused of disregarding the essential fact that the child 
develops in communication and interaction with others (e.g., Kitchener, 1 98 1). 
After all, Piaget's constructivist perspective is about stages leading toward 
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increasing levels of cognitive equilibrium, toward an increasing fit between the 
child and her world, between the knower and the known, and social experience 
no doubt contributes to the achievement of this increasingly equilibrated state. 
But how, more specifically, is the other or  social expenence conceived in this 
connection? 1s the other simply a factor to be appended to a process of otherwise 
asocial and universal development-a sort of supplement to the more critical 
process of interna1 self-regulation-or is the other intemally related or intrinsic to 
development, that is, a constitutive aspect of cognitive functioning? The 
prevalence of the interaction metaphor in Piagetian theory suggests that the first 
of these possibilities more accurately describes the status of  the other, or of social 
experience, in this framework In keeping with the biases of  philosophical 
modernity, the interactionist metaphor reflects a dichotomized image of the 
individual and the social. On the Piagetian view, reasoning is placed in the 
child's mind while the social context is placed firmly on the outside, such that 
the cognitionkontext problem becomes one of "how the social im~inces on the 
preexisting individuai" (Walkerdine, 1982, p. 130, italics added). Here, the 
relation between the person and the social world is conceived as an individual 
standing apart fiom and interacting with a social environment (Bidell, 1992). 
Even where the self is seen to originate in interactions with the social world, 
the assumption of a self that exists apart fiom interaction persists. Social- 
communicative interactions with others are conceived in purely fùnctionalist 
tems: they may influence-that is, impede or enhance-othewise naturally 
emergent cognitive processes, but they "do not actually enter into the structunng 
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of cognition itseIf" (Unvin, 1986, p. 261), the more essentiaI source for that 
stnrcturing residing within the individual. Social experience, then., while 
necessary for completion of structures of intelligence, is not at the source o f  
these structures. According to the Piagetian view, any social "influence" must 
be rnediated by structures constmcted independently by the individual. In other 
words, in order to assimilate the contributions of his or her social experience, 
the child must already be endowed with mental structures which make this 
assimilation possible. 
It is precisely on the foregoing point that the Piagetian view diverges 
fiom the Vygotskian perspective and, as we shall see shortly, from the 
Bakhtinian view as well. While Vygotsky (1987), like Piaget, acknowledges 
the importance for cognitive development of the chiIdYs imer maturationa! 
promptings and his or her active exploration of the physical world, he proposes, 
in contrat to Piaget, that social-communicative factors are foundational for the 
emergence of distinctively human psychological processes. Through their 
(pedagogical) interactions with abler members of their community, children Ieam 
to use and eventualiy intemalize or appropriate "psychologica1 tools" (e-g., 
language), tools that then corne irrevocabiy to mediate al1 higher psychological 
processes (e-g., logical memory, voluntary attention, concept formation, strategic 
problem solving). According to the Vygotskian view, individual psychological 
functioning is inherently or constitutively social. As Vygotsky (1 98 1) himself 
puts it, 
The very mechanism underlying higher mental functions is a copy fiom 
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social interaction; al1 higher mental fbnctions are intemalized social 
relationships. . . . Their composition, genetic [Le., developrnental] 
structure, and means of action [Le., forms of mediationl-in a word, 
their whole nature-is social. Even when we turn to mental [intemal] 
processes, their nature rernains quasi-social. In their own private 
sphere, human beings retain the fiinctions of social interaction. 
(VygotsS., 198 1, p. 164) 
Moreover, for Vygotsky, as for Bakhtin, language qua speech is a critical, 
constitutive feature of higher psychological firnctioning. In the absence of 
symbolic mediation, higher thought simply could not develop, and nor could 
the acquisition of a determinate sense of self. But in saying this much we are 
getting ahead of ourselves. The formative importance of language for the 
workings of consciousness and for self-understanding will be the subject of the 
following chapter. Presently, let us consider the ways in which the modemist 
devalorization of language and social discourse is reflected in some 
contemporary psychological thinking about mindedness and seffhood. 
Lan.waee and Self Received Views. Within the mainstream 
developmental Literature, relatively M e  attention is paid to the constitutive 
significance of language for children's self-understanding. Rather, language is 
seen to fiinction Iargely in either a referential or representational way. 
Consonant with modem conceptions, language is assurned to refer us to or to 
represent ideas, feelings, experiences, or self-referential categories whose origins 
lie in the structures, processes, and contents (e-g., ideas, images, niles, 
propositions, schemata) of the individual mind and whose ontological statu is 
such that they are more or less self-sufficiently rneaningful prior to their encodinq 
in language. In other words, Ianguage is viewed as an instrument in the s e ~ c e  of 
mental representations. These representations are ultimately what mediate Our 
relationship to the world by organizing experience and serving a regulative role 
with regard to behaviour. The mind is a system of such representations and the 
meaning of a cognition is a function of the network of cognitions in which it is 
implicated and with which it interacts, with language emerging as a more or less 
adequate tool with which to codiS. or mirror a meaning that is othenvise 
exhausted by this system of cognitions. Correspondingly, and in accord with the 
Lockean account, communication becomes a matter of transmitting, through the 
vehicle of language, ideas fiom one mind to another. The following description 
of the communicative provides us with a paradigrnatic example of this view: 
How do we transfer the ideas in one mind to another mind in the 
meaningfùl manner, which we cal1 communication? Viewed in light of 
the previous questions, it becomes clear that language is but a tool that 
makes it possible for people to convey concepts and relations among 
concepts to other people. Language acquisition, then, is the Iearning of 
the use of a tool for communicating that which is already known in the 
form of concepts and concept relations. (Palenno, 1983, p. 5 1) 
The assumption that language functions to represent or transmit ideas 
also underlies the Piagetian, structural-developmental perspective. In keeping 
with his modernist philosophical roots, Piaget is hard pressed to view language 
in its constitutive aspect. Rather, language is conceived as but one of  a number 
of symbolic or representational functions, the others inciuding imitation, the 
system of gestural symbols, symbolic play, drawing, and mental images. In 
characteristically structuralist fashion, Piaget regards language as a sign system of 
"differentiated signifiers." Ancillary to this signieing system is a more pnmary 
system of "undifferentiated signifiers" associated with prelinguistic action, the 
built-in Iogic of which helps to structure linguistic behaviour (Piaget & Inhelder, 
1969). Language, more simply, does noi guide thought. Indeed, the emergence of 
language itself is dependent on prelinguistic cognitive processes. Interpretive, 
conceptual, categorical intelligence, whose origin lies in the formation of 
schemata from the internalization or appropriation of action upon objects 
precedes and is rnereIy represented by language. 
Not surprisingly, Piaget also shares the rnodernist suspicion about the 
capaciry of language adequately to reflect cognitive structures. He writes, for 
example, that "When the chiid is questioned he translates his thoughts into 
words, but these words are necessarily inadequate" (1929, p. 27). Elsewhere, he 
downplays the constitutive import of language for thought, attributing the need 
to articulate a meaning not so rnuch to logical requirements as to socially 
imposed demands for clarity and facile communication (Piaget, 1959). Before 
this moment of express articulation, we have a full, self-suffkient 
understanding of the solution to some problem, "but as soon as we try to 
explain to others what it is we have understood, difficulties corne thick and 
fast" (Piaget, 1959, p. 65). The reason for these difficulties, according to 
Piaget, lies in the initially imagistic nature of our understanding and perhaps 
also in the fact that this insight couid be represented to oneself in abbreviated 
language (Blachowicz, 1997). Expressing this understanding to others requires 
filling in the gaps with those previously ornitted connecting elements. 
According to Piaget (1959), such is the difference between "personal 
understanding and spoken explanation" (p. 65). 
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Many developmental accounts of children's self-understanding clearly 
reflect the Piagetian-or, more generall y, the modemist-perspective on 
Ianguage. These accounts assume, more specifically, that children's self- 
referential utterances simply reflect underlying conceptual categories about the 
self that the child has formed through his or her own actions upon the world. 
The research of Lewis and Brooks-GUM (1979) on the nature of self- 
understanding in infancy and early childhood is exemplary in this regard. As 
part of their research program, these investigators examined the spontaneous 
vocalizations of children ranging in age from nine to 36 months. Their specitic 
interest was in demonstrating how language is related to young children's 
ability to recognize themselves. What is particularly relevant to the present 
argument is the fact that for these investigators language is regarded as a 
storehouse of "verbal labels," a sort of conduit to underlying, non-linguistic 
conceptual categories. Consistent with stmctural-developmental assumptions, 
language is conceived as a tool for expressing, but not constituting, the 
experiential categories and understandings that exist pnor to any embodirnent in 
or representation through language and forms of discourse. In oîher words, a 
rather static view of language is assumed, a view according to which "Lexical 
items or utterance-level propositions are interpreted as semantic encodings of 
self-referential categories" (Miller, Mintz, Hoogstra, Fung, & Potts, 1992, p. 47). 
According to this representational approach, "self and social concepts . . . 
become crystallized notions within a representational system. Verbalizations 
pertaining to self are viewed as direct referents to the child's concept of self' 
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(Mintz, 1995, p. 62). 
Sperry and S miley (1 995) accurately characterize much recent work 
examining the depiction of self in spontaneous conversation, noting that it 
betrays an allegiance to a long tradition in psychological scholarship on the 
self which assumes "that Ianguage is the mirror of the soul" (p. 2). And 
because language is understood to function primxily in a representational way, 
it is not surprising that concerns about the communicative context in which 
talk about the self occurs are rarely considered in developmental investigations 
of children's self-understanding. As Mintz (1 995) has recently noted with 
regard to the developmental literature, seldom is attention directed to the 
rhetorical context of a child's self-descriptive utterances: to whom they are 
addressed, for what purposes, and so forth. Provided that measures have been 
taken to eliminate the possibility of social desirability or self-presentation 
effects, such utterances are assumed to fiinction in a strictly referential way. 
Language, in short, is simply a methodologicaI tool that is adequate to its 
object (the self) and that reflects its object directly, bypassing the voices and 
potential responses of others. Indeed, the possibility that rhetorical concerns 
may be operative in these investigative contexts is considered problematic and 
potentially detrimental to efforts to reveal children's "true" self-understanding. 
It is problematic because the rhetorical context may somehow contribute to the 
form and content of the self-descriptions that people, and perhaps children in 
particular, produce. Accordingly, efforts must be taken to ensure that a 
methodology is engaged to circumvent these concems. In keeping with this 
reasoning, Kagan (1 989) argues that self-report mesures  alrnost invariably 
produce data that are tainted by social desirability and self-presentational 
factors; hence, he advocates the use of more indirect, projective assessrnent 
devices, the assurnption being that such instruments are better suited to 
vouchsafing investigators a glimpse of the child's actual or real self, a self that 
is tainted neither by social desirability nor by any other rhetorical concerns. Of 
course, what this sort of  thinking fails to take into account is the possibility 
that the self is inherently and inescapably a rhetorical production, that is to Say, 
a phenornenon that betrays a constitutive or formative link to the context in 
which speech (or writing) about the self takes place. 
In addition to assuming that language functions in a representational 
way, investigators sometimes also assume that Ianguage fiinctions in a more 
destructive way. Expressing the self in language may radically transform, 
perhaps even destroy, a more primordial sense of self, one that existed prior to 
its mediation by or representation in language- Consider, for example, Stern's 
(1985) account of the roIe of language in the development of self in infancy. 
According to Stern, language emerges in the second year of life, becoming for 
the infant a new means and medium of interpersonal communication for the 
parent-child dyad. More specifically, Stem claims that the advent of language 
engenders an "intersubjective" understanding of self and offers "a new way of 
being related to others . . . by sharing personal world knowledge with them, 
coming together in the domain of verbal reIatednessn (p. 173). Pnor to this 
"verbal self' phase, Stem contends that the child's self unfolds naturally 
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according to predesigned characteristics. During this prior phase the infant has 
the ability to experience reality in an unmediated, holistic or omni-modal way, 
in a way unencurnbered by linguistic-cultural interpretations. With the 
acquisition of language, however, a Iinguistic-cultural meaning system is 
imposed on a more primordial biological meaning system. Stem further argues 
that while the arrival, with language, of this linguistic-cultural meaning system 
promotes a greater union for infant and parent, "it is a very mixed bIessing to the 
child. . . . The infant gains entrance into a wider cultural membership, but at the 
risk of Iosing the force and wholeness of original experience" (p. 177). This loss 
follows from the fact that linguistic or culturaIly-mediated meanings are 
symbolic, impersonal, generalized, abstract, and superficial, and thereby are by 
definition alienated fiom subjective, concrete, Iived experience. Language, in 
effect, creates a rupture between two forms of interpersonal experience: 
experience as lived and as it is represented in spoken Ianguage. Ultimately, 
language separates and estranges the chiId fiom an earlier, more primordial and 
authentic knowledge of both self and self-other relationships, a knowledge that 
was in essence largely unshareable, amodal, and related to specific experiential 
moments. 
More recently, Harter (1997) has expressed a similar view on the 
dangers of language. Harter's analysis is concerned with authentic and 
inauthentic expenences of self, which she hypostatizes in the notions of "true" 
and "false" selves, respectively. FolIowing Stern, she argues that "the 
emergence of language is a double-edged sword" (p. 84). While language, in 
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its provision of a common symbol system, helps promote greater 
connectedness and shared meaning among interlocutors and also helps in the 
construction of seIf-narrative, language can introduce a gap between 
interpersonal experience as it is lived and as it is verbally represented. The 
ability to objectiQ the self through Ianguage, while enabling one to transcend 
irnmediate experience, also entails the potential risk of distorting that 
experience. Objectieing the self through language leads to transcendence, and 
therefore to the distortion of the immediacy of felt experience. In a related 
vein, Harter also notes that in using language to construct a self-narrative, a 
child is at least initially highly dependent on parents who, in their scaffolding 
of the child' s self-relevant story, ofien and perhaps unavoidably dictate which 
particular aspects of the child's experience are important and hence which 
aspects corne to be codified in the child's autobiographical memory. This 
practice, she continues, engenders "potential misrepresentations of the child's 
actual experience" (p. 84), which, in turn, may contribute to the development 
of a faIse self-and even faIse mernories. 
Echoes of Rousseau's distrust of Ianguage are clearly heard in Stem's and 
Harter's understanding of language. For both investigators the advent of language 
canies the potentiaI to distort and transcend reality as subjectively experienced, 
and thereby to alienate the self from its primordial, authentic relationship to the 
world. Just as Rousseau bemoaned the disappearance of our natural wholeness 
with the advent of civilization and language, lamenting the disappearance of the 
"noble savage," so do Stem and Harter conceive of Ianguage as a force 
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potentially contaminating the "noble child." The self that pre-exists speech 
embodies a purity and wholeness that, once brought within the folds of the 
abstraction-ridden world of Ianguage, must remain an object of nostalgie longing. 
C W T E R  2 
DIALOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY AM> THE BAKHTIMAN SUBJECT 
Tn the preceding chapter, we have seen how knowledge is considered the 
achievement of a self-suficient individual subject in the epistemologicd 
fiameworks of modem thinkers like Descartes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. 
Each of  these representatives of the modem philosophical tradition holds that 
the reliability and authenticity of one's understanding requires that one secure 
one's own individua1 foundations for knowledge. Each of us is built by nature 
to have access to the universal light of reason or experience. And while some 
of us may be more prepared for the task, each of us must think for hirnself or 
herself. And thinking for oneself, as we have also seen, requires that one turn 
away or  disengage fiom the other, for knowledge could never be reliably 
grounded in or extracted fiom our social-communicative relations. On the 
modernist view, thought, knowledge, and tmth are not co1Iaborative 
achievements; they speak to phenomena that can be predicated only of 
individual minds. 
Epistemolow as Dialornie 
In these defining aspects, the modem epistemological stance constitutes a 
thoroughgoing monologism, an orientation to the world which, according to 
denies the existence outside itself of another consciousness with equal 
rights and equal responsibilities, another 1 with equal rights (W. With 
a monologic approach . . . another uerson remains wholly and merely an 
ob-iect of consciousness, and not another consciousness. No response is 
expected fiom it that could change everything in the world of  my 
consciousness. Monologue is finalized and deafto the other's response, 
does not expect it and does not acknowledge in it any decisive force. (pp. 
292-293) 
Bakhtin also reminds us, however, that rnonologism is but one possible 
fiamework for conceptualizing the nature of knowledge and existence. He asks 
us to consider the possibility of 
a unified tmth that requires a plurality of consciousnesses, one that 
cannot in principle be fitted into the bounds of a single consciousness, 
one that is, so to speak, by its very nature fbll of event potential and is 
bom at a point of contact among various consciousnesses. (p. 8 1) 
Here, Bakhtin is alluding to a very different conception of knowledge, one that 
sees it as an emergent, provisional, processual, and eventfiil phenornenon, as 
something that is possible at each and every moment of existence and that, 
most irnportantly, requires a plurality of consciousnesses, a plurality of 
perspectives on the subject matter in question. In contrast to Descwtes' 
metaphor of the single architect, Bakhtin sees knowledge as an interlocutive 
event, something "born between ~eop le  collectively searching for the truth, in 
the process of their dialogic interaction" (p. 110). Least of aIl, according to 
Bakhtin, is an idea "a subjective individual-psychological formation with 
'permanent resident rights' in a person's head; no, the idea is inter-individual 
and inter-subjectivethe realm of its existence is not individual consciousness 
but dialogic communion between consciousnesses" (p. 88). An idea lives not in 
the isolated individual consciousness, and indeed "if it remains there only, it 
degenerates and dies" (p. 87). Rather, the idea lives its most authentic, genuine 
existence only when it exists in dialogic relationships with other ideas and, 
more importantly, with others' ideas. It is only in the space opened up by 
dialogue, in the space of communicative practice, that an idea takes on a 
determinate shape, that it develops and is transformed, and that it gives rise to 
new ideas. "Human thought," writes Bakhtin, 
becomes genuine thought . . . ody  under conditions of living contact 
with another and alien thought, a thought embodied in someone else's 
voice, that is, in someone else's consciousness expressed in discourse. 
At that point of contact between voice-consciousnesses the idea is born 
and lives. @p. 87-88) 
Clearly, Bakhtin espouses a decidedly Socratic conception of knowledge. 
Knowledge does not exist ready-made, simply awaiting discovery by some 
self-contained, self-suffkient, and fully autonomous subject, but rather 
emerges in dialogic interaction, in the dynamic interplay of consciousnesses or 
v~ices .~ '  
In proposing this sort of dialogical epistemology, Bakhtin is attempting 
to do justice to a phenornenon that is obscured in modernist thought, namely, 
the existence at every point in cultural-historical development of an 
inescapable plurality of perspectives ftom which to conceive any given aspect 
of the world. On the modem view, this son of plurality ernerges less as an 
ineradicable fact of existence than as an accidental, superfluous, and 
problematic state of affairs, one that is ultirnately antithetical to the notion of a 
single, unified, timeless, and universal truth. This modernist attitude toward 
diversity is readily discernable in Descartes' writings. At several points in his 
Discourse, for example, Descartes acknowledges the bewildenng scope of human 
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diversity, a diversity with which over the course of travels he became personally 
acquainted. It was a diversity, moreover, which he saw no less to characterize the 
opinions of philosophers on any given question than the cultural manners and 
customs of other peoples. Conflict and contradiction among perspectives seemed 
to be everywhere, and this, for Descartes, reflected badly upon the world's state of 
aEairs. However, Descartes' confrontation with such human diversity, his 
realization that despite the efforts of great thinkers "there is d l  no point in 
[philosophy] which is not disputed and hence doubtful" (I.8, 1988, p. 24), does 
not Iead him to affirm a position of relativism or scepticism or, more generally, 
any position that might require the acknowledgement of the inescapably 
perspectival nature of truth. From a Cartesian standpoint, to acknowledge the 
ineradicable difference in human flairs would be a step in the direction of 
making the individual mind seem an inherently social phenomenor., of grounding 
our ways of perceiving and making sense of the world in the contexts of 
particular human communities; or, rather, it would mean seeing individual 
understanding as one arbitrary "voice" among many others. Of course, Descartes' 
response to diversity followed a different, and what proved to be a very 
influential, path. Rather than accede to the inevitable partiality and cultural 
specificity of one's beliefs and opinions, indeed of truth itself, Descartes sought to 
resolve the problem of diversity by asserting the absoluteness and universality of 
truth. Although there rnay be many conflicting opinions regarding a particular 
matter, there can only be one that ments the status of truth. Each of us, 
moreover, is endowed with the same kind of reason, the same "natural Iight" 
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which, if carefilIy cultivated and allowed proper methodical expression, would 
invariably reward us with such objective, absoiute, and sïnguIar tmths. In other 
words, beneath the cacophony of particufaristic and sociocuhrally specific 
voices and their attendant worldviews, there sounds the unified and unieing 
voice of rea~on.~'  
The universalistic fiamework of  inquiry that characterizes the 
Enlightenment-that is, its abstract conception of a uniform and invariable 
human nature-similarly renders human difference and diversity problematic. 
In a recent work, Sampson (1993) reminds us that 
The story of the Enlightenment is not simply one in which we find an 
unabashed celebration of the individual, but is better told in terms of  the 
active suppression of the other-where the other is the particuIaristic 
standpoint available to people because of their group memberships and 
coIIectively shared experiences. (p. 80) 
In Enlightenment thought, differences amounted io potentially conflicting views 
of the world and thereby "threatened a return to those times when people's lives 
were endangered by the clashes of diversity, and no court but brute force could 
settlc cornpeting clairns" (Sampson, 1993, p. 80). In effect, such diversity stood 
in the way of the Enlightenment's political (humanistic) project of establishing a 
democratic society based on pnnciples of fieedom and equality. Establishg 
equality meant identi@ing some universally shared quality, some common core 
that, in effect, would make al1 human minds the same. Beneath the multiplicity of 
perspectives there existed a single perspective, "a fundamental universality, a 
End of deep structure that al1 share" (Sampson, 1993, p. 79)-a single voice, as it 
were. The promise of equality resided in the unity and impartidity of reason 
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itseIf Only via the impartial and singular voice of reason could competing daims 
to tmth be settled without the contaminating influence of the contingency and 
particularïty of potentially conflicting group i n t e r e d O  
As the example of Descartes and the Enlightenment shows, the discourse 
of modernity suppresses and undermines the diversity of voices and perspectives 
on the world by proposing the existence of what Bakhtin (1984) calls a 
"consciousness in general" (p. 8 l), a sort of basic, universal human nature that 
speaks to what we al1 have in common. In this respect, the discourse of 
philosophical modernity is a totalizing discourse, one that seeks unity in 
multiplicity, sameness in difference. Again, this is a unity or sameness that is 
made possible by the potential for reason that we d l  ~ h a r e . ~ '  And it is precisely 
this potential that, on the modem view, imparts to the individual subject his or 
her epistemic self-suficiency and seIf-containedness. The modem subject, 
conceived along the lines of the Cartesian co~i to ,  is possessed of an inherent 
and inviolable oneness, a unity that stems fiom its ability to speak in the 
unified voice of reason. Accordingly, it need not rely on others or on outside 
perspectives to know either the world or itself 
From a Bakhtinian perspective, diversity or difference is not something to 
be overcome, but rather something to be celebrated, even nurtured. In keeping 
with more recent postmodenl critiques of modernist epistemology, Bakhtin 
conceives of diversity as a constitutive and ineradicable feature of the sociaI 
world- Diversity is not, on this view, the quality o f  an imperfect, yet-to- 
develop state, nor is it something to be overcome in the positing of a universal 
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human nature. Rather, social reality is unavoidably, but not lamentably, a 
fiagmented ensemble of diverse elements and, as such, is incapable of being 
articulated as a single, integrated truth. As an apostle of difference, as an 
apologist for heterogeneity-in language, customs, world views, and so 
forth-Bakhtin launches a consistent polemic against the "tendency toward 
reducing everything to a single consciousness, toward dissolving in it the 
other7s consciousness7' (1 986, p. 14 1). His dialogisrn, accordingly, represents 
an epistemological pluralisrn that, like a cubist painting, seeks to represent the 
diversity of perspectives on an object as well as the lack of self-suEciency of 
any individual perspective on that object. Indeed, on the Bakhtinian view, that 
lack of self-suficiency is definitive of individual subjectivity. 
A P henomenological Groundinp for the Dialogical Self 
Bakhtin's dialogical epistemology clearly requires an alternative conception of 
the individual subject, a conception that challenges the notions of self- 
sufficiency and self-presence allied with modemist accounts of subjectivity. In 
light of the constitutive and generative value that Bakhtin attaches to dialogue, 
the individual subject can hardly be presented as the ultimate source and ongin 
of meaning. Least of  ail could this be a subject thzt knows itself apodictically 
from within. Rather, this must be a diaIocical subiect, a subject that needs and 
that is built to Ieam about itself and the world fiom others. 
Foreshadowing recent postmodern efforts to rethink the sovereignty 
and self-sufficiency of the fiwt-person perspective, Bakhtin's (1 990, 1993) 
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earliest essays on ethics and aesthetics offer a view of subjectivity that 
decenters or dislodges the subject from the privileged epistemological and 
ontological locus it has inhabited within philosophical modemity. But for 
Bakhtin this redefinition o f  the subject does not take the form o f  a dissolution 
or death of the subject under an impersonal system of language o r  "text" 
(Derrida, 1976), nor does it reduce subjectivity to a mere vehicle for 
fùndamentally transubjective, cultural, or traditionary forces (Gadamer, 1989). 
Rather, Bakhtin takes as his starting point the inescapably perspectival nature 
of the individual subject. Each of us, he says, constitutes a specific, and 
irreplaceable center of awareness. From moment to moment, each of us, no 
matter how physically close to each other we may stand, occupies a unique 
place in the world. And our individual perception of the worid is invariably 
grounded in that uniqueness. An event, it follows, is never the same for each o f  
AS we each observe the world from a temporally and spatially different 
perspective-from a different "chronotopic" platforrn, as Bakhtin might say- 
we each see the world in a diKerent way. It should be noted here that while 
Bakhtin's reliance on the categories of space and time suggests his 
indebtedness to a Kantian account of subjectivity-time and space specieing 
two of the a priori categones of understanding to which experience rnust relate 
for its meaning-Bakhtin does not see these categories, as does Kant, as 
transcendental ones. Bakhtin's concem is not with articulating the universal 
and necessary conditions for knowledge as embodied by the Kantian 
transcendental self, but rather with foregrounding the uniqueness of each 
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individual's chronotopic situatedness in the world and the unique interpretive 
horizon associated with the particularity and concreteness of that spatio- 
temporal fiame. In this regard, Bakhtin might be said to have 
detranscendentalized the Kantian subject (Maranhao, 1990). The Bakhtinian 
subject is not, after all, the universal, timeless, and disembodied subject of 
modernity, that foundationaIist subject who is capable of  rising above history 
and mastering the world. Rather, Bakhtin's is an embodied subject, a finite 
subject who inhabits a particuIar moment and place in existence and who is 
always subject to socioculturaI and historical influence, a subject, finally, 
whose concrete histoncity makes it always open ro change and transformation. 
To highlight the epistemological (ethical and aesthetic) implications of 
our chronotopic singuiarity and to establish a phenomenological grounding for 
the self s need for the other, Bakhtin (1990) draws on a metaphor fiom visual 
perception. He considers, more specifically, the case of two people looking at 
each other. "As we gaze at each other," writes Bakhtin, cctwo different worlds 
are reflected in the pupils of our eyes" (p. 23). As each occupies and looks out 
fiom a unique "horizon," each sees aspects of  the other and of the other's 
surroundings that the other does not see: parts of the other's body, the 
expression on the other's face, the world behind the other's back, and so forth. 
What this metaphor clearly highlights is the visual "surpIus" that each self 
enjoys relative to the other, an existential surplus or excess (of seeing and 
knowing and feeling) based on "the uniqueness and irreplaceability of my place 
in the world. For only 1-the one-and-oniy I-occupy in a given set of 
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circumstances this particular place at this particdar tirne; al1 other human beings 
are situated outside me" @akhtin, 1990, p. 23). While the metaphor suggests 
that each of us, relative to any other-and in virtue of the unique spatial- 
temporal platform we inhabit-enjoys a surplus of seeing, each of us is a lso-  
and again in vimie of the uniqueness of our place in the world-possessed of 
an inherent perceptual lack. There is a findamental inadequacy, a 
méconnaissance or scotoma-a dark or blind spot-at the heart of self- 
perception. From the unique place 1 occupy in existence I cannot see myself 
whole, in a complete way, or in any sort of integral form. I am never, in other 
words, fùlly present to myself. There are parts of my own body, for example, 
that 1 cannot see, expressions on my Clce that are unavailable to me, scenes 
behind my back that 1 cannot witness. 
To overcome the difference between the self and the other's horizon 
completely, Bakhtin argues, "it would be necessary to merge into one, to 
become one and the same person" (p. 23). But this difference is something that 
neither should nor c m  be overcome. The fact that self and other each see the 
world through the optic of their own unique place in existence is not a nod 
toward solipsism, nor is this radical perspectivism to be conceived as an 
impediment to communication with others-say, as a form of egocentrism that, 
with development, stands to be sublated into higher foms  of cognition that 
would allow the subject to assume an objective position common to all. Rather 
than lament the perspectival nature of our awareness, Bakhtin sees it as an 
inescapable feature of the human condition. But more than this, he sees it as a 
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positive, enabling condition for self-understanding, as the following excerpt 
suggests: 
Zn what way would it enrich the event if 1 merged with the other, and 
instead of two there would be now only one? And what would 1 myself 
gain by the other's merging with me? If he did, he would see and know 
no more than what 1 see and know rnyself; he would merely repeat in 
himsetf that want of any issue out of itself which characterizes my own 
life. Let him rather remain outside of me, for in that position he can see 
and know what 1 myself do not see and do not know f?om my own 
place, and he can essentially enrich the event of my own life. (Bakhtin, 
1993, p. 87) 
For Bakhtin, the difference between self and other is the productive ground for 
self-understanding. And, as his metaphor fkom visual perception clearly 
suggests, it is precisely the fact that 1 cannot perceive myself in any sort of 
cornplete way that ultimately occasions my need for the other (and, 
correlatively, the other's need for me). According to the Bakhtinian view, self- 
knowledge is not, as it was for Descartes, Rousseau, and Kant, a matter of self- 
observation. Indeed, Bakhtin insists that it is precisely Our own selves that we 
cannot know. Knowing myself requires that 1 tum to the other, to you. From 
your position outside me, h m  your excess of seeing, volition, and feeling 
relative to rny own, you can help to define me, to inform me about the 
complexities of my situation and Save me fiom the limitations and 
fiagmentariness of my own unique perspective on the world and on rnyself; 
and 1, fiom my own position outside you, stand to return the favour. Neither of 
us being fùlly present to ourselves, we turn to each other. We share in each 
other's surplus and in so doing see the world and ourselves in a more complete 
way. 
In the course of one his earliest essays, Bakhtin (1990) elaborates this 
visual metaphor and its implications for self-other relations through the use of an 
extended account of the relation between author and hero in the aesthetic event. 
For Bakhtin, aesthetics is conceived rather broadly as the question of how 
humans give forrn to or make sense of their experience. In this regard, aesthetic 
activity is a rather prosaic phenomenon, something we are routinely engaged in 
as we go about rnaking sense of the world. More specifically, this activity of 
perceiving or making sense of the world-of an object, a te- or a person- 
involves the activity of gathering its disparate elements into provisionally 
stable, meaningful wholes. Bakhtin's more specific aesthetic metaphor for 
such activity is authoring. An activity identified metaphorically with the self, 
authoring involves the process of "consummation," shaping scattered 
fragments of meaning and assembling them into a finished image. What needs 
to be emphasized, however, is that we are not authors of our selves. We can 
author ourselves no more than we can love, esteem, chastise ourselves in an 
unmediated way. We cannot author ourselves because, again, we cannot see 
ourseives whole, as Bakhtin's metaphor from visual perception clearly 
suggests. 
1-for-Mvself and 1-for-the-Other. In order further to elaborate these 
daims, iî is necessary to consider in greater detail Bakhtin's phenomenological 
account of s~bjectivit~." This account appears in Bakhtin's (1990, 1993) 
earliest wrïtings and emerges as part of an attempt to lay the groundwork for a 
philosophy that would supplant the rationalism, objectivism, and abstraction 
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characteristic of the Western intellectual tradition." As Bakhtin (1993) writes: 
It is an unfortunate misunderstanding (a legacy of rationalism) to think 
that truth can only be the tmth that is composed of universal moments; 
that the truth of a situation is precisely that which is repeatable and 
constant in it. Moreover, that which is universal and identical (logically 
identical) is fiindamental and essential, whereas individual truth is 
artistic and irresponsible, Le., it isolates a given individuality. (p. 37) 
Against the "epistemologism" of the rationalist view, which, in its tendency 
toward cognitive abstraction and universalization, dissociates the subject f?om 
the realm of the concret-and hence fiom the other-Bakhtin (1993) aims to 
situate the subject in the impure space of "the unitary and unique world of the 
performed act" (p. 60). In other words, Bakhtin's conception of the subject 
takes as its starting point the concretely enbodied, act-performing self. 
In this phenomenological account, Bakhtin (1990) posits two categones 
or components of subjectivity to emphasize the essential asymrnetry between 
the way the self experiences itself from within-that is, from the vantage point 
of its own seIf-activity-and the way in which it experiences the other. The 
first of these components, which he terms the "1-for-myself," is ar. experiential 
mode of subjectivity which, in effect, speaks to the unique, concrete subject- 
position each of us inhabits, the place fiom which each of us perceives the 
world and fiom which in the course of lived experience we confiont diverse 
~ t h e r s . ~ ~  Phenomenologically, the dominant characteristic of this mode of 
subjectivity is its onentedness to an unpredetermined fùture. The 1-for-myself 
experiences itself as moving constantly into open time: it leads a "forward- 
duected life" (Bakhtin, 1990, 14). Here, Bakhtin is pointing to what he sees as 
a defining feature of human existence: As a human being, 1 plan, pursue goals 
and purposes, dream, hope, and anticipate consequences because 1 am in 
essence oriented toward that which 1 am not yet; in Iived experience, 1 always 
project meaning and my own possibilities into the world ahead of myself. 
Accordingl y, fro m within its own self-activity, the self-the f-for-myself- 
experiences or  is present to itseIf as someone always "yet-to-be," as a self 
whose meaning resides in the ongoing possibility of new meaning and of being 
othenvise. As Bakhtin (1990) writes, "My determination of myself is given to 
me (given as a task-as something yet to be achieved) not in the categories of 
temporal being, but in the categories of not-vet-beinq, in the categories of 
purpose and meaning" (pp. 123-124). From within itself, then, the self s 
determinateness in being is perpetually deferred. As 1 orient myself f?om 
within to goals, purposes, and meaning, 1 am never present to myself in my 
factual existence. Frorn within my own consciousness there are no moments 
that could "finalize" or "consummate" me or make me coincide with myself, 
that is, with what is already given in me or "present-at-hand." The I-for- 
myself, in short, is Bakhtin's "loophole" self, a self that is constantly shifking 
and fixing its sights on what might be, a self that inhabits "the world of what is 
yet to b e  achieved, outside my own temporal being-already-on-hand" (p. 123). 
On the basis of the foregoing description, it would appear that the 
subject-position occupied by the 1-for-myself is a privileged one, and indeed 
this is so. This privilege inheres in the fact that this innermost self cannot be 
encompassed completely in space or in time (as can the other, who exists for 
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me space and time). Shifiing and unstable, never coming to  rest, the I-for- 
myself continually perceives itself as open to possibility. In this ceaseless self- 
activity it enjoys a surplus vis-à-vis the other: where the other is present to me 
as a buunded, unified whole, my self never coincides with its already existing 
makeup. 
But alongside this surplus is also a weakness or  a lack. To understand 
this lack, we need to bear in mind that any fieedom 1 might enjoy in being 
someone onented toward a yet-to-be meaning is invariably a constrained 
fieedom. What I am yet-to-be is not the projection of a pure, limitless 
possibility; rather, what 1 am yet-to-be defines a projection of possibility that is 
at once tied to and that goes beyond what 1 have been or what 1 am now. Al1 
the unpredetermined meanings, purposes, and goals toward which the I-for- 
myself orients itself are responses, in other words, to what is already given in 
me, to past and present determinations of my self. Awareness of such 
determinations requires that 1 be present to myself as a determinate object 
But how do 1 achieve such determinateness? How do 1 become a given 
object for myself? We have seen that achieving the temporal, spatial, and 
axiological stability of a determinate being is impossible fkom within my own 
self-activity. Given its forward-looking orientation toward goals and 
purposes-its reaching for what it is yet-to-be-the 1-for-myself can never be 
fully articulated, finalized, consummated, or perceived as an object fiom 
within itself. In one place, Bakhtin (1990) articulates this lack in t e m s  of the 
impossibility, in principle, of self-narrative or autobiography. To the extent 
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that the 1-for-myself is an extratemporal mode of subjectivity-extratemporai 
in the sense that it is never fuily present to itself lived-experiential tirne, but 
rather only in the temporally open category of what is yet-to-be-then it 
cannot narrate its own story. Narrative, after ail, pertains not to the realm of 
actual, lived expenence, but to its memory. Narrative, rnoreover, requires the 
imposition of temporal and spatial boundaries. Accordingly, for the self to be 
consummated or finalized narratively, it must be encompassed completely in 
categories such as space and time, must occupy a determinate space, a 
determinate tirne. We have seen, however, that such a spatial and temporal 
enclosure is incapable of being perceived fiom within the self: spatially, I 
cannot see the world behind my back; temporally, 1 cannot consciously 
experience the moment of my binh and death. And axiologically, too, 1 lack 
the resources, fkom within my lived-experiential orientation to the world, with 
which to assign a justificatory value to my life. In short, as my 1-for-myself is 
incapable of perceiving its own spatial, temporal, and axiological boundaries, it 
cannot produce an autonomous narrative representation of my As 
Bakhtin (1990) puts it, "From within lived experience, life is neither tragic nor 
comic, neither beautiful nor sublime, for the one who objectively experiences it 
himself' (p. 70). And again: "my own existence is devoid of aesthetic value, 
devoid of plot-bearing significance, just as my physical existence is devoid of 
plastic-pictonal significance. 1 am not the hero of rny own life." (p. 112). When 1 
am experiencing life in the category of my own Efor-myself-when 1 am 
"difised and dispersed in the projected world of cognition" (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 
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14)-1 am fundamentally incapable of gathering myself "into an outward 
whole that would be even relatively finished" (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 35). From 
within my own inner sense of myself, 1 know only that each of my acts and 
utterances is partial and open-ended, unconsummated, always open to change. 
I know that 1 am more than 1 was in the past or am in the present. 
But as much as the self is open to possibiIity, it needs moments of 
consummation or finalization. Tt needs to see itself in some determinate, 
objectified form (narrative or othenvise), for such determinations or 
objectifications are the necessary points of departure for its own meaningfùl 
projections into the open, unpredetemiined future. On the Bakhtinian 
frarnework, the impossibility of representing oneself from within-whether 
temporally, spatially, or axiologically-brings about the need for a second 
consciousness, an other for whom-from his or her temporal and spatial 
position outside my lived life-events appear as discrete and closed. Only this 
outside consciousness can provide al1 those moments that are needed for self- 
objectification: the other can enclose me in space (situate my action in an 
"environment," in a setting that is imperceptible from within my Iived 
"horizon"); the other can fiame me in time (against and beyond the moment of 
my birth and death, moments that are inaccessible to my own conscious 
experience); and the other can bestow significance upon my actions (gather up 
the moments of meaning in my life and bestow a value or a "rhythm" upon 
them, a rhythm which is alien to lived experience as such). In short, the spatial, 
temporal, and axiological enclosure required for forming a representation of 
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myself are acquired from the other. The other rhythmicizes my life temporally 
and forms it spatially. From the standpoint of narrative, the plot or story of my 
own personal life is created by the othec4' And it is in this sense that 
one can speak of a human being's absolute need for the other, for the 
other' s seeing, remembering, gathenng, and uni@i ng self-activity-the 
only self-activity capable of producing his outwardly finished 
personality. This outward personality could not exist, if the other did 
not create it. (Bakhtin, 1990, pp. 3 ~ - 3 6 ) . ~ *  
The self needs the other in order to constitute itself as something cognitively 
determinate-to pass from "primitive self-sensation [to] complex self- 
awareness" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 146). For fiom the diEuse and dispersed world 
of lived experience, I cannot arrive at any authoritative, stable definition of 
itself, and hence 1 must go out to the other to secure one, however partial and 
provisional it may be. In other words, 1 require a point d'appui outside the 
context of rny own lived expenence, a "genuine source of real strength out of 
which 1 would be capable of seeing myself as another" (p. 3 I) .~ '  Only another 
active consciousness is capable of imparting to the sense of closure, stability, 
and realization-the "gifY of f ~ r m ? ~  
Incapable of establishing wholeness of fonn and autobiographical value 
tiom within itself, the Efor-myself must appropriate it fiom the other. Thus 
emerges the "I-for-the-other" as an indispensable, second mode of subjectivity 
in Bakhtin's early phenomenological account of the self 1 must become an I- 
for-the-other, that is, I must become a self that is scaffolded by others' 
finalizations of me, by their images of me, and by their discourse about me. 
Through the appropriation of these finalizations, 1 in effect take up a position 
outside rnyself and experience myself in a way that differs fi-om the way in 
which I actually experience rny lived life. For example, in perceiving Our 
outward ap pearance, 
we take into account the value of our outward appearance tiom the 
standpoint of the possible impression it may produce upon the other, 
although for ourselves this value does not exist in any imrnediate way 
(for our actual and pure self-consciousness). We take into account the 
background behind Our back, that is to Say, al1 that which in our 
surroundings we do not see and do not know directly and which has no 
direct axiological validity for us, although it is seen and known by 
others and has validity for others; al1 that, in other words, which 
constitutes the background, against which, as it were, others perceive us 
axiologically, against which we stand forth for them. . . . In short, we 
are constantly and intently on the watch for reflections of our own life 
on the plane of other people's consciousness, and, rnoreover, not just 
reflections of particular moments of our life, but even reflections of the 
whole of it. (Bakhtin, 1990, pp. 15-16) 
In his most mature writings, when dialogue became a more central 
category in his thought, Bakhtin was to incorporate these claims about Our 
dependence on others into a unique theory of language. More specifically, 
what in his early, phenornenologically-oriented writings he identifies as the 
consrimrnating activity of the other in relation to the self, is in his later works 
presented more explicitly as a process in which my individual utterances 
dialogically implicate the words and voices of others (e-g., Bakhtin, 1984, 
1986; see also Volosinov, 1986). In effect, it is through such dialogue that one 
encounters and engages the alterity that is so crucial for constructing a stable 
and extemally integral image of one's self, and that one gains the outsideness 
that rouses one's possibilities and enriches one's life. 
But even in Bakhtin's earliest writings, we find an intimation of the 
importance of dialogue, and more specitically of the importance of the other's 
response, for self-formation. In these early works, Bakhtin likens the other's 
response to me to a screen through which 1 see the other's possible enthusiasm, 
love, astonishment, or compassion for me. Looking through this screen, 1 achieve 
some deterrninate form, and hence sorne determinate value. Indeed, the value of 
my identity, of my sense of who 1 am, is shaped for me into an aesthetic whole, 
and intermittentIy throughout my life, by the acts of others in relation to me: "acts 
of concem for me, acts of  love, acts that recognize rny valuey' (p. 49). In a 
passage that is especially relevant to developmental concerns, Bakhtin describes 
how a child's initial sense of self is built out of the authoritative, loving words of 
others. He writes that 
as soon as a human being begins to experience himself fiom within, he at 
once rneets with acts of recognition and love that come to him fiom 
outside-fiom his rnother, fiom others who are close to him. The child 
receives ail initial determinations of himself and of his body fkom his 
rnother's lips and from the lips of those who are close to him. It is fiom 
their lips, in the emotional-volitional tones of their love, that the child 
hears and begins to acknowledge his own proper name and the narnes of 
al1 the features pertairllng to his body and to his inner States and 
experiences. The words of a loving human being are the fmt and the 
most authoritative words about him; they are the words that for the first 
time detemine his personality fiom outside, the words that corne to meet 
his indistinct inner sensation of himself, giving it a forrn and a name in 
which, for the first time, he finds himself and becomes aware of himself 
as a something. (Bakhtin, 1990, pp. 49-50) 
This passage illustrates quite clearly how others' words impart to the child the 
gift of form. It is in virtue of others' loving recognition, in virtue of the words 
addressed to and constmcted in the infant's reciprocating presence, that the 
infant's self-experience oîherwise acquires a specificity of form and content. 
This passage also suggests a particular conception of intemalization. A child 
hears others' words and voices and actively appropriates or internalizes them, 
that is, makes them his or her "own," and in the process achieves a sense of 
self that has a determinate form and emotional tone. Again, let me elaborate by 
quoting Bakhtin: 
The child begins to see himself for the first tirne as if through his 
mother's eyes, and begins to speak about himself in his mother's 
emotional-volitional tones-he caresses himself, as it were, with his first 
uttered self-expression. Thus, he uses Sedonate-diminutive terms in 
the appropnate tone of voice in refemng to hirnself and the limbs of his 
own body-"my footsies," "my tootsies," "my little head," "go night- 
night," "nightie-night." He determines himself and his States in this case 
through his mother, in his mother's love for him, as the object of his 
mother's cherishing, affection, her kisses; it is his mother's loving 
embraces that "give form" to him axiologically. From within himself, 
without any mediation by the loving other, a human being could have 
never begun to speak about himself in such affectionate-diminutive 
tones, or, at any rate, these forms and tones would not express properly 
the actual emotional-volitional tone of my self-expenence, my 
immediate inner relationship to myself (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 50) 
And so it is throughout one's life. For Bakhtin, Our self-understanding is built up 
out of the intoned, concrete voices we encounter and appropriate in the course of 
Our Iives. Not only in infancy or childhood but always, I rely on others' words 
to establish my place in existence. These others' words "corne to meet the dark 
chaos of my inner sensation of myself' (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 501, giving it a name, 
a direction, and linking it to the social world. In doing so, these others' words 
give real, material form to the otherwise indeterminate, formless world of my 
inner self sensation. 
These allusions to the process of achieving form through the 
intemalization of others' voices stand as a sort of bridge between Bakhtin's early 
phenomenological writings and those produced after Ianguage became a central 
category in his thought. In these later writings, Bakhtin (1986; Volosinov, 1986) 
is still concerned with the question of form, but approaches that question more 
expressly in terms of the constitutive, fom-imparting significance of Ianguage 
for subjectivity. 
The Speakinp Consciousness 
An assurnption that is foundational for a dialogical mode1 of the self is that 
language (qua discourse) plays a constitutive role in the delineation of human 
thought and experience, and therefore, by implication, in the demarcation and 
constitution of selfhood. Rather than view subjectivity as the property of an 
autonomous, rational entity, containing purely mental structures, Bakhtin 
construes it as an intemally diversified, socially and linguistically constituted 
proçess. Bakhtin challenges the notion of a disembodied, wordless & and 
directs us, instead, to a "speaking consciousness" (Holquist & Emerson, 198 1, p. 
434). On the Bakhtinian view, the material of the human psyche is 
preeminently inner speech- 
Within the Bakhtinian perspective, the notion that language is of  
constitutive significance for the self refiects a central and enduring concem in this 
fiamework with the embodiment or personification of thought. In particular, 
Bakhtin focuses on the ide* thought, or expenence as it finds embodiment in 
some signiQing matenal and as it lives in the space of communicative practice. 
In the boldest articulation of this position, Volosinov (1986) claims that 
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"inde~endent of ernbodiment in some particular material (the material of gesture, 
inner word, outsry), consciousness is a fiction"(p. 90). Similarly, Bakhtin and 
Medvedev (1978) h t e  that "no distinct or clear consciousness of  the world is 
possible outside of the word." (p. 133). And it is the word-"word" used here 
as a synecdoche for any type of verbal discourse-that is particularly cntical on 
the Bakhtinian view, for "it is the word which constitutes the foundation, the 
skeleton of inner Me" (Volosinov, 1986, p. 29). 
Underlying this view of subjective life as an internally diversified, 
socially and Iinguistically constituted process of inner speech is the fbrther, 
related assumption that expressibiiity is a condition of our ability to experience 
the world and ourselves in a rneaningful way. For a thought or experience to 
reach the threshold of rneaning or, equally, for it to be understood and interpreted, 
it must be expressible or communicable to others, which means it must find 
embodiment in some signiQing material, süch as words, stories, opinions, 
theories and so on. Again, Vnlosinov (1986) puts the point quite strongly in his 
argument that outside the material of signs experience as such does not exist and 
that any experienc-any t hought, intention, or emotion-is expressible, at least 
potentially. "This factor of expressivity," he writes "cannot be argued away 
from expenence without forfeiting the very nature of expenence" @. 28). It is 
not the case, then, that some forrn of interpretive understanding or rneaningful 
experience precedes expression-as Piaget and others (Harter, 1997; Stern, 
1985; de Gramont, 1990) argue-but that experience (or thought) itself is 
inextricably linked to the moment of expression, whether that expression takes 
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place in outer speech or on the plane of inner speech. There is simply no raw, 
direct expenence of the world, no meaningfiil thought about the world that 
precedes its embodiment in some discursive material. Rather, it is language or, 
more approprÏateIy, discourse, that constrains and enables the way we 
understand, and thereby experience, the world and ourselves. "It is not 
experience that organizes expression," adds Volosinov (1986), "but the other 
way around-expression organizes ex~erience" (p. 85). Expression is active 
and formative. It is "what first gives experience its form and specificity of 
direction" (p. 85). A feeling, for example, "cannot achieve culmination and 
definitiveness without tinding its extemal expression, without nurtunng itself 
on words, rhythm, color, that is, without being forged into a work of artyy 
(Volosinov, 1987, p. 87). Bakhtin (1986) hirnself expresses this sentiment 
somewhat more aphoristically: 'Wot frorn the thing to the word, but fiom the 
word to the thing; the word gives birth to the thing" (p. 153). In short, 
expression creates being; it does not simply mirror it. As Bakhtin (1986) States, 
"only thought uttered in the word becornes a real thought for another person 
and only in the same way is it a thought for myself' (1986, p. 127). Unformed 
notions are reconstituted into thought through dialogue with others. As Bakhtin 
(1986) puts it, it is others "for whom my thought becornes actual thought for the 
first time (and thus also for my own self as well)" (p. 94). Indeed, the degree to 
which the thought or experience carried in the word "is perceptibIe, distinct, and 
formulated is directly proportional to the degree to which it is socially 
onented" (Volosinov, 1986, p. 87). What this means in part, of course, is that 
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expression in and of itself presupposes a language community within which 
any given expression can take on meaning. Expression always presupposes a 
relation to some conimon language and horizon of understanding. 
It is worth noting that foregoing claims regarding the importance of 
expression for experience in no way constitute a posturing toward linguistic 
idealism. On the Bakhtinian view, language or discourse is not something that 
resides above Me, something that is independent of human expenence. While it 
is correct to Say that meaning needs language in order to reveal itself, this is not 
to suggest that meaning can be somehow reduced to language. Meaning or 
experience is always an expression "of the contact between the organism and the 
outside environment" (Volosinov, 1986, p. 26). In many respects, the Bakhtinian 
view accords wit h phenomenological-hermeneutical conception of language, a 
conception that Madison (1988) describes in the following terrns: 
It is Our lived experience that gets expressed in language and which 
confers on language whatever henneneutical-existential meaning it can be 
said to have. . . . Experience is not a metaphysical "other"; it is not 
something other than language that language merely "refers" to. . . . 
Language is not just the "expression" of experience; it experience; it is 
experience which cornes to know, acknowledge itself, to be this or that 
specific expenence. . . . When we achieve a more refined way of 
expressing an emotion, it is our emotional life itself which becomes more 
refined, not just Our description of it. (p. 165) 
Language without a foundation in experience, then, is as empty and meaningless 
as experience that eludes the realm of expressivity. Again, what expression does 
is impart a substantiveness to an otherwise inchoate experience. As Ricoeur 
(1983) has similarly argued in connection with the human impulse toward 
storytelling, narration is an act that configures a more primordial, prenarrative 
experience into something with meaning and structure: "the plots that we 
invent help us to shape Our confùsed, formless and in the last resort mute 
temporal experience" (p. 178). For his own part, Bakhtin (1 98 1) contributes to 
this argument by directing us more specifically both to the subject matter toward 
which language is directed and to the communicative context of its use. 
Discourse lives, as it were, beyond itself, in a living impulse . . . toward 
the object; if we detach ourselves completely fiom this impulse al1 we 
have left is the naked corpse of the word, fiom which we can l e m  
nothing at all about the social situation or the fate of a given word in life. 
To study the word as such. innonng the impulse that reaches out bevond 
it. is-iust as senseless as to studv psycholopical experience outside the 
context of that real life toward which it was directed and bv which it is 
determined. (p. 292) 
Language, in short, is always about something, always carries us toward 
something other than itself-toward a particular idea, a particular experience (cf. 
This emphasis on the formative nature of language establishes a general 
point of contact between contemporary philosophical arguments and Bakhtinian 
dialogism. On this postmodem view, we are said to encounter the world and 
everything in it through language; and even extralinguistic expenence, if it is to 
have any meaning for us, must be mediated by language. Each of the following 
excerpts seems to capture this emergent and defining theme of postmodern 
thought: 
Language is the double of being, and we cannot conceive of an object 
or idea that cornes into the world without words. (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, 
PP- 5-01 
From the moment that there is meaning there are nothing but signs. We 
think only in signs. (Demda, 1976, p. 50) 
Language is not a vanishing or transitory medium for thought, nor 
merely the covering of thought. The nature of language is by no means 
limited sirnply to revealing thought. It is much rather the case that 
thought achieves its own determinate existence by being comprehended 
in word. (Gadamer, PR p. 67) 
Our own existence cannot be separated f?om the account we can give of 
oursetves. It is in telling Our own ston'es that we give ourselves an 
identity. We recognize ourselves in the stones that we tell about 
ourselves. Tt  makes very little difference whether these stoties are true 
or  false, fiction as well as verifiable history provides us with an 
identity. (Ricoeur, 1985, p. 214) 
Each of these statements challenges the traditional epistemological understanding 
of language as a tool for expressing or communicating otherwise wordless ideas 
housed in the mind. And the self, by implication, is not some extra-cultural or 
prelinguistic phenomenon that we strïve simply to capture in language. As 
Ricoeur (1985) States, "there is no self-knowledge without some kind of detour 
through signs, symbols and cultural works" (p. 213). However divergent these 
postmodern philosophies are in other respects, they are generally united in their 
defence of t he constitutive, formative importance of language vis-à-vis 
subjectivity and selfiood. From Demda's (1 976) deconstructionist enterprise to 
Gadamer's (1989) ontological hermeneutics, the task remains that of dislocating, 
displacing or decentring the subject h m  the privileged position it has been 
accorded within the epistemic, moral, and existential space of modem discourse, 
and that it in many respects continues to enjoy in disciplines rooted in modern or 
empirical-rationalist commitments, such as psychology in its mainline empirical 
guise. Motivated by the need to situate our attempts to know the world and 
ourselves in a way that acknowledges Our embeddedness in the "life-wor1d"- 
that is, in the ongoing socially, culturally, and historicaily contingent practices of 
a community-investigators have tumed to language as the productive, enabling 
ground of positive possibilities for understanding. AccordingIy, the presumably 
self-suficient, autonomous subject of modemity, which, as a center of awareness 
seeks to construct its own individual foundations for knowledge and action, 
suffers a displacement precisely through its implication in the webs of language 
and social life, or, to use Taylor's (1989) felicitous phrase, in the "webs of 
intedocution." 
Each of the preceding viewpoints purges the concept of expression of its 
modem subjectivist flavour. Rather than conceive of expression as a secondary 
moment in the life of thought, seMng merely to extemdize or, equally, to 
communicate some imer experience, these accounts, in stressing the constitutive 
import of language, place expression more squarely in the rhetorical tradition. 
More specifically, on the dialogical view, the ontological distinction between an 
imer (individual, pnvate) world and an outer (social-ideological, public) world of 
Iinguistic communication-no Iess than the corollary dichotomies which it 
supports (e-g., mind-body, subject-abject)-is dissolved in positing that the stuff 
of human consciousness and individuai experience, as of outer expression, is the 
word. There is an ontoIogical and epistemological continuity here between the 
imer and the outer, between the individual and the social. And it is the dialogic 
word, the word that lives in social and cultural communicative practices, that is 
the bridge between these domains. 
It is in view of these arguments, moreover, that we can approach 
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thought not so much as a self-present realm of pure intenority, but as a 
phenomenon that is defined at the junctures of dialogic, linguistically rnediated 
exchange. For Bakhtin, inner Iife becomes Iess a bounded phenomenon than a 
boundary phenornenon, a social, "extraterritorial" phenomenon more properly 
situated in the space of dialogue between organism and environment, self and 
other (Volosinov, 1986). Indeed, "everythhg internai gravitates not toward itself 
but is tumed to the outside and dialogized, every interna1 experïence ends up on 
the boundq, encounters another, and in this tension-filled encounter lies its 
entire essence." (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 287). What emerges here is a new metaphor 
of locatedness. Inner Iife becomes a boundary phenomenon, a phenomenon 
situated in the space of dialogue between self and other. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE DLALOGIC UTTERANCE 
A dialogical approach to the self is founded on the assumption that we achieve 
rneaning as selves through communicative practice or discourse. As an 
individual's "own" utterance or discourse-both that which occurs extemaliy 
between interlocutors and that which transpires in inner speech-involves an 
invocation of and reliance on the word of the other, language use becomes the 
site of the other's active involvement in the constitution of self-refevant 
meaning. The purpose of this chapter is to address these foundational claims in 
greater detail through a consideration of Bakhtin's (1986; Volosinov, 1986) 
metalinguistic theory of the utterance. Arnong the specific themes 1 address in 
this chapter are the constitutive significance for the individual utterance of the 
pnor and anticipated words of others; the function of "speech genres" as social 
constraints on the individuai use of language; and the roIe of the 
"superaddressee" (or ideal listener) in the act of speech communication. As 
Bakhtin's account ofthe dialogic utterance reflects his enduring concem with the 
"eventness" of human action, let me begin by considenng the nature of the event 
in Bakhtin's thought. 
The Recovety of Eventness 
In his earliest writings in the area of ethics, Bakhtin (1993) launches a polemic 
against a mode of thought he calls "theoreticism," a style of thought which 
seeks above al1 to find what is generalizeable and constant in concrete human 
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actions. Closely allied with rationalist aspirations, this sort of thought is 
founded on the assumption that the meankg of any individual act inheres not 
in what is specific and unrepeatable about that act, but rather in the 
systemically organized rules, propositions, principles, or concepts of  which the 
individual act is a mere instantiation. It assumes that meaning, if it is to be of 
the rational variety, must speak to what is repeatable and constant in a given 
act. Anything situated outside the purview of a system of generalizations, any 
remainder or surplus not accounted for by some previously specified set of 
mies -anything unsystematizable, in other words-is deemed either 
inessential or inconsequential to meaning or, altematively, potentially 
subsumable under the yet-to-be-elaborated rules of  the system (Morson & 
Emerson, 1990). 
In the context of ethical thought, Kant's formulation of the categoncal 
imperative clearly exemplifies the theoreticist mandate. Kant's moral 
philosophy seeks to establish a universal foundation for ethical action and 
judgment, a foundation that on the Kantian scheme is provided by the 
generalized rules and norms implied by the categoncal imperative. On  this 
ethical framework, morality inheres not in what is individual and unrepeatable 
in an ethical deed but rather in what is comrnon to all-ultimately in what is 
universally and transcendentally valid. A particular moral agent's specific and 
local interests and circumstances do not establish the ethical value of the 
agent's moral acts or judgments. As an individual occupying a specific 
chronotopic platform-a specific place and t i m e t h e  one-and-on1 y "I" matters 
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little to categoncal ethics. On the categoncal view, moral agents are in 
principle generalizeable and replaceable-for after all, and again in principle, 
any nurnber of other people could have occupied the same position as the 
actual participants in any given moral act. For Kant, it is not the specificity of 
the participants that matters here but rather the timeless moral d e s  or 
principles that their actions instantiate. 
Now, from a Bakhtinian vantage point, the emphasis that categorical 
ethics places on abstract moral principles cornes at a very dear cost. By 
shortsightedly ignoring the inescapable particularity of moral agents, 
categorical ethics ignores what, according to Bakhtin, is the real source of 
ethical value and meaning. To extricate a thought, utterance, or deed from the 
contingency and partiality of its occurrence-to ignore the uniqueness and 
unrepeatability of the thought, utterance, or deed- is to "transcribe" away its 
"eventness," that is to Say, its living, unpredetermined quality, its concrete 
situatedness in time and place, and the particularized meaning attendant on this 
unsystematizable specificity. As Bakhtin reminds us, any true moral act or deed 
is always oriented responsibly toward the specific context in which it unfolds, 
toward the particularities of the "once-occurrent" (sole, singular, unique) 
situation in which a moral agent finds herself. The seat and sou1 of ethical 
cornportment are to be found precisely in the historical concreteness of the 
individual case, in the ongoing obligation to respond to the concrete 
circumstances in which the other is encountered, and not, as Kant argues, in 
some set of static, abstract, universally valid realm of moral noms  and rules. 
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Mordity is not categorical or transcendental, but local and specific, concrete 
and particular. Morality lives in particular people and particular contexts. The 
Bakhtinian ethical subject, Iike the knowing subject, is a fully real, embodied 
subject, a subject who occupies a specific temporal and spatial horizon and 
whose moral responses are conditioned by the uniqueness and unrepeatability 
of that horizon. Bakhtin's ethics do not resort to the ontological schemes of 
abstract or theoretical Kantian obligation, but rather highlight our need to 
address and respond to the other corn within a concrete, dialogical situation. 
While theoreticism, within itself, may be justified in its concern with 
abstract and general moments, it is fùndamentally incapable of providing a full 
account of the complexities and meaning-ethical or otherwise-of any real, 
individual human performance. For life is messier than theoreticism assumes: 
there is dways something in the concrete, historical event-a surplus, if you 
will-that eludes what is already given in the system of abstractions. An event is 
always more than an instantiation of a principle or concept. Indeed, with each 
real, concretely situated act 1 perform, 1 stand to create and contribute something 
new to the world-even if that contribution remains limited to the small world of 
my individual psyche. But even more than this, the eventness or unrepeatable 
particulanty of an event is the source of an act's most authentic value. As 
Bakhtin (1 993) elaborates, 
Everything taken independently of, without reference to, the unique 
center of value fiom which issues the answerability of a performed act 
is deconcretized and derealized: it is deprived of its weight with respect 
to value, it loses its emotional-volitional compellentness, and becomes 
an empty, abstractly universal possibility. (p. 59) 
It needs to be emphasized, however, that as an apologist for the 
concrete and the particular, Bakhtin is not simply privileging the opposite pole 
of a dichotomy. In claiming, for example, that the moral act or deed is the site 
of our unique answerability or responsibility, Bakhtin is not simply reducing 
the answerable act to  our own unique interests and predispositions. To do so, in 
fact, would be to remain ensnared by the binary, either/or logic that is so 
characteristic of theoreticist thought. In fact, dichotomous renderings of any 
sort-say, between the particular and the general, the individual and the social, 
the subjective and objec t iveare  the stuff of theoreticism' s rationalist cast of 
mind. Bakhtin consistently eschews the eithedor logic of this rationalist 
enterprise, opting instead for a relational, b o t h h d  logic that has the effect of 
undermining any such dichotomous painngs. Bakhtin seeks units of analysis 
that establish a relational union between the particular and the general, 
between lived experience and abstract content or meaning, between life and 
"theoretical cognition." Accordingly, every thought o r  act of mine, while 
speaking in some fashion to its generalized content, is an individually 
answerable performance or, to use Bakhtin's preferred expression, a "deed." 
Each of my deeds may be informed by abstract, generalized knowledge-such 
knowledge does, after all, provide me with possibilities-but there dways 
rernains the task of actualizing that knowledge. And it is in this moment of 
concrete actualization that what is otherwise abstract is imbued with real 
meaning: "Everything that is universal and pertains to  abstract sense . . . 
acquires its real heaviness and compellentness only in correlation with actual 
uniqueness" (1993, p. 44). 
Moreover, this abstract knowledge is in and of itself incapable of 
carrying the weight of obligation, for obligation resides in the concrete event. 
In the context of ethics, for example, Bakhtin claims that an act is oriented to 
theoretical knowledge in a way that does not in any way absolve us of the 
responsibility to make that knowledge morally significant. In what amounts to 
a defense of phronesis or practical, context-sensitive judgment (Gadamer, 
1989), Bakhtin maintains that we must always assess the implications of 
general knowledge in light of the present situation. The need for phronesis 
arises because rules can never exhaust the contingent, cornplex, even 
contradictory circumstances that define specific instances. So, for exampfe, if 
parents are called upon to settle disputes among their children and want to do this 
in a fair manner, they must assess the implications o f  whatever general rules 
they want to bring to bear on the situation by considering the particular 
features of this situation. To apply rules mechanically in a detached, objective 
manner without considering these particulars wouId, in the end, lead not so 
much to justice and fairness but to dogmatic insensitivity. The application of 
moral knowledge, then, cannot be reduced to a form of techné or mechanical 
knowledge but rather must include within itself a finite understanding of the 
actual circumstances facing the individual. Hence, the ethical or answerable act 
gathers within itself both the general and the individual. It is answerab!~ 
motivated by each of these realms. 
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Within the tradition of psychological scholarship, Bakhtin's criticism of 
theoreticism and his related efforts to rehabilitate the role of the particular and the 
eventful find their paraHels in James' (1948) essay on "the sentiment of 
rationality," a work that discusses, in terms strikingly similar to Bakhtin's, the 
contrasting demands of philosophical thought. In this essay James distinguishes 
between two modes of inquiry, each of which corresponds to a particular 
intellectual need or passion. In the first of these modes, which James calls the 
CC theoretic way," the philosopher, confionted with the "facts of the world in their 
sensible diversity," (p. 4) strives to conceive ofthis chaotic whirl of facts as the 
manifestation and expression of a single foundational fact. The philosopher seeks 
to reduce multiplicity to unity, an aim most clearly reflected, according to James, 
in the philosophical penchant toward classification. But while the classification of 
the world certainly satisfies the demands of theoretic philosophy, it is, says 
James, "a most miserable and inadequate substitute for the fullness of the tmth 
. . . a monstrous abridgrnent of life, which, Iike al1 abridgments, is got by the 
absolute loss and casting out of reaI matter" (p. 7). Hence, alongside of this 
impulse toward economy and simplification James says we find a competing 
impulse, one charactenzed by an allegiance "to clearness and integnty of 
perception, dislike of blurred outlines, of vague identificationsy7 (p. 5). This is an 
intellectual impulse that revels in the recognition of ccparticula.s in their full 
completeness" (p. 5), prefemng "any amount of incoherence, abruptness, and 
fkagmentariness . . . to an abstract way of conceiving things that, while it 
simplifies them, dissolves away at the same time their concrete fulnessy7 @. 5j. 
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M i l e  these rival passions may pose a dilemma for the philosopher, James 
contends that any philosophic strivings which hope to find acceptance require a 
balance of the sameness to which the theoretic mode aspires and the difference or 
otherness of the world3s phenomena that the more particularistic mode of thought 
seeks to express. "A man's philosophic attitude," writes James, 
is determineci by the balance in him of these two cravings. No system of 
pliilosophy can hope to be universally accepted among men which 
grossly violates either need, or entirely subordinates the one to the other. 
. . . m h e  only possible philosophy must be a compromise between an 
abstract monotony and a concrete heterogeneity. (p. 5) 
In many respects, Bakhtin appears to heed James' injunction. 
Throughout his writings, Bakhtin might be said to come across, even more 
insistently than James, as a prophet of particularity. He continually seeks to 
establish a clearing for the scholarly study of the eventness of human 
existence. From his earliest writings on the nature of the moral act to his most 
mature writings on the philosophy of language, he betrays an unwavering 
concem with the vicissitudes and significance of the concrete, histoxica! 
moment, seeking units of anaIysis that are adequate to its unrepeatable and 
unsystematizable particularity, and at the same time acknowledging the force 
of the general. As noted above, in his early work on ethics, Bakhtin (1993) 
proposes the "answerable act" or "deed" as the unit most capable of doing 
justice to both generalized content and the ethical demands of concrete 
situations. In effect, the act or deed has a dual orientation: it is directed at once 
to what is already given in the form of abstract moral rules and principles and 
to the unrepeatable exigencies that face us in the concrete circumstances in 
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which we are required to act. 
Bakhtin' s Metalinmistic Theory of the Utterance 
When language becomes a more central concern in Bakhtin's thought, it is the 
utterance that cornes to assume the role previousiy assigned to the answerable 
act or deed. Bakhtin (1986) proposes the utterance, as he did the act before it, 
as a way of recovering the importance of eventness to meaning, which in the 
case of language, is synonymous with a concem with the vicissitudes of 
concrete expression. In making the utterance his fundamental unit of analysis, 
Bakhtin is polemicizing more specifically against Saussure's (1966) structural 
Iinguistics. Bakhtin objects to Saussurean Iinguistics in the sarne way he 
objects, in his earliest writings, to the rationalist or theoreticist penchant for 
abstraction. Consistent with the theoreticist mode of thought, Saussurean 
linguistics posits a fiindamental distinction between Iangue and parole. Lanme 
refers to the systematic dimension of a language, to the abstract d e s  and 
constraints of language that together constitute a discrete and systemic whole. 
This system can be distinguished fi-om parole. the actual utterances of particular 
individuals. On the Saussurean view, parole is a mere instantiation of the 
normative structures of language. Moreover, as parole is regarded as a purely 
individual, id~nitely variable phenomenon, beset by the contingency and 
particularity of time and place associated with concrete expression, it eludes 
systernatic and scientific analysis and hence, according to Saussure, is beyond the 
purview of a rational philosophy of language. Only language conceived 
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paradigmatically, that is, as a dved and abstract systern comprising normatively 
identical or repeatable phonetic, grammatical, and lexical forms-in short, as 
Ianme-could be the subject of such analyses and hence be considered the 
proper object of study for linguistics. As Saussure (1 966) puts it, to study 
language is to study "speech less speaking" (p. 77). 
For Bakhtin, in contrast, it is precisely the event of speaking, the 
utterance, that needs to be considered more fiilly, for it is only in the concrete, 
histotically situated act of speech communication that language assumes its real 
being. "After ail," writes Bakhtin (1986), "language enters life through concrete 
utterances (which manifest language) and life enters language through concrete 
utterances as well" (p. 63). Language cannot be reduced to a timeless and 
abstract system, for to do so would be to deny that language is used by actual 
speakers to communicate specific intentions and to accomplish specific ends in 
a reaI world, In effect, Bakhtin collapses the sterile, structuralist dichotomy 
between the social, objective system of language and the individual utterance by 
forging a path between static form and infinitely variable content, a path 
traverse4 in the Bakhtinian scheme, precisely by the dialogic nature of utterance. 
Indeed, the situated act of speaking, the articulated utterance, is where language 
assumes its most authentic incarnation and where accrue to it d l  those features 
that distinguish it fiom language units, such as the sentence, that constitute the 
exclusive focus of traditional linguistic analyses. 
The Event of Meaning;. According to Bakhtin (1986), it is only as 
living, concrete expression that language regains the realm of actual (as opposed 
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to merely potential) meaning. In its concentration on the grammatical, syntactical, 
and phonetic features that detine Ianguage as a system, linguistic science 
decontextualizes Ianguage b y obscuring the dynamic, semantic life of the word. 
Limited to examining the purely forma1 relationships among iterative linguistic 
elements (e-g., phonemes, words, sentences), meaning camot help but rernain, on 
the traditional linguistic view, but an abstract possibility. In the absence of its 
spoken dimension, language is limited to expressing a static or generalized 
meaning, a sort of meaning in neor mortis. In other words, formal, linguistic 
analyses can only provide us with an understanding of "abstract meaning," which 
is to say the sort of self-identical, repeatable "significationyy we might find, for 
example, in dictionaries. The conventionalized, semantic entries in 
dictionaries-even the most obsessively unabridged ones-an never 
exhaustively specie the meaning that accrues to words when they are actuaI1y 
uttered by one interlocutor to another, even when those interlocutors are one and 
the same person, as is the case, for example, in inner speech. "Neutral dictionary 
meanings of  the words of a language," as Bakhtin (1986) writes, "ensure their 
cornmon features and guarantee that al1 speakers of a given language will 
understand one another, but the use of words in tive speech communication is 
always individual and contextual in nature" (p. 88). Dictionary meanings, then, 
cany o d y  the potential to mean. In order to be transforrned into what Bakhtin 
(1986) and Volosinov (1986) refer to as "real," "actual," or "contextual" 
meaning, abstract meaning must enter the realm of lived expression. Hence, 
while the utîerance's contextual meaning certainly presupposes-and indeed is 
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enabled by-abstract signification, contextual meaning is irreducible to abstract 
meaning. Actuai, concrete meaning is possessed of a semantic surplus whose 
origins lie in the very reasons people use language, namely, to achieve specific 
communicative effects in the world. 
One ûf the implications of Bakhtin's emphasis on the concrete, historicd 
event of speaking is the nonrepeatability of any utterance and of the contextual 
meaning it embodies. This too establishes the utterance's critical divergence fkom 
a purely linguistic unit such as the sentence. Sentences, d e r  all, can be repeated; 
they are, by definition, iterative units, and must be if they are to be the stuff of 
any rational linguistic analysis. The utterance, in contrat, is a singular, once- 
occurrent phenomenon. Even two verbally identical utterances will never, 
strïctly speaking, mean the same thingas2 Afier aII, the context and reason for 
being of each utterance will differ fiom those of every other utterance. Again, 
this follows from the fact that each utterance is boni of the meeting of abstract, 
generalized meaning with a unique, concretely historical context of enunciation. 
The Nature of Context: Demda and Bakhtin. The Bakhtinian emphasis 
on contextual meaning complicates the view which sees an utterance's 
meaning as originating solely within, and as coteminous with, the speaker's 
individual, self-present intentions. In these daims regarding the social- 
contextual nature of meaning and, correspondingly, the de-privileging of the 
speaker's intention, the Bakhtinian view accords with recent postmodem 
critiques of subjectivist, originarist conceptions of meaning. Demda's (1 978, 
1981, 1982) is one such critique. Both the Bakhtinian and Derridean accounts 
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problematize the conventional humanist (modernist) view of subjective 
agency, according to which the individual subject is empowered to 
communicate a univocal, self-identical, and self-present meaning through the 
medium of language. Both thinkers, in other words, challenge the conventional 
mode1 of communication, which posits the direct transmission of a univocal 
meaning fiom a sender (speaker, writer) to a receiver (listener, reader).s3 This 
challenge, moreover, cornes in the way of an emphasis on the inescapably 
contextual foundation of meaning. 
A more detailed consideration of the ways in which Derrida's stance 
converges with (and diverges eom) Bakhtin's requires that we examine their 
respective understandings of context more closely. Derrida's (1982) approach 
to the question of context can be discerned in his deconstruction of Austin's 
(1962) speech act theory-a theory, which, at first view, appears to share the 
Bakhtinian and Demdean emphasis on the contextual nature of meaning and 
on the de-privileging of the speaker's intentional stance. According to Austin, 
what defines a performative statement as a promise or a waming or a request- 
what establishes its illocutionary force, in other words-is not the inner state of 
mind that accornpanies the speaker's utterance but the features and conditions of 
the context in which the utterance is mad+features that can presumably be 
formally and exhaustively specified. 
As Derrida's deconstruction of Austin's theory shows, however, Austin 
reintroduces the very feature that he wants to subvert. More specifically, Austin 
resurrects the notion that the meaning of a speech act is determined by a 
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speaker's conscious, self-present intention at the moment of utterance. This 
(self-)deconstructive moment in Austin's account cornes about when he makes 
the distinction between "serious" and non-serious or "parasitic" contexts for 
speech acts. As Austin argues, a speech act rnust be uttered seriously, must be 
"felicitous," if it is to achieve its performative force. This notion of 
performative felicity requires, in other words, that the speaker rneans what he 
or she says- A promise spoken in jest, for example, would be lacking in 
commitment and therefore would not possess authentic perforrnative status. 
This distinction between felicitous and parasitic speech acts is required 
because Austin's efforts to speciQ the features of context (e-g., the nature of 
the words, the particularities of the circumstances, and persons required) that 
are necessary for an utterance to have a particdar meaning or force can never 
be completely successfiil. This is because an utterance can always be grafted 
ont0 a new context where the utterance would not have the illocutionary force 
it is supposed to have. To stop or control this process, Austin reverts to the 
notion that the success of a performative utterance depends on the presence of 
a signiwcg, self-present intention in the speaker's consciousness. 
On Demda's (1982) account, Austin's distinction between serious and 
parasitic utteraces points precisely to what is required for the success of a 
performative statement. More specificaIIy, Derrida claims that for an utterance 
to succeed, it must be "identifiable as conformine to an iterabie model," (p. 
326), must be "identifiable in some way as a 'citation"' (p. 326). That is to Say, 
the success of a speech act depends on the repetition of a conventional 
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procedure in other contexts, including parasitic ones. A senous speech act c m  
succeed only if it can be cited or repeated-stylized or  parodied, for 
example-in other, non-serious contexts. In short, the presence of the non- 
serious is what makes possible the serious. Hence Austin's effort to separate 
the serious fiom the parasitic employment of a speech act ultimately faiIs. 
What Derrida's deconstruction of Austin's theory foregrounds is the 
more general importance of citationality or  iterability in detennining the 
meaning of a signifying sequence. The iterability of signiGing forms implies 
that their meaning cannot be explained or located within the self-present 
intentions of a speaker or in the self-presence of a total context. Rather, these 
forms depend for their meaning on a larger system of non-self-present 
signification, on a play of difference that never coincides with an individual 
speaker's signifying intentions. The employment of a signi&ing form depends 
on the endless iterability of those forms through innumerable and unsaturable 
conditions, conventions, and contexts, contexts of which the speaker is not 
consciously aware over the course of his or her speech act. Context is not 
transparently present to the speaker. As Demda (1982) writes, "Every sign, 
linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written . . . can be  cited, put between 
quotation marks; thereby it can break with every given context, and engender 
infinitely new contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion" (Derrida, 1982, 
p. 320). What this view would seem to undermine, then, is the effort to speci@ 
contextual conditions exhaustively and formally. Contexts cannot be 
theoreticized or mastered or totalized, as Austin's theory suggests. While 
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meaning can be established oniy in context, context itself cannot be contained 
in a set of forma1 specifications-it cannot be specified without remainder, as 
Demda puts it. No one context determines the rneaning of a signiQing 
sequence. And it is precisely this multiplicity of  contexts that undermines the 
irnmediacy or  self-presence of meaning. 
Bakhtin (1986) converges with Derrida on this last point. Contextual 
meaning, he writes, "cannot be dissolved into concepts" (p. 160), but rather 
can only be revealed with the aid of another contextual meaning: 
Contextuai meaning is potentially infinite. . . . Each time [contextual 
meaning] must be accompanied by another contextuai meaning in 
order to reveal new aspects of its own infinite nature (just as the word 
reveals its meanings only in context). Actual contextual meaning 
inheres not in one (single) meaning, but only in two meanings that 
meet and accompany one another. There can be no "contextual 
meaning in and of itself3-it exists only for another contextual 
meaning, that is, it exists only in conjunction with it. Therefore, there 
can be neither a first nor a last meaning; it always exists arnong other 
meanings as a link in the chain of meaning, which in its totality is the 
only thing that can be real. In historical life, this chain continues 
infinitely. (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 146). 
This infinite contextual rneaning, moreover, suggests that Austin's efforts to 
establish a grammar of contexis, as it were-to codie  context-is misguided. 
Any context is infiinitely open to redescription, and hence is potentially 
unfinalizable. In this regard, one of Bakhtin's notebook entries is particularly 
apposite: "Context and code. A context is potentially unfinalized; a code must 
be finalized. A code is only a technical means of transmitting information; it 
does not have cognitive, creative significance. A code is a deliberately killed 
context" (1986, p. 147). 
But while there is a general agreement between Bakhtin and Derrida on 
the unfinalizability of context and, correspondingly, on the impossibility of a 
self-identical meaning, Bakhtin's understanding of context differs sharply fiom 
Derrida's in at least one crucial respect. Derrida's notion of iterability pertains 
to the repeatability of linguistic foms and hence betrays a concern with 
language in its systemic aspect (Evuis, 1990). Context for Demda is conceived 
rather abstractly, as an economy of difference characterized by the 
interminable play of signs-which results in the constant deferral of meaning. 
Meaning is never self-present, never stabilizes or cornes to rest in some 
transcendental, originary signified, but rather exists in a state of perpetual 
movement from one signifier to another. And accordingly, the speaker's 
intentions are inescapably subverted by the "slippage7' inherent in language. In 
contrast, context in the Bakhtinian sense speaks to an intertextual or 
interlinguistic or dialogical space of others' utterances, other subjects' voices. 
And it is precisely this context that allows for a determinate meaning (however 
partially and provisionally) to be attached to Iinguistic forms. In what follows, 
1 examine this context of others' words and voices, and its implications for 
dialogical conception of rneaning, in greater detail. 
Utterance as DiaIoeue 
To posit the embodied, contextualized utterance as the source and site of 
actual, unrepeatable meaning is at once to acknowledge that the utterance is an 
inescapably social phenornenon. For whatever else context may be, it is 
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decidedly social. In this regard, too, Bakhtin's approach to language diverges 
significantly from the Saussurean model, in which parole is depicted as a 
purely individual phenomenon. This traditional linguistic view assumes a 
telegraphic model of the communicative process, according to which 
information (e-g., an idea) is "transrnitted" fiom the mind of a speaker to the 
mind of a hearer. More formally, the rnodel posits the linguistic encoding of an 
idea into a signal by a sender, the transmission of this signa1 to a receiver, and 
the decoding of the signal into a message by the receiver. Premised on a 
modernist conception of communication, this mode1 accords Ianguage both the 
status of a code-employed by an individual speaker in the seMce of 
representing some object or content of thought-and the status of a conduit-a 
vehicle for the transmission of ideas. Absent fiom the model, however, is any 
recognition of the social-rhetorical nature of the communicative situation, any 
consideration of the fact, for example, that in formulating an utterance, a speaker 
has a specific sense of the Iistener and specific expectations about how the 
utterance will be understood and responded to by an other. Ultirnately, the 
telegrap hic rnodel regards the speaker's utterance as a purely monological 
phenomenon, the product and performance of a single consciousness, voice, and 
intention. 
Bakhtin departs f?om the telegraphic mode1 of communication in his 
emphasis on the social nature of the utterance. According to Bakhtin, every 
utterance is subject to certain social constraints, constraints that operate, however 
consciously or unconsciously, in any speech situation and in any utterance-fi-om 
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a wordless sigh to a single-word rejoinder in dialogue, to a multi-volume 
philosophical treatise. Most pertinent to the present discussion are those 
constraints suggested by the Bakhtinian refrain that "Any utterance is a Iink in a 
very complexly organized chain of other utterances" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 69). By 
this Bakhtin means to say that above and beyond its relation to its speaker and to 
its object, any utterance relates dialogicalIy to other utterances-ne's own or 
others'-on the same topic. Indeed, the concrete and unrepeatable meaning of 
any given utterance rests in large part on the unique constelIation of dialogical 
relations with other utterances into which that utterance inescapabiy enters. 
Bakhtin argues that the study of such dialogical relations is beyond the purview 
of purely linguistic analyses. While traditional linguistic units such as words 
and sentences do relate to one another, they do so only through a system of 
formal, grammatical oppositions (Saussure, 1966). According to Bakhtin 
(1986), however, such systeïnic interrelations do not amount to dialogical ones. 
While dialogical relations do "presuppose a language . . . they do not reside 
within the system of a language. They are impossible among elements of a 
- language" (p. 117). Nor can dialogicaI relations be reduced to "logical, 
linguistic, psychological, mechanical, or any other natural relations" (Bakhtin, 
1986, p. 124). There can be no dialogical interaction between the forma1 
elements of a system, or, equally, between concepts or abstractions. To use one 
of Bakhtin's (1984) examples, two sentences, "Life is good" and "Life is not 
good," while connected to each other through the logical relation of negation, 
do not enter into a dialogic relationship: "diey do not argue with one another in 
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any way (although they can provide the referential material and logical basis 
for argument)" (p. 183). Dialogical relations are possible only among 
embodied utterances. In other words, sentences need to be envoiced, must 
belong to someone in particular, before they can enter into more cornplex, 
dynarnic semantic relations with other utterances. In short, in the absence of 
any reference to actual speech events, the sentence remains closed off to 
dialogicaI, utterance-to-utterance relations. It is for these reasons that Bakhtifi 
(1 984) pürsues what he calls a ccmetalinguistic" approach to the utterance, an 
approach that attends to those features of an utterance-most notably its 
dialogical implication in a web of other utterances-that purely linguistic 
fi-ameworks have failed properly to accommodate. 
But what, more precisely, does Bakhtin mean when he writes of an 
utterance's dialogical interrelationships with other utterances? What, more 
simply, does he mean by dialogue in this particular context? On the Bakhtinian 
view, the meaning of dialogue exceeds the cornmonsense notion of verbal turn- 
taking. Dialogue is more than "merely . . . a compositional form in the 
structuring of speech" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 279). What this more usual 
conception of dialogue ignores, according to Bakhtin, is the "interna1 
dialogism of the word, which does not assume any extemal compositional 
forms of dialogue" (p. 279). Utterances are intemally dialogical. More 
specifically, they are shaped fiom within by a dual dialogical orientation. First, 
utterances are conditioned or constrained by what has already been said about 
the subject to which the utterance speaks; every utterance is related dialogically, 
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and with v q i n g  degrees of awareness, to the already-spoken discourse and 
historicaliy accrued rneanings on the topic at hand. Second, any utterance is 
shaped by what has yet to be said about the subject, that is, by the anticipated 
word and responsive understanding of the other to whom the utterance is 
addressed. In sum, no utterance is an island. Each utterance ccalways 
presupposes utterances that precede and follow it. No one utterance can be the 
fïrst or  the last. Each is only a link in the chain, and none can be studied 
outside this chainy' (p. 136). Let us now consider this chah of  utterance in 
greater detai t. 
The Already-S~oken. Ricoeur (1988) writes "that we are never in a 
position of being absolute innovators, but rather are always first of al1 in the 
situation of being heirs" (1988, p. 22 1). The world we encounter is invariably 
an already-interpreted, already-talked-about world. This insight finds a unique 
expression in Bakhtinys (1986) writings on the utterance, and more specifically 
in his congenial claim that "any speaker is himself a respondent to a greater or 
iesser degree. He is not, after all, the first speaker, the one who disturbs the 
etemal silence ofthe universe" (p. 69). Bakhtin (1986) reminds us that any 
utterance, even if it appears to be directed solely to its object, 
cannot but bey in some measure, a response to what has already been 
said about the given topic, on the given issue, even though this 
responsiveness may not have assumed a clear-cut extemal expression. 
It will be manifested in the overtones of the style, in the finest nuances 
of the composition. (p. 92) 
In formulating a discourse about a topic, then, a speaker has a sense of what was 
previously said about the topic. Accordingly, the speaker's utterance relates to 
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past utterances that had the same object, such that any individual utterance is 
always "a new link in the historical chah of speech communication" (p. 106). 
Each utterance responds to utterances that have corne before it and engages these 
utterances dialogically in some way: "refutes, affirms, supplements, and relies on 
the others, presupposes them to be known, and somehow takes them into 
account" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 91). This "interna1 dialogism" of the utterance 
suggests the presence within the utterance of multiple-and often 
compositionally unmarked-voices. Our utterances are inhabited and interlaceci 
by the voices of others who have spoken or written about a given matter, either in 
the distal or proximal past. In this regard, oilr utterances are "double-voiced" 
(see Chaptor 6). Consequently, Bakhtin can write that Our voice is "not impelled 
toward a well-rounded, finalized, systematically monologic whole" (Bakhtin, 
1984, p. 32), but rather stands forever as a re-Îoinder in an ongoing, unfïnalizable 
dialogue. 
Clearly, Bakhtin's account of the already-spoken-about quality of the 
utterance complicates a purely referential view of language, according to which 
words signiQ their objects in a simple and direct way. What Bakhtin is saying, 
in contrast, is that "no living word relates to its object in a sinmilar way" (p. 
276). When we speak or write about an object (topic, subject matter, issue), it is 
never the object in and of itself that we encounter, for the object is always 
aiready constituted for us by others' interpretive utterances about it. In a passage 
heavy with înetaphor and imagery, Bakhtin (198 1) writes that 
between the word and its object, between the word and the speaking 
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subject, there exists an elastic environrnent of other, alien words about 
the sarne object, the same theme, and this is an environrnent that is often 
difficult to penetrate. It is precisely in the process of living interaction 
with this specific environment that the word may be individualized and 
given stylistic shape. . . . Indeed, any concrete discourse (utterance) finds 
the object at which it was directed already . . . overlain with 
qualifications, open to dispute, charged with value, already envefoped in 
an obscuring mist-or, on the w n t r q ,  by the "light" of alien words that 
have aiready been spoken about it. It is entangled, shot through with 
shared thoughts, points of view, alien value judgments and accents. The 
word, directed toward its object, enters a dialogically agitated and 
tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgments and accents, 
weaves in and out of complex interrelationships, merges with sorne, 
recoils from others, intersects with yet a third group: and al1 this may 
cmcially shape discourse, may leave a trace in al1 its semantic layers, 
rnay complicate its expression and uifluence its entire stylistic profile. 
(1981, p. 276) 
Its dense imagery aside, this passage succeeds in pointing up that the relation 
between the speaker's word and the other's already-uttered word on a given 
topic is, if nothing else, a highly complex one. The word signifies the object 
o d y  through the prism of heteroglot and stratified discourses which engage and 
interanimate one another dialogically. Our speech always takes place in this 
"tension-filled environment" comprised of otherst words and value judgrnents, 
an environment that includes even of our own previously uttered words. It is in 
this highly "agitated" arena that the speaker must constmct his or her utterance. 
In contrast to the assumptions of modernist view, then, the utterance does 
not simpIy "express" some inner, private thought of an insular consciousness, but 
rather speaks out of a tradition of discourse. The utterance never embodies a 
"separate thought" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 93), that is, a thought, claim, or 
proposition that bears only on its referential object (e-g., an idea, an 
experïence). Utterances, and hence thoughts, always live in dialogic interaction 
with other utterances, and other thoughts. This conception of the 
utterancdthought as aIways in some measure a response to what has already 
been said or wrïtten about a subject clearly problematizes the rnodernist quest of 
"starting again with a clean slate." The monological pretensions of modemkm 
notwithstanding, any utterance-a philosophical treatise, for example- 
cannot but be, in some measure, a response to what has already been 
said about the given topic, on the given issue, even though this 
responsiveness may not have assumed a clear-cut external expression. 
It will be manifested in the overtones of the style, in the finest nuances 
of the composition. (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 92) 
Let us take Descartes as an example. Even Descartes' most monologic wrïtings 
do not stand alone, but are themselves links in a traditionary chain of 
communication. Descartes' understanding of the knowing subject, like that of 
other modem thinkers, is situated in a particular sociocultural, historical, and 
linguistic context. In building an edifice of knowledge, Descartes was, after ail, 
constrained to use the French or Latin languages in developing his ideas, 
languages which camed the formal and thematic weight of their own 
prejudices and which, therefore, both constrained and enabled his 
philosophical discourse. The discourse and thought of the past, for example in 
the form of traditional logic and metaphysics (substance, matter, form, causality, 
reality, accident, and so on) still informeci his meditations (Gallagher, 1992), 
despite his self-conscious efforts to put them aside and begin "from scratch." 
That Descartes' discourse is a link in the chain of speech communion is fùrther 
suggested by his appealing to the cogto "as rebutting Montaigne's denial of 
certainty in philosophy" (Toulmin, 1990, p. 72). Descartes' cogito ergo sum, 
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moreover, clearly stands in a relation of agreement with a similar pronouncernent 
made by Augustine centuries earlier-although the expression of such agreement 
was not a part of Descartes' "speech plan," as Bakhtin might put it. Far fiom 
being the product of an isolated individual, then, Descartes' philosophical 
project was a rejoinder in a conversation that preceded him and which he 
engaged-and to which he contributed--dialogicalIy. In this regard, Bakhtin's 
(1986) daim that "dialogic relations are always present, even among 
profoundly monologic speech works" (p. 125) seems particularly apt. 
Addressivity We saw above that the telegraphic mode1 of 
communication conceives of the act of speech in unidirectional terms; that is to 
Say, it posits a speaker as the sole source of a message and a rather passive 
Mener-passive in the sense that the listener participates merely in the 
"extraction" of meaning fiom the speaker's words and not, more critically, in the 
construction of that meaning fiom the outset, at the utterances's origin as it were. 
B y failing adequately to acknowledge the role of the other in the process of 
speech communication, the telegraphic mode1 obscures what, on the Bakhtinian 
view, is the most essential aspect of this process, narnely, the Iistener's active 
role in the life of the utterance. 
The fact is that when the listener perceives and understands the 
meaning (the language meaning) of speech, he simultaneously takes an 
active, responsive attitude toward it. He either agrees or disagrees with 
it (completely or partially), augments it, applies it, prepares for its 
execution, and so on. (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 68) 
In contrast to a transmission mode1 that pays only lip service to the role of the 
other (listener, receiver) in the speech process, Bakhtin daims that the way in 
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which the speaker senses or imagines the addressee enters as a constitutive 
moment in the creation o f  his or her utterance, contri buting materialIy to its 
compositional form, style, content, and rneaning. Bakhtin (1986) writes that 
fiom the very begiming, the utterance is constmcted while taking into 
account possible responsive reactions, for whose sake, in essence, it is 
actually created. . . . When constructing my utterance, 1 try actively to 
determine this response. Moreover, 1 try to act in accordance with the 
response 1 anticipate, so this anticipated response, in tum, exerts an 
active influence on my utterance. (pp. 94-95) 
Bakhtin is refemng here to a defining aspect of any utterance: "its qudity of 
being directed to someone, its addressivity" (p. 95). As we formulate Our 
individual utterances, the other's "voicey7 or "semantic position" is taken into 
account such that it enters into the utterance as an active and necessary 
constitutive element. As Bakhtin (198 1) argues, "every word is directed toward 
an answer and cannot escape the profound influence of the answering word 
that it anticipates . . . Responsive understanding ie a fundamental force, one 
that participates in the formulation of disco~rse '~ (p. 280). As a speaker, 1 
continually anticipate and count on the listener's active responsive 
understanding-on the addressee's recognition, acknowledgment, agreement¶ 
disagreement. In any instance of speech communication, "the speaker stnves to 
get a reading on his own word, and on his own conceptual horizon, that 
determines this word, within the alien horizon of the understanding receiver" 
(1 98 1, p. 282). Hence in each utterance we can discem the voice of  a listener 
or addressee, a "second" voice that participates actively in the construction of 
the utterance. 
According to Bakhtin (1980, this addressee can take a number of varied 
foms, depending on the sphere of human activity in which the utterance is 
situated. For example, the 
addressee can be an immediate participant-interlocutor in an everyday 
dialogue, a differentiated collective of specialists in some particular area 
of cultural communication, a more or less differentiated public, ethnic 
group, contemporaries, likeminded peopIe, opponents and enemies, a 
subordinate, a supenor, someone who is lower, higher, farniliar, foreign, 
and so forth, And it can also be an indefinite, unconcretized other. 
(Bakhtin, 1986, p. 95) 
Any utterance, in short, is always directed, with varying degrees of awareness, 
to a real or potential, physically present or imagined, other. So cmciaI in fact is 
this feature of addressivity that only when a word or sentence is addressed to a 
real or implied other does it become an utterance with real, concrete meaning; 
indeed, "without [addressivity] the utterance does not and cannot exist" (p. 99). 
The notion of addressivity, no less than the idea that an utterance relates 
dialogically to previously uttered views on a subject, requires that we conceive of 
the utterance as a decidedly collaborative, interlocative accomplishment. While it 
is no doubt tme that the speaker "owns" the utterance, this is only in the 
narrowest of senses, only perhaps in the physiological sense as the site of 
particular reverberations in the vocal tract (Volosinov, 1986). But as socially 
meaningful discourse, the utterance belongs to at least two people: the speaker 
and his or her listener. In this sense, the utterance 
is interindividual. Everything that is said, expresseci, is located outside 
the "soul" of the speaker and does not belong only to him. The word 
cannot be assigned to a single speaker. The author (speaker) has his own 
inalienable right to the word, but the listener also has his rïghts, and 
those whose voices are heard in the word before the author cornes upon 
it also have their rights (&er all, there are no words that belong to no 
one). The word is a drama . . . perfomed outside the author, and it 
cannot be introjected into the author. (Bakhtin, 1986, pp. 121 -122) 
And similarly for Volosinov (I986), 
the word is a two-sided act. It is determined equaIIy by whose word it is 
and for whom it is meant. . . . Each and every word expresses the "one" 
in relation to the "other." 1 give myself verbal shape from another's point 
of view. . . . A word is a bridge thrown between myself and another. If 
one end of the bridge depends on me, then the other depends on my 
addressee. A word is temtory shared by both addressor and addressee, by 
the speaker and his interlocutor. (Volosinov, 1986, p. 86) 
Through the prism of Bakhtin's metalinguistic conception of the utterance, 
then, we see that the construction of an utterance never simply involves a 
completely fiee and individual combination of forms of  language. The 
utterance cannot be generated ex nihilo by the individual speaker but requires 
the second voice of an addre~see.'~ 
To illustrate this point, let us return once again to Descartes. Despite 
his withdrawal in solitude, and despite the self-understanding that his most 
authentic se!f was a separate, disembodied entity, owing nothing to others for 
its constitution, Descartes can reasonably be argued to have constructed the 
autobiographical and philosophical discourse of his Meditations against the 
dialogical backdrop of an other's reciprocating presence. He did, after dl ,  
craft the preface of this worlg as he himself suggests, in light of the anticipated 
and actual ccobjections and replies" of others. Moreover, as O'Banion (1992) 
has recently noted, Descartes' decision to write his discourse in both French 
and Latin may well be regarded as "a rhetorical decision designed to sidestep 
ecclesiastical authonty and appeal directly to academics" (O'Banion, 1992, p. 
141). And might we not also regard Descartes' malin eenie (evil genius) as an 
imagina1 other, a sort of virtual addressee whose anticipated objections and 
ruses figure crucially in constituting Descartes' discourse? His antipathy 
toward the concerns of rhetorical scholars notwithstanding, it would appear 
that Descartes was no less bound to exploring and building his notions through 
the refiactive mirror of his interlocutors, both real and imagined-again, 
despite any monological aspirations he might have harboured about his 
discourse as "speech that is addressed to no one and [that] does not presuppose 
a response" @akhtin, 1986, p. 117) 
Speech Genres. Closely related to the Bakhtinian notion of addressivity is 
that of speech genres. Speech genres refer to the relatively stable types of 
utterances that characterize language use in particular spheres of human 
activity. "We speak only in definite speech genres, that is, all our utterances 
have definite and relatively stable typicai forms of constnxtion of the whole." 
(Bakhtin, 1986, p. 78). Whereas utterances are individual and momentary, in 
the sense that they reflect the unrepeatable dimensions (the eventness) of 
concrete Ianguage use, "each sphere in which language is used develops its own 
relatively stable types of these utterances" (p. 60). Genres are collective and 
historical, and hence implicate the speaker's broader institutional and 
sociocultural setting. However, genres are not merely linguistic devices. As 
reflections of mord values, beliefs, and social evaluations, they are also 
discursive h e w o r k s  that help us interpret the world. As we look out and try to 
make sense of the world, we always do so through the eyes of particular speech 
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genres. Genres create and conmunicate particular ccthemes7' by giving direction 
as to what constitutes an appropriate topic, by guiding what can and cannot be 
said in given situations, by specifying a range of questions and answers, by 
guiding the speaker's choices with respect to lexical and syntactic forms, and 
The relevance of genres to the notion of addressivity inheres in the fact 
that the utterance's belongingness to a particuIar genre is based on the relation 
of the individual's word to the word of others: "each speech genre in each area 
of speech communication has its own typical conception of the addressee, and 
this defines it as a genre" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 94). Genres are characterized and 
constituted by various forms of addressivity and various conceptions of the 
addressee. 
The Su~eraddressee. Aithough when formulating his or her utterance a 
speaker may not always have a particular, concrete addressee in mind, a 
reciprocating, interlocutory presence of some kind is always assumed. Bakhtin 
(1986) adds, however, that the speaker "car, never turn over his whole self and 
his speech work to the complete and final will of addressees who are on hand 
or nearby" (p. 126). Accordingly, in addition to the second voice of the 
immediate addressee(s), the speaker 
aIways presupposes (with a greater or lesser degree of awareness) some 
higher instancing of responsive understanding that can distance itself in 
various directions. Each dialogue takes place as if against the 
background of the responsive understanding of an invisibly present 
third party who stands above al1 the participants in the dialogue. (p. 
126) 
Separate fiom an actual addressee, this "superaddressee" is a hypothetical 
presence "whose absolutety just responsive understanding is presumed, either 
in some metaphysical distance or in distant historïcal tirne" (p. 126). The 
nature of this ideal addressee may Vary culturally and historically, and may 
assume different ideological embodirnents-for example, "God, absolute tmth, 
the court of dispassionate human conscience, the people, the court of history, 
science, and so forth" (p. 126). This irnplicit "third" voice may be seen as a 
recognition of a strong psychological need to achieve understanding and 
legitimation fiom others (Cheyne & Tamlli, 1999) (see Chapter 4). For the 
superaddressee fùlly compreliends the speaker's utterance and hence allows the 
speaker to make his or her utterance even in the face of doubts about whether the 
"second" voice of the actual addressee will understand or respond. When we 
speak, we imagine being understood, perhaps only partially by our addressee, 
but more perfectly by Our superadressee. Like the real (physically present or 
imagined) addressee, the superaddressee "is a constitutive aspect of the whole 
utterance, who, under deeper analysis, can be revealed in it' (pp. 126-127). 
As the preceding discussion suggestq the utterance is implicated in a 
complex social situation consisting of the past and anticipated words of others, 
culturally specific generic forms, and a superaddressee's responsive 
understanding. Because consciousness on the Bakhtinian view is always a 
speaking consciousness, wha? we have said in regard to the utterance might be 
said equally about the self. It is to this parallelism of utterance and self that 1 
now tum. 
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CHAPTER 4 
UTTERANCE AND SELF 
We have seen that meaning, on the Bakhtinian view, is a dialogical, 
interlocative achievement, one that hinges on the self-other relations that 
characterize vocative exchange. Having considered Bakhtin' s metalinguistic 
account of the utterance, we are now in a position to consider some of the 
implications of this account for a conception of the self as a dialogically 
constituted phenomenon- The assumption guiding the following discussion is 
that the nature and vicissitudes of the dialogical self parallel those of the 
utterance: the dialogic self and the dialogic word work in the same way. 
Accordingly, 1 elaborate, first, a conception of the self as an unrepeatable event 
of meaning. Then 1 consider the self as a phenomenon that implicates both the 
previous and anticipated utterances of others and that assumes particular 
generic forms. Finally, 1 discuss the ontological significance (for the seIf) of 
the other's recognition and, through a consideration of Iiterary and everyday 
examples, chart the implications of its absence. 
The DiaIosical Self as an Unrepeatable Event of Meanine; 
Like the utterance to which it is constitutively related, the dialogicaI self is an 
unrepeatable event of meaning. To regard the self as a phenomenon 
characterized by eventness is to highlight the degree to which one's emergent 
sense of identity is a concretely situated act or performance carried out for 
particular purposes and under particular circumstances. If on sorne occasion, 
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for example, 1 reflect upon or t a k  about who 1 am or engage in a discourse 
about a particular self-relevant expenence, 1 am doing something very specific 
with words. In speaking, 1 am achieving some end, answering a specific 
question, creating a specific effect in the world. Lideed, it is only when I 
engage the world eventfùlly or participatively through the medium of 
language, through concrete expression, that I acquire a specific sense of self. In 
its eventness, this dialogically constituted self involves the specific 
achievement of a once-occurrent, unrepeatable meaning. If on two separate 
occasions, for example, 1 describe myself as "a graduate student in psychology 
struggling to complete my dissertation," the meaning of these words for me is 
diEerent, even if only slightly, on each of the occasions in which 1 utter them. 
After all, the specific context of enunciation o f  the second utterance is different 
from the first, time having intervened to make it so. Each time f utter these 
words, covertly to myself or overtly to others, 1 do so for vanous unrepeatable 
reasons having to do with the specific time and place 1 occupy in existence. 
What this suggests, then, is that the dialogical self is a site of perpetual 
becoming. The task of determining who and what I am-and even that 1 am- 
is never a matter of finished business. My identity confronts me as an 
unfinalizable process of moment-to-moment meaning in the making. 
Deterrnining my identity presents itself to me as an ongoing, never completed 
task, a project always yet to be achieved. The self is a never-ending, creative 
process, constantly accruing new meanings. Indeed, my whole life is composed 
of a series of such deeds. 
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In its eventness, the dialogical self differs quite substantially £rom what 
psychologists usually refer to as the self-concept. By definition, the self- 
concept, like any concept, is a generalization or a system of generalizations 
(schemata, propositions, and so forth), and hence speaks to what is abstract and 
repeatable about the self. Indeed, the assurnption underlying the use of self- 
concept as a mediating variable in psychological explanations of human 
behaviour is that the self-concept relates to any instance of self-relevant 
behaviour as a general to a particular moment. Just as the traditional linguistics 
assumes that the formal elements and generalized rneanings of the language 
system are simply instantiated in the individual act of speech, so too is it 
assumed that underlying any given individual act is a self-concept which in 
effect contains the meaning of that act. Any situated, self-relevant human act 
or thought is understood as an instantiation of a particular self-concept or 
systern of self-concepts. In this respect, psychology, particularly in its 
contemporary cognitivist self-understanding, espouses a commitment to what 
Williams (1989) calls "intellectualisrn": "the idea that al1 behavior is to be 
explained by some act of rule-governed cognition" (p. 108). What a person 
dues, and hence the rneaning of what a person does, "is a fùnction of the 
concepts andor rules that characterize the psychologically real structures of his 
or her mind" (p. log), an assumption perfectly in keeping with theoreticism's 
rationalist penchant. Meaning, on this view, onginates in the structures and 
processing of the individual mind and is a function of the mental representations 
of an object of experience. To understand the meaning of action requires that we 
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examine these individuai, internai representations (Wakefield, 198 8)- 
While the notion of the self-concept satisfies mainline psychology's 
nomothetic strivings for prediction and control, as a transcription or 
generalization of experience, it omits something essential: the eventness of 
expenence, and hence of the self. To be sure, one's self-concept is inductively 
derived from individual experience-a fact which would seem to distinguish it 
tiom the sorts of transcendental abstractions and generalizations (ethical, 
linguistic, or otherwise) that preoccupied Bakhtin in his critique of 
theoreticism. But the self-concept does betray a family resemblance to these 
more impersonal concepts and abstractions in that it inhabits a domain outside 
the concrete, historical event. As such, the self-concept remains incapable, 
fiom within its own explanatory possibilities, of capturing the eventness of the 
self. 
Nor can the dualism of concept and event, of cognition and Iife, be 
surmounted from within cognition itself Such a strategy is suggested, for 
example, by those who put forth hierachical models of the self s 
multidimensionality (e-g., Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Epstein, 1973; 
Shavelson & March, 1986). The general notion underlying such models is that 
the self s diversity consists in some organized collection of knowledge 
structures (e.g., schemata, prototypes, subselves, episodic exemplars, goals, 
images, propositions, attriblites, and so on) which represent differentially 
abstract encodings of self-relevant information. Though hierarchical models 
differ in the way they conceptualize the association among features and levels, 
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they are generally consistent in positing a core or global self-conception at the 
hierarchy's apex with many more self-aspects positioned subordinately beneath 
it. The most abstract eIements of the self (e-g., the general self-concept) sit at 
the top of  the hierarchy; intermediately abstract components (e-g., the 
academic self-concept) occupy the middle ranges of the hierarchy; and the 
lowest-level abstractions sit at the bottom of the hierarchy. Within such 
hierarchical models, the fûnction of the general, most superordinate self is to 
provide a sense of unity in the face of the individual's diverse and sometimes 
conflicting self-relevant experiences. It is a theoretical expression o f  the 
self-continuity we experience in the face of different, context-dependent 
manifestations of our selves. The lowest-level self-representations, on the other 
hand, are meant to represent episodic or behavioural exemplars that are closely 
tied to specific contexts. The purpose of including this lowest level of  self- 
representations is to accommodate the fact that we behave and see ourselves 
differently in different contexts. In other words, through the inclusion of such 
context-specific representations investigators attempt :O establish a sort of 
mental grammar of sel f-relevant contexts. Now, according to the dialogical 
perspective, this mental grammar of contexts, however much it might suggest a 
means of accommodating the contextual specificity of  the self-concept, 
remains incapable of accounting for the self-relevant meaning associated with 
any actual, concretely situated act. Even the lowest-order, most contextually 
specific abstractions-the phonemes of the self, as it were-cannot exhaust the 
meaning generated in an actual performance. 
121 
What role, then, is the self-concept to play in a dialogical conception of 
the self? In light of the preceding arguments, the nature of the self-concept and 
its explanatory primacy vis-à-vis self-relevant meaning and expenence has to 
be reconsidered. More specifically, just as generalized ethical knowledge 
constitutes but a moment in the Iife of the ethical act, so too must the self- 
concept, as a distillation of personal experience, be seen as but a constituent, 
technical moment in the life of the self. The self-concept is, on this revised 
view, a statement of what is given to the self before any concrete act or event. 
Bakhtin's (1993) comments on the nature of generalized knowledge are 
suggestive in this regard: 
The abstract-sense aspect, when it is not correlated with inescapable 
actual uniqueness, has the character of a project: it is something like a 
rough draft of a possible actualization or an unsigned document that 
does not obligate anyone to do anything . . . only through the 
answerable participation effected by a unique act or deed can one get 
out of the realm of endless draft versions and rewrite one's Iife once 
and for al1 in the form of a fair copy. (p. 44) 
Through articulation and embodiment in a dialogical self, the concept enters 
the life of concrete meaning and value, and it is there that it suffers its peculiar 
displacement. The self-concept achieves its fuIlness only in the event. The 
event is what puts flesh on the concept, bnngs it within the folds of the real 
moment. The dialogical self is where the concept enters life. 
As an event of meaning, the dialogical self is, to be sure, created out of 
what is given and hence must somehow be oriented fiom within itself to 
generalizations drawn 5om experience. In this respect it is analogous both to 
the individual utterance, which needs the resources of the given system of 
language to corne into being, and to the ethical deed, which needs to be 
onented to and aware of general ethical prescriptions if it is to be nothing more 
than a random act. But also Iike the utterance and the ethical act, the dialogical 
seif, as an event, must be a response to and product of the particularities of the 
moment. The dialogical self, like the dialogical utterance, is situated at the 
intersection of the general and the particular.s5 But precisely as a 
particularistic, singular, creative, and unpredictable event of meaning, the 
dialogical self surpasses what is given in the self-concept. The notion of a 
dialogical self reminds us that we never filly coincide with concepts about 
ourselves. 
The Self and the Alreadv S~oken  
James (1950a) writes that "it would be dificult to find in the actual concrete 
consciousness of a man a feeling so limited to the present as not to have an 
inkling of anything that went before" @. 241). As an event of meaning, self- 
relevant discourse orients itself toward and engages the already uttered words 
of others. In foming an utterance about myself, I cannot help but be influenced 
by previous utterances-my own and others', actuai and imagined-about me. It 
is not the case that in moments of self-reflection 1 hold before me some 
unmediated conception of some autobiographical experience of who 1 am. 
Talking to others or to myself about myself is never the accomplishment of a 
single voice. In describing myself as this or that person, for example, I do not 
individudiy construct categones and conceptions, but rely on preconceptions 
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informed by my situatedness in traditions and carx-ied in the Ianguage of the 
linguistic community (or cornmunities) I inhabit. Invariably, then, there is a 
coI1ective element in self-definition. In describing myself as a student, a son, a 
brother, a fiend, I express a range of experiences stemming bath fiom my 
contexted uniqueness and fiorn a larger tradition, one which identifies student, 
son, brother, and Eend as meaningfùl, discursively constituted categories that 
betray a relation to the words and voices of others. 
Addressivitv and the Self 
The notion of addressivity suggests a number of implications for the 
conception of a dialogical self. First, at a methodological level, Bakhtin's ideas 
about the constitutive import for the utterance of the other's anticipated 
responsive understanding speaks quite directly to recent emerging concems 
within psychology about the need to take the social context of autobiographical 
statements more directly into account in studies of individuals' self- 
understanding. As Mintz (1995) has recently nored, consideration of "who these 
statements are addressed to and the conversational genres in which they are 
embedded . . . are not systernatically figured into the interpretation of what 
these utterances mean" @. 62). The virtue of a dialogical account of the 
utterance and of the self is that it provides a theoretical fiamework that 
explicitly acknowledges the formative role that these rhetorical elements play 
in the production of self-descriptive utterances. In this regard, Bakhtin's work 
anticipates some of the more recent daims about the socially constructed nature 
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of self-narratives. Gergen and Gergen (1988), for example, argue that self- 
narratives are not fùndamentally individual possessions, but rather 
constructions that are particularly responsive to social-communicative 
demands. Invoking notions strikingly similar to those addressed above in 
comection with the dialogic utterance, Gergen and Gergen claim that in 
constmcting self-narratives one relies on discourse that inherently implies an 
audience of some kind. In the process of their public realization, narratives of 
persona1 life events are said to "become subject to social evaluation and 
resultant molding7' (p. 3 8). The rhetorical context of the communication of 
such narratives becomes particularl y significant here. Individuals are described 
as socially negotiating their narrative accounts, a process that may be 
c'anticipatory or implicit, taking place with an imaginary audience" (p. 38). 
A second implication of the notion of addressivity pertains to the question 
of the seIf s multiplicity. The idea that the self is characterized by multipticity is 
wïdely held in the scholarly psychology community. Indeed, it is a notion that 
figured importantly even in the earliest writings on the self (Cooley, 1902; James, 
1950a; Mead, 1934). The fundamental premise of this earIy work-which 
continues to inform conternporary analy ses-is t hat we are different things, 
different selves, to different people. 1 am one thing to my parents, another to my 
colleagues, and yet another to my friends. As James (1950a) put the point, 
Properly speaking, a man has as manv social selves as there are 
individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind. 
. . . But as the individuals who cany the images fa11 naturally into 
classes, we may practically Say that he has as many different social 
selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he 
cares. He generally shows a different side of hirnself to each of these 
different groups. . . . We do not show ourselves to our children as to Our 
club companions , to our customers as to the laborers we employ, to our 
rnasters and employers as to Our intimate tiiends. From this there 
results what practically is a division of the man into several selves. (p. 
294) 
James' notion that we portray different selves depending on the Company we 
happen to be keeping at any particular moment was later appropriated by 
Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934). For Cooley, the looking-giass self develops as 
the child interacts with other people, such that 
The young performer soon learns to be different things to different people 
. . . Ifthe mother or nurse is more tender than just she will almost 
certainly be "worked" by systematic weeping. It is a matter of common 
observation that children often behave worse with their mother than with 
other and less sympathetic people. (p. 197) 
In the life of the child, argues Cooley, a coznplex peer structure may generate 
several selves, because one displays a different self for each distinct peer or peer 
group. According to Cooley, what 
moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of 
ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection 
upon another's mind. This is evident fiom the fact that the characier and 
weight of that other, in whose mind we see ourselves, makes al1 the 
difference with our feeling. We are ashamed to seem evasive in the 
presence of a straightforward man, cowardly in the presence of a brave 
one, gross in the eyes of a refined one, and so on. (p. 184) 
Mead (1934) simiIarly recognizes that the self breaks into different parts or 
different selves, given that we interact with different people who place 
different demands on us. 
We are one thing to one man and another thing to another. . . . We 
divide ourselves up in al1 sorts of different selves with reference to our 
acquaintances. We discuss politics with one and religion with another. 
There are al1 sorts of different selves answering to al1 sorts of different 
social reactions. @p. 142443) 
What a dialogical view adds to this findamental insight that we are 
different selves to different others is an explicit discursive fiarnework. In 
speaking, we fashion different accounts, present different aspects of ourselves, 
for diEerent auditors. Were there a different interlocutor, a dflerent utterance, 
and hence a different self, would be fonnulated. 
Speech Genres and the Self 
Bakhtin's (1986) notion of speech genres also becornes particularly relevant in 
this context. More specifically, the concept of speech genres allows us to 
approach Our membership in and identification with different social groups and 
the different selves to which those rnemberships give rise, in discursive terms. On 
the Bakhtinian view, self-discourse is characterized by generic heterogeneity; 
we use different genres in speaking with different groups of people. Each of the 
social domains in which we participate or groups in which we are rnembers is 
characterized by a particular way of speaking that mediates Our identity within 
that social domain or group. According to Bakhtin (1986), one factor 
deterrnining the choice of a genre is "the nature and degree of personal 
proximity of the addressee to the speaker" (p. 96). Speech genres may range 
from forma1 genres, which involve a hierarchically inscribed social distance 
between addresser and addressee, to familiar and intimate genres, which 
"perceive their addressees in exactly the same way: more or less outside the 
eamework of the social hierarchy and social conventions, 'without rank,' as it 
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were" (p. 96). The result of the use of familiar and intimate genres is "a certain 
candor of speech" (p. 96), which, in the most intimate of genres "is expressed 
in an apparent desire for the speaker and addressee to merge completely." Such 
intimate genres reflect a "maximum interna1 proximity of the speaker and 
addressee" (p. 97). 
Intimate speech is imbued with a deep confidence in the addressee, in 
his syrnpathy, in the sensitivity and goodwill of his responsive 
understanding. In this atmosp here of profound trust, the speaker reveal s 
his intemal depths. This determines the special expressiveness and 
interna1 candor of these styles. (p. 97) 
Familiar and intimate genres are more conducive to our expressing what we 
are thinking. 
Bakhtin's notion of speech genres also allows us to situate self-relevant 
discourse in the larger sociocuIturaI context of its production. In talking about 
ourseIves, we invariably cast Our utterances in certain socioculturally specific 
generic forrns-forms that communicate particular "themes," that give direction 
as to what can and cannot be said in a given situation, that guide a speaker's 
choice of lexical and syntactic forms, and so forth. These genres serve as 
enabling constraints for self-understanding and are acquired like any sort of 
cultural knowledge. B eing a member of a particular linguistic community and 
participating in the communicative activities of daily life in a particular culture 
means acquiring a certain proficiency in its available genres. Of course, this 
knowiedge is often tacit, as we are generaIly unaware that Our speech and 
thought are subject to generic constraints. As Bakhtin (1986) puts it, 
Our repertoire of oral (and written) speech genres is rich. We use them 
confidently and skillfùlly in practice, and it is quite possible for us not 
even to suspect their existence in theory. Like Moliere's Monsieur 
Jordan who, when speaking in prose, had no idea that was what he was 
doing, we speak in diverse genres without suspecting that they exist. 
Pakhtin, 1986, p. 78) 
As an example of the generic structuring of self-relevant discourse, 
consider the linguistic practice, typical of many Western cultures, of appealing 
to tratlscontextual regularities and generaiities to describe the self. In the West, 
the self is understood as an abstract imer landscape, a bounded space populated 
with intentions, psychological qualities, and other mental entities that together 
constitute a private inner world. It is not surprising then, to find that people 
enculturated into this belief-into this speech genre, in other words-use self- 
descriptive terms that refer to abstract psychological dispositions or traits. In 
Eastern cultures, on the other hand, people's self-relevant discourse is more likely 
to refer to relationships and to the conmete, social contexts in which in people are 
situated, than to qualities abstracted from any particular setting (Cousins, 1989). 
In this respect, each broad cultural ethos-autonomy and independence in the 
case of the West, relatedness and interdependence in the case of the East-is 
associated with its own particular set of generic conventions for talking about the 
self. 
The Ontoloaical Sienificance of the Addressee 
Bakhtin's metalinguistic theory of the utterance acknowledges the constitutive 
significance of the listener or addressee in the construction of an individual 
utterance. An utterance can only be completed through the responsive 
understanding of that addressee. Indeed, in the absence of an active, 
responsive, and reciprocating presence of some kind, it is impossible for the 
utterance to mean. The importance, for the utterance, and hence for meaning, 
of the other's response, is suggested in Bakhtin's discussion of the boundaries 
of the utterance. These boundaries, says Bakhtin (1986), 
are determined by a change of speakina subjects, that is, a change of 
speakers. Any utterance . . . has, so to speak, an absolute beginning and 
an absolute end: its beginning is preceded by the utterances of others, 
and its end is followed by the responsive utterances of others (or, 
although it may be silent, others' active responsive understanding, or, 
finally, a responsive action based on this understanding). The speaker 
ends his utterance in order to relinquish the floor to the other or to 
make room for the other's active responsive understanding. (p. 71) 
The utterance, whether overt or constructed on the plane of inner speech, is 
followed by a sort of pause, "a silent (p. 72), which is filled with the 
speaker's anticipation of the other's response or responsive understanding, a 
responsiveness which in effect completes the utterance. That the other will in 
fact respond is an expectation contained in the utterance itself The very reason 
we speak, after all, is to occasion a response from an other. 
The role of the addressee's responsive understanding in the completion of 
the utterance also has broader ontologicaI implications for the self What 1 want 
to argue, more specifically, is that it is only through the other7s response or 
responsive understanding that 1 achieve the subjective sense of myself as 
sornething of value and determinateness, that 1 gain a sense of my own being "as 
a reliable event, objectively occumng, here and now, in the life of the human 
species" (Kharash, 199 1, p. 54). In other words, Our sense of ourseives as 
distinct and fùlly weighted beings depends crucially on the other's 
responsiveness. Our identity arises not from within, not from some inner, pre- 
social, or primordial sense of ourselves, but rather dialogically, from Our 
vocative contact with others. In keeping with the eventfil nature of the 
dialogical self, Bakhtin (1 984) says that dialogue "is not a means for revealing, 
for bringing to the surface the already ready-made character of a person; no, in 
dialogue a person not only shows himself outwardly, but he becomes for the first 
time that which he is . . . not only for others but for himself as well" (p. 252). In 
dialogue, an other's reciprocating presence does not merely reveal being but 
rather actively produces it. For Bakhtin (1984), the ongoing process of 
communication is the key to existence: 
1 am conscious of myself and become myself only while revealing myself 
for another, through another, and with the help of another. The most 
important acts constituting self-consciousness are determined by a 
relationship toward another consciousness (toward a thou). Separation, 
dissociation, and enclosure within the self as the main reason for the 
loss of one's self Not that which takes place within, but that which 
takes piace on the b o u n d q  between one's own and someone else's 
consciousness, on the threshold. And everything interna1 gravitates not 
toward itself but is turned to the outside and dialogized, every intemal 
experience ends up on the boundary, encounters another, and in this 
tension-filled encounter lies its entire essence. . . . The very being of 
man (both extemal and internal) is the deepest communion. To be means 
to communicate. (1984, p. 287) 
It is only through such interchange or dialogue with the other that the self is 
aware of its own distinctness and substantiveness. Bakhtin says that "two 
voices is the minimum for Me, the minimum for existence" (1984, p. 252). Or 
as Brazilian educator PaoIo Freire (1970) puts it, dialogue is "an existential 
necessity" (p. 77). 
The Value of Recomition. One of the central provisions of the 
addresseers reciprocating presence is the other's recognition. Recognition, 
conceived along Bakhtinian lines, is not something that we can provide for 
ourselves; rather, recognition is only something that the other can bestow upon 
us. In dialogue, the other's "recognition or acceptance descends upon me . . . like 
a gift, like grace, which is incapable of being understood and founded f?om 
within myself' (1990, p. 49). And similady: "recognition cannot be Af -  
recognition" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 288) 
The importance for the self of the other's recognition is certainly not a 
theme that is unique to the Bakhtinian account. We find a somewhat congenial 
view, for example, in the writings of James (1950a). To be sure, James may 
seem an unlikely place to lauiich a defence of dialogical nature of self. M e r  d l ,  
his position is often seen as one of strong subjectivism. To be sure, there are 
many places where James seems unquestionably to advocate such a stance. He 
argues, for example, that the self is the subjective screen through which we select 
and create Our reality: "The fons et orieo [source and origin] of al1 reality. 
whether from the absolute or the practical point of view. is thus subiective, is 
ourselves" (1950b, pp. 296-297). James's subjectivism is hrther reflected in his 
claim that we have privileged and direct access to the contents of our own minds, 
but are barred unconditionally fiom having knowledge of the contents of other 
minds. His contention that al1 thoughts are "owned" and that "My thought 
belongs with rny other thoughts, and your thought with your other thoughts" 
(1950% p. 226) is couched in terms that stress the seemingly unbridgeable gap 
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between rninds. Indeed, he refers to the gap between such thoughts as <'the most 
absolute breaches in naturey' (1950a, p. 226). James's use of the metaphor of the 
"stream of consciousness7' for conceiving mindedness appears fùrther to support 
this ontological separation of minds. The stream of thought is, for James, an 
isolated stream following its own course and utterly isolated from other streams. 
But for al1 his allusions to the unbridgeable gap between minds, James is 
hardly an apologist for some radical subjectivism or, worse, solipsism. Despite 
his seerning emphasis on the ontological insularity of our thoughts, James does 
not deny the possibility of real communication. That possibility, however, does 
not rest for James on a sharing of minds, but rather in a reaching out for the 
other's recognition and in establishing a connection to a network of social 
relations. In this regard, James' correspondence is most informative. For 
example, in a letter to a friend (Thomas Ward), James alludes to his own 
protracted period of rnelancholy and depression and wrïtes of the pressing need 
to escape from the "tedious egotism" and the debilitating self-obsession that 
this isolating depression engendered: "the disease makes you think of yourself 
al1 the time; and the way out of it is to keep as busy as we can thinking of 
things and other people-no matter what's the matter with our self' (H. James, 
III, 1920, p. 132). In this same ietter, James also mentions the importance of 
establishing a sense of beiongingness in order to escape the confines of a 
disconnected interiority. James speaks of entering into "real relations" with 
people: making some practical difference in the world, contnbuting to its 
welfare in various ways: "You may delight its senses or 'tane' by some 
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production of luxury or art, cornfort it by discovering some moral truth, relieve 
its pain by concocting a new patent medicine, Save its labcr by a bit of 
machinery, or by some new application of a naturai product. . . . and you wiII 
come into & relations with your brothers-with some of them at least7' (130- 
13 1). For James, to "rnake my nick, however small a one, in the raw stuffof 
the race" (H. James, III, 1920, p. 132) is to assert one's reality. For making a 
difference in the world is to be noticed, to be acknowledged. It is to achieve 
recognition and response from others and, as a result, to feel that one belongs 
to an unbroken chain of existence. 
In the absence of the communion that afirms being, one remains 
trapped in the debilitating self-engrossrnent of which James writes in his 
letters. Outward comection, belongingness, making a difference, dialogue and 
the recognition it affords, locating one's thoughts and deeds in a human social 
order-al1 these act as foils to the hermetic, insular self and help one weave 
what Bakhtin refers to as the relational fabric of the self. As Bakhtin goes on to 
Say, the self "rnust find itself . . . within an intense field of interorientations" 
(1984, p. 239). For the sake of the integrity of one's own sense of self, one 
wants and needs to be Iinked to the vocative chah of existence. Might we not, 
accordingly, invoke a companion metaphor to the more individuaIistic 
Jarnesian stream of consciousness? Might we not perhaps also speak of a 
"stream of communication"? 
Of Rage and Impotent Despair. The theme of recognition is captured 
even more forcefully in his scholarly writings. James (1950a) defines a 
134 
person's "social self' precisely as "the recognition which he gets from his 
mates" (p. 293). This notion ofthe social self rests in tum on the assumption 
that we have an "innate propensity to get ourseIves noticed, and noticed 
favorably, by our kind" (p. 293). Indeed, so indispensable to us is othersy 
recognition, in whatever for- that its absence precipitates a loss of self, a 
circumstance in which any form of interaction would be a relief. James (1950a) 
puts the point more poignantly in the following classic passage: 
No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were such a thing 
physically possible, than that one should be turned loose in society and 
remain absolutely unnoticed by al1 the rnernbers thereof. If no one 
turned round when we entered, answered when we spoke, or minded 
that we did, but if every person we met 'cut us dead,' and acted as if we 
were non-existing things, a kind of rage and impotent despair wouId ere 
long well up in us, fiom which the cruellest bodily tortures would be a 
reIief; for these would make us feel that, however bad might be our 
plight, we had not sunk to such a depth as to be unworthy of attention 
at all. (p. 293-294) 
James's hypothetical scenario seems clearly to point up the ontological 
significance for us of the other's response and recognition. Our very being, it 
would appear, is enacted through the recognition we receive fiom others. Later 
in his text, James elaborates on this theme in a series of remarks concerning the 
recognition one receives fiom the person one loves: "To his own consciousness 
he not, so long as this particular social self fails to get recognition, and when 
it is recognized his contentment passes al1 bounds" (p. 294). Indeed, so 
dominant is this instinctive impulse toward "social self-seeking," that its 
pursuit may even extend to the recognition accorded us by persons we might 
otherwise self-consciously exclude fiom our list of "significant others." 
The noteworthy thing about the desire to be "recognized" by others is 
that its strength has so Iittle to do with the worth of the recognition 
computed in sensational and rational terms. . . . So that it cornes about 
that persons for whose opinion we care nothing are nevertheless 
persons whose notice we woo; and that many a man truly great, many a 
woman truly fastidious in most respects, will take a deal of trouble to 
dazzle some insignificant cad whose whole personality they heartily 
despise. (James, l%Oa, pp. 308-309) 
What James seems to be suggesting here is not that there is some originary self 
that gets confirmed in recognition, but that the self cornes into being, assumes 
a particular fom, in recognition. Being socialized to the opinions of others is 
not, on James's view, a matter "of remaking a preexisting self into a social 
being, but of creating a seIf that is from the beginning social in nature" (Leary, 
1990, pp. 109-1 10). James's scenario points up Our Iack of self-sufficiency, 
and thereby Our absolute need for the other. It is in dialogic interchange, in 
confrontation with a responsive other, that one's self is actualized. To sustain 
the engagement of a fistener, to be recognized, is actually to construct and 
perpetuate one's own being. 
It is certainIy difficult to imagine a world in which others' recognition 
could be so utterIy lacking as to give rise to the impotent despair described by 
James. In human society, people engage in a wide variety of practical activities 
that routinely provide this sense of confirmation. In our daily interactions with 
others we participate in many communicative rituals that help sustain mutual 
recognition. We offer greetings and bestow gifts, we smile responsively, tender 
congratulations, pick up Our end of a joint task, listen to people's stories, 
express sympathy. One thing we also do in this regard is cal1 people by name, a 
simple but ontologically formative act, as Taylor (1 989) has recently argued. 
Names, he says, betray the Iink between dialogue and identity. 
My name is what 1 am 'called'. A human being & to have a name, 
because he or she has to be called, Le., addressed. Being called into 
conversation is a precondition of developing a human identity, and so 
my name is (usually) given me by my earliest interlocutors. Nightmare 
scenarios in science fiction where, e.g., the inmates of camps no longer 
have names but just numbers, draw their forces from this fact. Numbers 
tag people for easy reference, but what you use to address a person is 
his name. Beings who are just referents and not also addressees are ipso 
facto classed as non-human, without identity. It is not surprising that in 
many cultures the name is thought in some way to capture, even to 
constitute, the essence or power of the person. (p. 525) 
Whether in calling people by name or in participating in any of the other 
aforernentioned activities, we seem routineIy to proffer signs and acts of 
attention which "by confionting the subject with the task of remembering, 
recognizing, and practicaIly reacting, sewe objectively as a test of the ievel of 
his mental mobilization relative to other people and social groups" (Kharash, 
One Character in Search of an Auditor, To the extent that "man bas to 
communicate with others for the sake of his own awareness of self' 
(Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967, p. 85), the absence of any linkage to a 
community of others is to perpetuate loss of self, to be denied existential 
weightiness. Indeed, the violation of any of the aforementioned rituals and 
practices-even if only the simple absence of a wordless, acknowledging 
glance-can evoke feelings, if not of "rage and impotent despair," then at the 
very least the sense of not existing for the other. With this in mind, I want 
fùrther to address the significance of others' responsiveness for Our sense of 
self by considering the case where such responsiveness is al1 but absent. As 1 
noted above, to one degree or another al1 societies make provisions to ensure 
that their rnembers are afforded the opportunity for mutual recognition; and so 
it would be rather difficult to find a real-life exarnple. 1 will turn, therefore, to 
the Iiterary realm in an effort to highlight-in admittedly rather exaggerated 
form-the implications for the self of the lack of others' recognition. 
Two central characters inhabit the world of  Mary Shelley's 
Frankenstein: Victor, the eponymous protagonist of the tale, and his creation, 
the "monster." This narrative, which in fact is a series of nested narratives, is 
among other things a sort of treatise on the quest for identity, both Victor's and 
the monster's. It is also without question a very sad account of the ravages of 
loneliness (primarily the creature's) in one of its perhaps most extreme forms 
imaginable, namely, as the affective expression of a desire for being. The tone 
for this particular theme is set when the creature first confiants his creator with 
the apostrophic plea to be heard. At first, Victor vehemently refuses, seeing in 
the creature before hirn a detested enemy, a "daemon." The creature, however, 
persists: 
How can 1 move thee? Will no entreaties cause thee to turn a 
favourable eye upon thy creature, who implores thy goodness and 
compassion? Believe me, Frankenstein: 1 was benevolent; my sou1 
glowed with love and humanity: but am 1 not alone, miserably alone? . . 
. Let your compassion be moved, and do not disdain me. Listen to my 
tale: when you have heard that, abandon or commiserate me, as you 
shall judge that I deserve. But hear me. . . . Listen to me." (p. 70) 
Moved by a blend of curiosity and udormed compassion and duty as his 
creator, Victor consents to listen to this "odious cornpanion." But despite this 
initial and mornentary triumph, the creature's supplications for an auditor are 
time and again denied in the course of the story. In effect, the tale charts the 
tragic collapse of at least one man-his monstrosity notwithstanding-in the 
face of an unfiilfilled desire for communication: "Like Adam, 1 was apparently 
united by no link to any other being in existence. . . . 1 was wretched, helpless 
and alone" (p. 92). 
The man-creature longs desperately to join the human world? Both 
through his observations of the social world and the books he has taught 
himself to read, he imbibes many voices, gaining knowledge of love and 
companionship, of "ail the vanous relationships which bind one human being 
to another in mutual bonds" (p. 86). In his emergent ideas, desires, and 
feelings, he cornes to regard himself as sirnilar yet sadly unlike those others 
who he watches and of whom he reads: "But where were my friends and 
relations? No father had watched my infant days, no mother had blessed me 
with smiles and caresses" (p. 86). And simiIarly: "1 was dependent on none and 
related to none . . . and there was none to Iament my annihilation. . . . Who was 
I? What was I? Whence did I come? What was my destination?" (p. 91). 
Ultirnately, his increasing knowledge proves a double-edged sword. While it 
allows him to entertain the notion of himseIf existing in communion with 
others, it also exacerbates his loneliness and reminds hirn "more clearly what a 
wretched outcast 1 was. 1 cherished hope, it is true; but it vanished when 1 
beheld my person reflected in water, or my shadow in the moonshine, even as 
that fiail image and that inconstant shade" (p. 93). Fatefùlly and increasingly 
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over the course of the story, he lives in a state of perpehial discrepancy 
between his actual social relationships and what he feels fiom within as his 
ownmost social potentials. In the absence of a sympathetic interlocutor, of  an 
other's responsive understanding, the monster's fate is to remain hopelessly 
within the grips of a very bad infinite: the infinite hope for love and feilowship 
and the infinite deferral and frustration of these hopes. 
Furtively, ftom a barren, low hovel, the creature is vouchsafed images 
of the routine existence of the DeLaceys, a family of dispossessed cottagers 
who the creature grows quickly, but lamentably from afar, to admire. These 
cottagers inhabit a world of which the creature longs to be a part, a world 
seemingly sheltered from barbarities and injustices. In the telling of his tale to 
Victor, the creature recalls his captivation by the DeLaceysY manners and 
qualities and the warmth of their social relations, how, agonized by his hideous 
countenance and forever lamenting the exile in which he reluctantly lived, he 
craved incessantly to find acceptance and fiiendship among the cottagers, to be 
a participant, "an actor in the busy scene where so many admirable qualities 
were called forth and displayed" (p. 90). He recounts how his "heart yearned to 
be known and loved by these amiable creatures: to see their sweet looks 
directed towards me with affection was the utmost limit of my ambition . . . I 
required kindness and sympathy" @. 94). The creature spends much of his time 
imagining "a thousand pictures of presenting myself to the- and their 
reception of me. 1 imagined that they would be disgusted, until, by my gentls 
demeanor and conciliating words, 1 should first win their favour, and 
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afterwards their love" (p. 8 1). He lets himself "fancy amiable and lovely 
creatures sympathising with my feelings, and cheering my gloom" (p. 93). For 
a time, it is this interna1 dialogue that sustains hirn and that, at least for a time, 
gives him hope and moves him to establish contact with the DeLaceys. 
Following his tragic encounter with the cottagers the creature recounts 
how he began his search for Victor in the hope that his creator, while having 
mercilessly abandoned him, might show him the compassion he desperateiy 
sought. He asks that Victor create for him a female, someone with whom he 
could "live in the interchange of those sympathies necessary for . . . being" (p. 
103). E only he might see that he could "excite the sympathy of some existing 
thing" (p. 104), "feel the affections of a sensitive being" (p. 106), then perhaps 
he would "become iinked to the chain of existence and events, frorn which [he 
was] now excluded" (p. 106). Victor reluctantly agrees, but later in the story 
fatefully destroys this incipient "bride," sending the creature on a vengefûl 
rampage. Having despaired of obtaining fiom the other the gift and grace of 
recognition, the monster is now forced to secure it not, as earlier, by 
supplication, nor even any longer by threat and coercion, but rather by 
violence: "Am I not shunned and hated by al1 mankind? . . . 1 will revenge my 
injuries: if 1 cannot inspire love, I will cause fear" (p. 104). 
His murderous campaign of revenge ultimately consurnmated, we find 
the monster at the end of the tale reflecting plaintively on the futility of his 
actions: "For while 1 destroyed [Victor's] hopes, 1 did not satisfy rny own 
desires. They were for ever ardent and craving; still 1 desired love and 
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fellowship, and 1 was still spurned" (p. 161). The story ends, of course, with 
the monster discIosing plans for his own self-destruction, then disappearing 
into an arctic wasteland- 
If, as 1 stated earlier, it is through one's dialogic encounter with a 
responsive other, and through the recognition such an encounter afEords, that 
one acquires existential weightiness and that one's self is enacted, it becomes 
clear that Our story protagonist's quest for sympathetic audition is nothing less 
than a quest for being. Beyond the "captive audience" the monster addresses at 
different points in the story, he ultimately faiIs to secure a fnendly, reliable, 
and reciprocating presence of some kind and hence never attains the Ievel of a 
self with form and substance. He remains that shadowy figure inhabiting the 
lonely, wooded margins of human community. His namelessness is prophetic 
in this regard, a homely sign of his inability to be called into being. 
Beinn Heard. In the more routine scenarios of life, the failure to secure 
others' recognition is not an entirely uncommon event. While 1 extrapolate corn 
my own expenence, 1 think it wouId be safe to argue that most of us have felt 
compelled, at one time or another in Our Iives, to relate or "share" some 
experience-an adventure, a triumph, an emotionai fall-to an other or others 
who might be eager, willing, or perhaps just gracious enough to listen. 
Phenomenologically, the sense of anticipation and urgency associated with this 
compulsion can be rather strong-"1 cadt  wait to tell . . ."-at tirnes, 1 imagine, 
strong enough to suggest that what is at stake in this overt telling is the very 
consummation, or Ieast some firther or different consurnmation, of the 
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experience or thought itself The sense here is that the experience can only be 
called into being interlocatively, that is, in the form-irnparting space of dialogic 
praxis. Recall, too, the sense of dejection that often overcomes us when we have 
something to tell but no one to tel1 it to. ''No pleasure has any savor for me 
without communication. Not even a merry thought cornes into my mind 
without my being vexed at having produced it alone without anyone to oEer it 
tom-so writes Montaigne (1585-88/1976, p. 754). Each utterance wants to be 
heard or recognized. Expression is always in the service of eliciting a response 
from an other. To speak @ someone is precisely to speak in the anticipation of a 
response. Or as Gadamer (1989) puts the point, "to find the expression means to 
find an expression that will make an impression-that is, it is not an expression 
in the sense of an expression of experience'' @. 503). Or, arguing fiom an 
aesthetic standpoint: "Expression is not to be understood primarily as an 
expression of one's own feelings, but as an expression that arouses feelings" 
(Gadamer, 1989, p. 503). Tt is ultimately the other's dialogic, responsive 
understanding that imparts form and substance to thought and experience. Lived 
experience needs a response, needs to be affirmed, agreed or disagreed with, 
polemicized against, and so on, if it is to constitute experience in the sense 1 am 
advocating here. Experience, like the word, needs to be situated dialogically, 
needs to be uttered and expressed, and therefore heard, recognized, 
acknowledged by others-even if only potentially or on the imagina1 plane-if it 
is to be meaningfùl, if it is to assume some shape and contour, if it is to be more 
than a chaotic, formless impression. "Like the word, the idea wants to be heard, 
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understood and 'answered' by other voices fiom other positions. Like the 
word, the idea is by nature dialogic" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 88). 
This is not to suggest, however, that any old interlocutor will always 
do. An especially powerfùl example of the despair one might feel in the face of 
a particularly unresponsive interlocutor is provided by Oliver Sacks (1984). In 
his recoIIection of the events and insights surrounding his ordeal with a severe 
medical condition, he writes of his desperate attempt to relate the limbo-like 
nature of this condition to one of his doctors: 
This would be tolerable, or more tolerable, if it could be communicated 
to others, and become a subject of understanding and sympathy-Iike 
grief. This was denied me when the surgeon said "Nothing," so that I 
was thrown into the fùrther hell-the hell of communication denied. (p. 
85)  
Sacks seeks out, but unfortunately does not secure, a confirmatory response on 
the part of his interlocutor. He fails to evoke the sort of response that, as Laing 
(1969) describes it, "is relevant to the evocative action, [that] accords 
recognition to the evocatory act, and accepts its signifrcance for the evoker, if 
not for the respondent" (p. 82). In a description that seems apposite to the 
circumstances raised by Sacks, Laing goes on to Say that "emptiness and 
futility can arise when a person has put himself into his acts, even when these 
acts seem to have some point to him, if he is accorded no recognition by the 
other, and if he feels he is not able to make any difference to anyone" (p. 67). 
Again, as in James, we are attuned to the "sense of emptiness and impotence in 
self' (Laing, 1969, p. 68) in the face of an unresponsive or imperviaus other. 
In a similar vein, Watzlawick et al. (1967) discuss the sense of alienation and 
loss of self that accompanies the phenornenon of "disconfirmation," which 
they define as an instance of pathological communication in which one's very 
existence is put into doubt by an unresponsive other. More specifically, in 
contrast to "rejection," which 
amounts to the message "You are wrong," disconfirmation says in 
effect T o u  do not exist." Or, to put it in more rigorous terms, if 
confirmation and rejection of the other's self were equated, in formal 
logic, to the concepts of tmth and falsity, respectively, then 
disconfirmation would correspond to the concept of undecidability, 
which, as is known, is of a different Iogical order. @. 86) 
Givet1 this need for social confirmation of the self, it is not surprising 
that its absence ofien occasions highly rnotivated attempts to regain it in some 
fashion. Consider, in this regard, the plight of many lonely people. Loneliness 
is sometirnes described as a "driving" force that motivates people to seek out 
social interactions despite any anxiety they may have regarding such 
interactions (Sullivan, 1953). Weiss (1973) argues that "the loneIy are driven 
to find others" (p. 15). The hypersensitivity of lonely people to social cues is 
perhaps only an exaggerated instance of what we dl seek in some measure: 
some sort of response from the other that helps to establish Our place in the 
social whirl, that lets us how that we matter. Commenting on this state of 
enhanced vigilance, Weiss adds: 
The individual is forever appraising others for their potential as 
providers of the needed relationships, and forever appraising situations 
in terms of their potential for making the needed relationships 
available. . . . [Loneliness] produces an oversensitivity to minimal cues 
and a tendency to misinterpret or to exaggerate the hostile or 
affectionate intent of others. (1973, p. 21) 
Though Weiss fiames his account of loneliness in terms of the absence of 
certain social provisions, one might reasonably argue that in the experience of 
Ioneliness one's ver). sense of self is at stake. The sometimes desperate search 
for a friendly presence of some sort becornes the expression of desire for living 
intercourse, for a linkage to the communal chain through which one's sense of 
self is enacted and affmed. Indeed, it has even been argued that this search for 
recognition bears not simply on our psychological well-being, but on Our 
physical health as well. The ability to secure the other's recognition is literally 
a matter of Iife and death. Lynch (198 l), for example, has documented the 
adverse medical consequences of loneliness (Le., of a "broken heart," not so 
figuratively speaking) and in his most recent work (Lynch, 1985) establishes a 
connection between the experience of dialogue and hypertension. More 
specifically, his analyses indicate the rnedical benefits of reciprocating 
dialogue and, conversely, the physically darnaging effects of not being heard. 
So vital to human health is the language of our hearts that-if ignored, 
unheard or misunderstood-it can produce tenible physical suffering, 
even premature death. For the language of our hearts cries out to be 
heard. It demands to be understood. And it rnust not be denied. Our 
hearts speak with an eloquence that poets have always, and tmIy, 
sensed. It is for us to leam to listen and to understand. (Lynch, 1985, p. 
10) 
Of course, in the absence of an immediate interlocutor or a live, 
reciprocating presence of some kind, we may search out other modes for its 
telling: for example, we might document the experience in writing, perhaps 
describe it in a letter to a fiend, make it the day's journal entry, and so forth. In 
a recent work on "the courage to write," Keyes (1995) denies any findamental 
difference between a writer's compulsion to write and a child's urge to scrawl 
her name in wet sidewalk cernent or a youth's proclivity to spray-paint his 
monicker on city walls. Underlying each of these otherwise diverse acts is a 
need for attention. 
Recognition. Immortality. And why not? One of the most fundamental 
of human fears is that our experience will go umoticed. We'd al1 like 
to have it recorded somewhere. What better way to achieve this goal 
than by writing? Long afier maggots have had their way with my 
corpse, my name will still be on the spines of books in the Library of 
Congress. I'm on the record." (p. 79) 
Talking to Ourselves. We are borne along, it seems, by a hndamental 
impulse to communicate, an impulse that Cooley (1902), for example, grounds 
in the human "need for social feeling" " @. 86). For Cooley, thought and the 
impulse to communicate "are like root and branch, two phases of a common 
growth so that the death of one presently involves that of the other" @. 92). And 
if outer expression, in the form of overt speech or writing, is for some reason 
impracticable, this thought realizes itself on the imagina1 plane in the form of an 
inner conversation. We speak to ourselves to accomplish a number of things. 
We chastise, encourage, and console ourselves in response to actions we 
perform or to events that befatl us. We speak to ourselves to aid in the 
retention of information or experience. Perhaps we even speak to ourselves to 
keep ourselves Company or, as Steiner (1978) suggests, "in order to speak 
to others" (p. 64). In Iight of my remarks on the importance of expression and 
recognition, perhaps we also speak to ourselves to consummate some 
otherwise unformed experience or thought. More or less self-consciously in this 
case, we become an other to ourselves, fashioning an account of the experience, 
perhaps even rehearsing some version of its telling, in the imagined presence of 
an addressee whose responsive understanding-whose sympathy, consolation, 
laughter, agreement, disagreement, questions, perhaps even expression of 
disbelief-we anticipate and somehow take into account in a way that shapes the 
form and content of this internal (sometirnes even externa!) dialogue with 
ourselves. Perhaps we talk to ourselves, too, in order to establish the 
distinctiveness and continuity of our very identity. Steiner (1978) seems to 
suggest this rnuch: 
Quantitatively, there is every reason to believe that we speak inside and 
to ourselves more than we speak outward and to anyone else. 
Qualitatively, these manifest modes of self-address may enact 
absolutely primary and indispensable fhctions of identity; they test 
and verïQ oür 'being there'. Taken together, internal and extemal 
discourse constitute the economy of existence, of our presentness. (p. 
9 1) 
So we taIk to ourselves to ground our own presentness, to cal1 forth our own 
selfhood. By invoking and provoking an other on the imaginal plane, 1 effect my 
own sense of separateness, T delineate my "I" contrastively against the backdrop 
of the other's responsiveness. But in the end it is perhaps not enough to have an 
imaginal addressee: "the response must corne sooner or later or  thought itself 
will perish. The imagination, in time, loses the power to create an interlocutor 
who is not corroborated by any fresh experience" (Cooley, 1902, pp. 94-95). 
We cannot talk only to ourseIves indefinitely. "One inevitably seeks an 
audience, has to pour himself out to somebody" (Mead, 1934, p. 141). 
Sometimes we need real others to help us clarie what we are thinking or 
feeling. Sometimes even a mute listener will do: "Being heard as such is 
already a dialogic relation" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 127). And we do need to be 
heard, for we cannot hear Our own tune. We can hear ourselves no more than 
we cm see our own bodies in motion as we move about the world. 
Somebodv. Somewhere: On the Function of the Superaddressee. To 
repeat, we need to be heard. We have, as James (1950a) proposes in comection 
with the social self, an instinctive tendency to get ourselves noticed. A similar 
therne runs through the d t i n g s  of Bakhtin (198 1,1984, 1986, 1990). Indeed, 
Bakhtin is no less explicit and impassioned than James in the rnanner in which 
he describes the urgent need for acknowledgment and recognition. In contrast 
to James, however, but certainly in keeping with the spirit of his claim, 
Bakhtin fiames this need in more expIicitIy vocative tenns, that is, as an 
inherent aspect of communicative, dialogicai praxis. According to Bakhtin 
(1986), the nature of the word is such that it "always wants to be heard, always 
seeks responsive understanding, and does not stop at irnmediate understanding 
but presses on tùrther and further (indefinitely)" (p. 127). For both the word 
and, by implication, the human being who utters the word "there is nothing 
more temble than a lack of response"(p. 127). 
It is precisely in light of this deep need for audition that Bakhtin's 
(1986) notion of the superaddressee may be appraised. The need to posit the 
existence of a higher addressee, a "third" voice if you will, signals the 
possibility that understanding in actual, face-to-face dialogue is not a given, 
despite the cornrnon ground interlocutors may share. Dialogue between 
interlocutors rnay be the site of misunderstanding and even conflict; there is 
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always the real possibility that one may fail to be heard. Under such 
circumstances in particular, the superaddressee offers some redemption for a 
speaker, offers the hope that his or her message will get through. We might 
turn once again to James (1950a) for an elaboration of this notion. James' 
discussion of the "potential social self' seems particularly apposite to the 
Bakhtinian idea of the superaddressee. Like Bakhtin, James connects this 
notion to Our moral and religious life. 
When for motives of honor and conscience L brave the condemnation of 
my own family, club, and "sety7 . . . 1 am always inwardly strengthened 
in my course and steeled against the Ioss of my actual social self by the 
thought of other and better possible judges than those whose verdict 
goes against me now. The ideal social self which 1 thus seek in 
appealing to their decision mal- be very remote: it may be represented 
as barely as possible. 1 may not hope for its realization during my 
lifetime; 1 may even expect the fùture generations, which would 
approve me if they knew me, to know ~o th ing  about me when I am 
dead and gone. Yet still the ernotion that beckons me on is indubitably 
the pursuit of an ideal social self, of a self that is at least w o r t h ~  of 
approving recognition by the highest possible judging companion, if 
such companion there be. This self is the true, the intimate, the 
ultimate, the permanent Me which 1 seek. This judge is God, the 
Absolute Mind, the "Great Cornpanion." @p. 3 15-3 16) 
James adds that we might understand the nature and fiinction of prayer in this 
Iight. Praying is something we cannot help doing. It is an expression of the 
need to be recognized and acknowledged, to find persona1 meaning through 
some ideal other's receptive understanding. "The impulse to pray," says James, 
"is a necessary consequence of the fact that whilst the innermost of  the 
empirical selves of a man is a Self of the social sort, it yet can find its only 
adequate Socius in an ideal world" (p. 3 16). As with Bakhtin, then, there is a 
sense that we c m o t  always reveal ourselves fdly to an interlocutor who is 
immediately on hand. The superaddressee, it appears, provides a sort of 
"Ioophole" out of the present, and respite fiom the failure to be heard by an 
actual interlocutor. Mere is how James fiames the point: "The humblest otrtcast 
on this earth can feel hirnself to be real and valid by means of this higher 
recognition. And, on the other hand, for most of us, a worId with no such inner 
refbge when the outer social self failed and dropped fiom us would be the 
abyss of horror" (p. 3 16). 
From the moment we corne into the world, we are in some relation to 
other people (our parents, siblings, friends, teachers, and su on). As 1 have 
tned to show in this chapter, our sense of self is achieved not in our separation 
fiom these others but in our dialogues with them, in the recognition such 
dialogues afford. The self is neither whole nor self-sufficient nor ever in 
complete control, but constantly in need of the other for its own (inescapably 
provisional) dialogical completion. 
CHAPTER 5 
DLALOGUE AND OTHERNESS 
The emphasis on the importance of otherness for dialogue is a unique, 
defining feature of the Bakhtinian view. Indeed, it is an emphasis that sets the 
Bakhtinian account apart from many other classic and contemporary 
conceptions of dialogue (Cheyne & TaruIli, 1999). The purpose of this chapter, 
accordingly, is to examine the nature ofotherness and its role in dialogue in 
greater detail. In the hope of bringing more fully into relief the uniqueness of 
Bakhtin's claims in this area, 1 will pursue a comparative strategy. More 
specifically, 1 will address the question of othemess dialogue by contrasting 
the Bakhtinian view on this subject with that put forth in the writings of 
pragmatist philosopher George Herbert Mead (1 934, 1936, 1964). 
Bakhtin and Mead 
In recent years, several scholars have noted points of convergence in the 
writings of Bakhtin and Mead (Holquist, 1990; Sampson, 1993; S hotter, 
1993a; Todorov, 1984). Undeniably, Bakhtin and Mead begin with similar 
concerns. Each is critical, for exanple, of the individual-social dudism and the 
deeper epistemological dichotomies (mind-body, inner-outer) on which it rests. 
Against both rationalist and romanticist views which pit an inner, pnvate world 
against an outer, social world, these thinkers approach the study of individuah 
in terms of relations rather than dichotomies. Each espouses an ontology of the 
social as opposed to the private, atomistic subject, arguing that there is no self 
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prior to a relation with an other. Each would agree, in other words, that 
Selves can only exist in definite reIationships to other selves. No hard- 
and-fast Iine can be drawn between Our own selves and the selves of 
others. Since our own selves exist and enter as such into Our experience 
onIy in so far as the selves of others exist and enter as such into Our 
experience also. (Mead, 1934, p. 164) 
Indeed, rather than positing a ready-made, individual consciousness that exists 
apart Eom human social activity, both Mead and Bakhtin argue that it is the 
social and cultural that gives rise to consciousness. Moreover, each of these 
thinkers places Ianguage and communication at the centre of his respective 
social ontology. Language, each contends, underlies al1 reIations between self 
and other and constitutes the means through which human beings understand 
the world and become selves. 
More significantly for present purposes, both Bakhtin and Mead uphold 
a conception of self erected around the idea of inner dialogue. Mead's thinking 
on this rnatter clearly reflects his roots in the pragmatist tradition. Mead's 
pragmatist forebear, Charles Sanders Peirce, had strongly defended a dialogical 
conception of consciousness. He often repeated, for exarnple, that "al1 thought 
is dialogue" (qcoted in Colapietro, 1989, p. xiv), and again, that "thinking 
always proceeds in the form of a dialogue-a dialogue between different 
phases of the ego" (1933, p. 6)- In this same pragmatist tradition, Cooley 
(1 902) insisted on the social-communicative foundations of thought and 
defended the view that at least two symbol-exchanging beings in interaction 
constitutes the basis of mindedness and selfhood. As Cooley (1902) observes, 
fiom children's overt conversations with imaginary playmates to the more 
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elaborated, sophisticated, and silent meditations of adults, a fundamental 
socialization of thought underlies thinking at any age. Accordingly, he writes 
that thought, at any age, is but a "perpetual conversation" (Cooley, 1902, p. 
90). Following in this tradition, Mead (1934) also contends that the process of 
interna1 reflection is dialogically constituted and sustained. Pursuing a 
dramaturgical metaphor, he writes that 
There is a field, a sort of inner forum, in which we are the only 
spectators and the only actors. In that field each one of us confers with 
himself. We carry on something of a drama. If a person retires to a 
secluded spot and sits d o m  to think, he talks to hirnself. He asks and 
answers questions. He develops his ideas and arranges and organizes 
those ideas as he might in a conversation with somebody else. Mead, 
1936, p. 401) 
Elsewhere, Mead (1964) is more explicit in pointing up the linguistic basis of 
this inner dialogue, arguing that "insofar as thought uses symbols, which are 
used in social intercourse, [it] is but an inner conversationy' (p. 146). 
Despite this cornmon point of departure, however, the specific paths that 
Mead and Bakhtin take, as well as their eventual destinations, are divergent-and 
in places even radically so. Below 1 explore some of these critical differences as 
they emerge more specifically in their respective accounts of the conditions and 
processes surrounding the notion of a dialogically constituted self. As 1 hope to 
show in the following analysis, the Meadian account of inner dialogue differs 
fiom the Bakhtinian view in terms of four critical, intenelated features: 1) 
positing unity in or sameness of meaning, rather than difference, as the enabling 
ground of dialogue; 2) equating progress in the development of self with the 
eradication of otherness; 3) conceiving the self s (apparent) multiplicity in 
systemic terms; and 4) conceptualizing the intemalization process as one that 
entails the increasing loss of the other's particularity, and hence of the other's 
otherness. Each of these aspects of Mead's accouat overlooks or effaces the 
alterity of the other and by doing so disrnantles the conditions which, fiom a 
Bakhtinian vantage point, are crucial for dialogue. 
Sameness as the Enablina Ground of DiaIoeue. The pragmatist 
conception of dialogue is one that seeks to do justice to the notion of sympathy 
or fellow feeling. Peirce certainly follows this injunction in his contention that 
Our interpersonal dialogues "are capable of generating such intimate unions 
among distinct selves as to be comparable to persona1 beings themselves" 
(Colapietro, 1989, p. 91). In taking this stand, Peirce is responding in particular 
to James's daim that we have privileged and direct access to the contents of our 
own minds, but are barred unconditionally from having knowredge of the 
contents of other minds. The stream of thought is, on Peirce's reading of James 
(see Colapietro, 1989), an isolateci stream following its own course and utterly 
isolated fiom other streams. The turther implication of this view, according to 
Peirce, is that we are each trapped in our own self-enclosed subjectivities, that 
we each inhabit a private, uncornmunicable subjective world. In contrast to 
James, Peirce argues that communication between and interpenetration of minds 
is the nom. This possibiIity follows fiom the fact that the self is a sign. If the 
activity of signs (semiosis) is the essence of rnindedness, and if it can be 
assumed, fiirthermore, that the Iife of a sign exceeds any of its particular 
instantiations, then it follows that the semiotically constituted mind need not be 
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taken as the exclusive property of, or as inherently residing in, any particular 
body. The mind, Iike the sign, is not cod~ned in its being to any particular 
location. The sign can be ai two places at once, and more specifically, it can be 
in each of our respective minds, where it can mean the same for each of us 
(Colapietro, 1989). "Two minds," writes Peirce, "can communicate only by 
becoming in so far one mind" (quoted in Colapietro, 1989, p. 104). While this 
f-usion of self and other is no doubt incomplete, there is little denying that the 
barriers otherwise separating us are, on the Peircian view, effectively eroded 
by the word. 
The notion that dialogue or  communication presupposes this sort of 
intersubjectivity is similarly reflected in the writings of Cooley (1902). 
Generally faithfûl to the spirit of the Peircean view, Cooley argues that the 
growth of personal ideas through conversation 
implies a growing power of sympathy, of entering into and sharing the 
minds of other persons. To converse with another, through words, 
looks or other symbols, means to have more or less understanding o r  
communion with him, to get on common ground and partake of his 
ideas and sentiments. (p. 136) 
For Cooley as for Peirce, then, conversation or dialogue is premised on the 
shared apperceptive horizon of self and other. Not difference but the 
intersubjectivity achieved through sharing a common outlook is the enabiing 
ground of dialogue. 
The pragmatist emphasis on the sameness or unity of meaning that 
characterizes the dialogical situation is also evident in Mead's (1934, 1964) 
understanding of the communicative process. According to Mead's 
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communication model, when an individual making a vocai gesture understands 
and can anticipate the other's response to his or her gesture, that individual is 
capable of "significant communication" (or language). Such communication 
transpires through the use of what Mead calls "significant symbols." The 
defining feature of a significant symbol is its ability to affect the individual 
who utters it as it affects others. Meaningful or significant symboIs, in other 
words, indicate the same to self and other, to speaker and listener. As Mead 
(1934) puts it, significant symbols "implicitly arouse in an individual making 
them the same responses which they explicitly arouse, or are supposed to 
arouse, in other individuals, the individuals to whom they are addressed" (p. 
47). Mead wants to provide an analysis of meaning in terms of response and he 
imparts to a social gesture the status of a significant symbol only if it elicits the 
fiinctionally identical response or attitude in its maker that it does in the other 
participants in the social act to whom it is addressed. 
The commonality upon which significant communication is premised is 
also the basis of people's ability to introspect and carry on conversations with 
themselves or  intrapsychologically; it is the very condition, in fact, that enables 
one to become an object to oneself-that is, to achieve self-consciousness. On 
Mead's view, a self emerges only when one can adopt the attitude or response 
of the other toward oneself. Hence, in order to be an object to myself 1 must 
have intemalized the communicative process, the conversation of significant 
symbols. It is when a person "not only hears himself, but responds to himself, 
talks and replies to himself as truly as the other person replies to him, that we 
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have behavior in which the individuals become objects to themselves" (Mead, 
1934, p.139). In other words, the use of significant symbols in inner speech 
aIIows me to take the other's attitude toward myself and toward what is being 
thought about. In thought or inner speech, 1 hear and respond to myself just as 
another would hear and reply to me-and this, again, is precisely what allows 
me to be a self According to Mead, the mechanism responsible for one's 
ability to be an object to oneself is the ability to hear one's words as others do. 
The vocal gesture is heard by the one making it "in the same physiological 
fashion as that in which it affects others. We hear Our own vocal gestures as 
others hear them" (Mead, 1964, p.287). And again: "We can hear ourselves 
talking, and the import of what we Say is the same to ourselves that it is to 
others" (Mead, 1934, p. 62). By hearing and being aware of our own vocal 
gesture, we arouse in ourselves the same response that it arouses in those who 
hear it, and hence we rnay respond to ourselves as does an other (Le., take the 
role of another toward ourselves). 
In conceiving of the communicative process as one that transpires 
through the use of significant symbols, Mead's account presumes a virtual 
symmetry of interlocutors, of self and other. Indeed, the basis for the 
development of a self requires such symrnetry. It is only through 
communication with socially shared, significant symbols that evoke the same 
response in self and other that one achieves a self. As a speaker 1 hear and 
respond to myself exactly as another would. 1 can only access the standpoint of 
the other-and hence achieve self-awareness-by sharing the listener's 
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response to my vocal gesture, by duplicating the other's response. 
Mead's emphasis on communication as a process that rests on zommon 
meanings is consonant with his broader social concerns and with his 
understanding, or vision, of human society. The necessity for such 
commonality stems, more precisely, from Mead's view of society as a 
cooperative enterprise. The social aim of communication is cooperative 
activity, the achievement of some shared social end. And according to Mead, 
shared meanings are the enabling foundation of cooperative, socially usehl 
activity and for the coordination of society's goals. Any social act must be a 
collective one, one oriented toward a collective object, that is, one having 
common rneaning to participants in the act. In Mead's framework, this system 
of common meanings is embodied in what he calis the generalized other, an 
abstract formulation of a societal ethos constructed by the individual by 
abstracting the attitudes and responses common to the group. The generalized 
other represents the organized attitudes or responses of al1 members of the 
group to which the individual belongs. 
There is little doubting that dialogic communication involves the 
interplay of both commonality and difference, of what is familiar and what is 
other. Either extreme-absolute difference or absolute identity of 
perspectives-would signal ihe end of dialogue. In the former instance, 
dialogue is impossible, as there would exist no common topic or language of 
exchange. In the latter, dialogue is unnecessary, as nothing new is likely to 
emerge fiom an encounter of identical perspectives. 
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In stressing communication as a process involving the exchange of 
significant symbols, Mead's view generally fails to establish the importance 
for dialogue of the otherness of the other, that is, of the capacity of the other to 
respond differently For Mead, dialogue requires that self and other share a 
common horizon of meaning. In this regard, Mead betrays the traditional 
concern of linguistics with "'language' itself and the logic specific to it in its 
capacity as a common ground, as that which makes possible dialogic 
interaction" (1 984, p. 183). Accordingly, Mead rarely considers social 
situations where one rnay be required to put oneself in the place of another 
who occupies a different interpretive horizon than one's own. Dialogue is 
never considered across such differences, across the distance introduced by the 
other's otherness. As Gurevitch (1990) observes, role taking is always seen as 
an ever-present possibility for Mead, something rarely fraught with problems 
and difficulties and the potential for misunderstanding. Moreover, in stressing 
the fact that the other shares the same response to the speaker's utterance, 
Mead privileges the single voice of the author of the significant symbol. In this 
case, it is the speaker who ultimately controls rneaning. The speaker never 
really gets outside himself and the Iistener enjoys no essential surplus, no 
direct power to mean differently. The other's voice is not fùlly autonomous; it 
is a reflection of the voice of the "author" of the utterance-a state of affairs 
that seems generall y in keeping wit h the Hegelian notion of "self-recognition 
in the other." The failure to acknowledge the possibility that the other may 
respond differently amounts to a denial of the otherness of the other?' 
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On the Bakhtinian view, in contrast, dialogue is not conceived as a sort 
of harmonious colloquy in which there reigns a single meaning. Dialogue 
between interlocutors, or, equally, among the voices in inner speech, may be 
the site of misunderstanding and even conflict. These speaking voices must 
not, and never do, completely understand one another, for without dzerence, 
without the creative tension of different voices, be they the voices o f  actual or 
presumed others, dialogue dissolves into reduplication, into the celebration of 
sameness. As Bakhtin scholar Cary1 Emerson (1 984) notes, "Two speakers 
must . . . remain only partially satisfied with each other's replies, because the 
continuation of dialogue is in large part dependent on neither party knowing 
exactly what the other meansy' (p. xxxii). The unfinalizability or 
inconclusiveness of  the dialogue hinges, in part, on rnisapprehension, on the 
fact that two perspectives never perfectly coincide-in short, on otherness. 
Consequently, even when Bakhtin and Mead are speaking of dialogue, they are 
not speaking fiom the same horizon of  understanding. Epigramically, one 
might characterize the difference in the following way: for Mead, dialogue is 
the sharing of the created, while for Bakhtin it is the sharing in creation. For 
Bakhtin, dialogue is much more open-ended and a rnuch riskier business. The 
risk and danger lie precisely in the conftontation with an other whose 
divergence fiom one's own perspective, whose otherness, carries the potential 
for transformation in one's understanding of the world and of oneself. 
The Fate of Difference. Mead's understanding of difference, like his 
understanding of the communication process, has its roots in the pragmatist 
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tradition. Before Mead, Cooley (1902) had argued that while shared meaning is 
required for comprehension, difference between interlocutors is required for 
interest. He writes: 
We cannot feel strongly toward the totally unlike because it is 
unirnaginable, unrealizable; nor yet toward the wholly like because it is 
stale-identity must always be du11 Company. The power of other 
natures over us lies in a stimulating difference which causes excitement 
and opens communication, in ideas similar to our own but not identical, 
in States of mind attainable but not actual. (p. 153) 
Hence, whiIe a radical or  absolute otherness would preclude dialogue, 
complete identity between interlocutors would rnake for an unproductive 
tedium. Accordingly, Cooley concludes that there must be a "resembling 
difference" (p. 154) in order to revitalize thought. The difference that Cooley 
recognizes as important for outer dialogue, however, fails to be considered as a 
needed, unelirninable feature of the interna1 conversations we hoId with 
ourselves. Here, Cooley gives the example of one whose "personal symbols" 
may stand in a conflictual or discrepant relation. One may be tom, for 
example, between the competing impulses of contributing to a charitable 
cause, on the one hand, and using one's savings to take one's family on a 
summer outing, on the other. In such cases, says Cooley, our imagination is 
beset by what appears to us as the mutual exclusivity of these impulses, this 
usually at the expense of our noting cccommon elernents." But it is precisely in 
the appeal to such common elernents, argues Cooley, that these "apparently 
conflicting personalities" (p. 130) cm be harmonized. One achieves this 
reconciliation by invoking the moral sentiment ofjustice or  right: "Thus 1 rnay 
Say to myself, '1 can afford a dollar, but ought not, out of consideration for my 
family, to give more,' and may be able to imagine al1 parties accepting this 
view of the case" (Cooley, p. 130). And so the dissonance which the individual 
experiences as intolerable is resolved in the positing of a higher-order unity 
that consists in the appeal to a sort of  moral universal. Cooley adds that the 
advent of this more universally valid and unifiing perspective is a sign of 
psychological progress: it is movement from a weaker to a stronger self- 
understanding. 
The conciliatory ethos reflected in Cooley's account finds an even 
more ardent defence in the writings of  Mead (1934, 1964). Consider, for 
example, Mead's (1964) discussion of the process of moral deiiberation. Mead 
assumes that as an "organization of habit" the self is not typicaIly conscious. 
Sometimes, however, a problem appears which causes disorganization in the self, 
causing character to be compromised, and hence occasioning conscious efforts at 
self-reconstruction: "When . . . an essential problem appears, there is some 
disintegration in this organization, and different tendencies appear in reflective 
thought as different voices in conflict with each other. (1964, p. 147). This gives 
rise to a moral process that is productive of a "new self '. Here is how Mead 
describes the ideai resolution: 
Where . . . the problem is objectively considered, although the confiict is 
a social one, it should not resolve itself into a stmggle between selves, but 
into such a reconstruction of the situation that different and edarged and 
more adequate personaIities may emerge. . . . In the reflective analysis, 
the old self should enter upon the same terms with the selves whose roles 
are assumed, and the test of the reconstruction is found in the fact that al1 
the persona1 interests are adequately recognized in a new social situation. 
@p. 147-148) 
What is particularly important to note here is the conciliatory nature of  this 
process of psychological reconstruction: ccSolution is reached by the construction 
of a new world harmonizing the conflicting interests into wbich enters the new 
self' (Mead, 1964, p. 149). 
The Hegelian teleology of reconciliation and consensus is similarly 
reflected in Mead's (1934) discussion of conflict in Society. Mead asks us to 
consider the case where one finds oneself in conflict with the group of which 
one is a member. Upon encountering the "conflicting experience," the 
individual is faced with the need to exercise his or her reflective intelligence 
and freedom as a thinker. Through such free reflection the individual proposes 
a new idea with the potential to change the generalized other. In this regard, 
Mead says that when the individual opposes his or her own group, the 
individual does so by appealing to a more universally valid community that he 
or she holds to be superior to her own: "The only way in which we can react 
against this disapproval of the entire community is by setting up a higher sort 
of community which in a certain sense out-votes the one we find" (Mead, 
1934, pp. 167-168)- Given the existing generalized other, the individual 
proposes a new, private perspective or kind of social action which, if 
successfUI, will be accepted by others. The problem is resolved, in other words, 
with the reconciliation of the private and community perspective. For present 
purposes, what is especially critical to note about this process is that cod ic t  is 
resolved through the formation of a more inclusive consensus, a consensus 
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reflected in the construction of a more encompassing, and therefore more 
adequate, social whole or generalized other. As Mead (1934) descnbes it, 
the way in which any such social reconstruction is actually effected by 
the minds of the individuals involved is by a more or less abstract 
intellectual extension of the boundaries of the given society to which 
these individuals al1 belong, and which is undergoing the 
reconstruction-an extension resulting in a larger social whole in terms 
of which the social conflicts that necessitate the reconstruction of the 
given society are harmonized or reconciled, and by reference to which, 
accordingly, these conflicts can be solved or eliminated. (1934, pp. 
3 08-309) 
According to Mead, creative social change always proceeds in the direction of 
greater   ni versa lit^.^^ Indeeci, Mead goes so far as to Say that social genius 
describes an individual "who is able to take in more than others of an act in 
process, who can put himself in relation with whole groups in the community 
whose attitudes have not entered into the lives of others in the community" 
(1934, p. 256). He refers to Jesus, Socrates, the Buddha as individuals who 
were able to change the course of history by, in effect, expanding the 
generalized other in the direction of a universal society, by making their own 
experience universal and by mediating between social groups and ecumenical 
movements. 
The notion that social change or progress always proceeds in the 
direction of greater universality finds its perhaps most impressive expression in 
Mead's (1 934) eschatological vision or histoncal ideal of the "universal human 
society," an ideal he in fact expresses in terms of the potentials inherent in the 
cornmunicational process itself 
The human social ideal-the ideal or ultimate goal of human social 
progress-is the attainment of  a univenal human society in which al1 
human individuals would possess a perfected social intelligence, such 
that al1 social meanings would each be similarly reflected in their 
respective individual consciousnesses-such that the meaning of any 
one individual's acts or  gestures . . . would be the same for any other 
individual whatever who responded to them. (Mead, 1934, p. 3 10) 
In Leibnizian fashion, it would appear, Mead dreams o f  a system of perfect and 
universal communion. The universalism, if not the utopianism, of this vision is 
in many respects inscnbed in the communication process itself. "Language," 
writes Mead (1934), "provides a universal community" (p. 283) in that it 
ninctions, by definition, as a means o f  getting beyond ourselves and accessing 
a more generalized experience, a system of common meanings. Inde3d, Mead 
(1934) defines the most inclusive abstract group to which we belong as the 
logical universe of discourse (or system of universally signiticant 
symbols) . . . which enables the largest conceivable number o f  
individuals to enter into some sort of social relation . . . a relation 
arising fiom the universal functioning of gestures as significant 
symbols in the general human social process of communication. (pp. 
157-158) 
Here, Mead is willing to cal1 a significant symbol "universal" to the extent that 
it can be understood in the same way by anyone who might be in the sarne 
communicative situation in which it is used. Signification is not limited to the 
particular situation in which language is used, but rather "acquires universal 
meaning. Even if the two are the oniy ones involved, the form in which it is 
given is universal-it would have the same meaning to any other who might 
find himself in the same position" (Mead, 1964, p. 245). 
Within Mead's model, the other is not conceived as  someone who 
preserves herself as other in dialogue; rather, the communicative process is one 
that effaces the other's alterity. At best, the other's otherness proves to be a 
productive impetus that, in the course of dialogue and through some 
ineluctable synthesizing process, is sublimated or negated in the more 
encompassing identity of a unified higher consciousness or idea. Here, Mead 
shows his implicit reliance on a Hegelian conception of otherness. On the 
Hegelian view, otherness is a quality of the world that stands to be dialectically 
overcome in the process of development. The universal language to which 
Mead aspires is ultimately a monologic language in which othemess is absent, 
having been superceded by the construction of universal meanings. It is an 
ideal language that, to use a Bakhtinian locution, has suppressed the "tension- 
fiIIed environment of alien words" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 276). 
For Bakhtin, in contrast, it is precisely this son of tension and 
difference that productively enables dialogue and hence that neither can nor 
should be overcome. Difference or otherness is not conceived as the 
antithetical pole in a self-other dialectic monologically and inexorably grinding 
out more encompassing, synthetic wholes. Bakhtin (1984) rejected Hegel's 
synthesizing dialectic, for "the unified, dialectically evolving spirit, understood 
in Hegelian ternis, can give rise to nothing but a philosophical monologue" @. 
26). As Bakhtin (1984) writes, 
there can be no question of synthesis; one can talk only of the victory 
of one or another voice, or a combination of voices in those places 
where they agree. It is not the idea as a monologic deduction, even if 
dialectical, but the event of an interaction of voices [that is critical]. 
(1 984, 279) 
On a Bakhtinian view, then, dialogic interactions are not necessarily aimed 
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toward the achievement of consensus or reconciliation, as on the Meadian 
view, but rather may even precipitate alienation: We come up against 
something other, there ensues an apona of sorts, which introduces uncertainty 
into self-understanding and hence the otherness needed for dialogue. 
Multiplicitv and the Will to S~stem. Mead's (1934) theory clearly 
acknowledges the presence and importance of rnultiplicity both within society 
and within the self. In his discussion of the diversity among individuals, for 
example, he acknowledges that the common social origin and constitution of 
selves "does not preclude wide individual differences and variations among 
them " (p. 210). Each individual, according to Mead, reflects the social whole 
fiom a particular and unique standpoint, with no individual mirroring the 
community in the same way. Hence, socialization produces both common, 
shared traits and unique traits that distinguish one individual from others. The 
need for commonality, of course, stems from the need for cooperation in the 
pursuit of common sociaI objectives. Individuals need to be able to coordinate 
with others if society is to fiinction as an integrated whole, and hence the 
internalization of a common symbolic structure is required. 
On Mead's view, hswever, rnultiplicity within society is seen largely as 
a functional multiplicity, that is, in terms of fiinctionaIly differentiated roles 
and skills. Moreover, these differentiated ro1es and skills are systemically 
interreiated and hence form an organized unity. "Society," writes Mead (1 934), 
"is the interaction of these selves, and an interaction that is only possible if out 
of their diversity unity arises. We are indefinitely different fiom each other, but 
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Our differences make interaction [Le., working toward a common end] 
possible. Society is unity in diversity" (p. 359). Whatever their differences in 
other respects, then, it remains the case that individuals need to be able to 
coordinate with others if society is to fùnction as an integrated whole. 
Rather than a conflictual multiplicity, Mead stresses and advocates a 
harmonious combination of fiinctional differentiated roles and skills, a 
pluralism without conflict or misunderstanding. Mead acknowledges the value 
of difference and multiplicity only to the extent that it reflects or is capable of 
being contained within the operations of a unified, overarching social system. 
Pluralism in any other sense, Say as disparate and conflicting multiplicity of 
voices and perspectives, can only compromise-indeed, would be antithetical 
to-the achievement of some constructive, social end. Understandably, then, 
Mead downplays individual and group differences that do not support "the 
system." A diversity incapable of being contained in a common social concern 
could only breed chaos and social disorganization, both in society and, by 
implication, in the self 
This Iast point is a critical one and hence warrants some elaboration. 
Mead argues that in the building of a self the social process is "taken up" in the 
experience of the individual. Inner life "is socially organized by the 
importation of the social organization of the outer world" (1934, p. 141). 
Hence, differentiation in the self is related to differentiation in the social 
collective and in particuIar in the multiplicity of generalized others that reflect 
the many groups in society. As people may hold membership in several 
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different groups, they have multiple generalized others and hence multiple 
selves. "A multiple personality," says Mead, "is in a certain sense normal" (p. 
142). In short, as the structure ofthe self reflects the organization of society, 
whatever multiplicity inheres in the social world will have its analogue on the 
plane of the self Again, however, we need to ask: What End of multiplicity is 
this? In view of the preceding arguments, it is clear that Mead conceives of the 
self s multiplicity in systemic terms. Corresponding to his vision of social 
organization is a unified, systemically integrated self The self s multiple 
aspects and roles are mutually complementing, al1 interrelated in a cornmon 
deep structure that goes by the name of the generalized other. The great value 
of the intemalization of the generalized other is that it allows for greater 
coordination of society's activities and the "increased efficiency of the 
individual as a member of the group" (Mead, 1934, p. 179). Moreover, as an 
internalized abstraction that reflects what is common to all, the generalized 
other ensures that the individual is not just a very loosely arranged, 
unintegrated aggregate of roles, and patterns of particularistic self-other 
interactions. The inclusiveness and hence also the unity of the self becomes 
increasingly established as one incorporates a wider and wider array of 
cornplexly organized self-other role relationships (family, peers, CO-workers, 
the church, the comrnunity, the society, and so on). Nor does the multiplicity 
attendant on the construction of multiple generat ized others preclude the 
existence of a more overarching, unified self wherein these othenvise diverse 
generalized others are combined. Indeed, Mead believes in the value of such 
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inclusiveness and, as I noted above, defines ethical progress precisely in terms 
of the formation of universalistic selves. 
Bakhtin agrees with Mead that the organization of subjective life 
reflects the organization of the sociocultural world one inhabits. A critical 
diEerence between these thinkers, however, lies in t heir respective conceptions 
of  that social organization. In his conception of the generalized other as a 
rather monolithic entity (Meltzer, 2972), Mead upholds a monologic view of 
society. Consistent with this assumption, Mead depicts the internaIization of 
the social-communicative process as one that entails growing into a unitary 
Ianguage. In this respect, Mead appears to foIIow the Saussurean view in 
presupposing both a "unity of language" and "the unity of an individual person 
realizing himself in this language" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 264). Societies are not, 
on Mead's view, characterized essentially by a stmggle among languages and 
their attendant conceptions of the world; nor, by implication, is the self (cf. 
Loriggio, IWO). 
A notion like the "universal language community" proposed by Mead 
fails adequately to acknowledge the cultural pluralism of cornpIex modem 
societies, the fact that cultural life is characterized by a conflicting, and 
irreducible, multiplicity of discourses. From a Bakhtinian standpoint, verbal- 
cultural life is not to be conceived, in fact or ideally, as the site of  a singular 
language. Bakhtin resists the view that social and linguistic communities 
constitute undifferentiated, organic wholes. Rather t han see such comrnunities 
in terms of solidarity, as does Mead, Bakhtin focuses on diversity, on 
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ideological struggie, on the suppression of marginal voices by the discourses of 
officialdcm. Accordingly, rather than stress the stable, abstract, systemic 
aspects of language, Bakhtin (1981) sees language and culture as the matenal 
site of a constant struggle between what he calls centripetal forces and 
centrifuga1 forces. Centripetal forces are those that strive toward unification, 
toward overcoming the multiplicity of cultural languages and discourses. A 
unitary language, such as the ideal language proposed by Mead, rnakes its 
presence felt in the rnanner by which it imposes Iimits on socio-linguistic 
diversity and in its guarantee of a certain maximum of mutual understanding 
between the members of any given linguistic community. The eEect of such 
forces is reflected more specifically in the establishment and regularization of 
national languages and of standards for correct and incorrect usage. For 
example, we might regard the Publication Manual of the APA as a text that, in 
its mandate to regularize or standardize scholarly communication among 
psychologists, exerts a centripetal force on their schoIarIy discourse. Moreover, 
in its rather exclusive emphasis on guidelines b r  the reporting of empirical 
research, the manual implicitly partakes in a gesture of exclusion or 
marginalization. Written works that fail to confom to the dictates of proper 
fonn, content, and style may be at a disadvantage as far as acceptance for 
publication is concerned. Understandably, then, centripetal forces may also be 
regarded as the "official" forces that seek to impose a unieing order on the 
otherwise diverse and messy social world. 
But Bakhtin reminds us also that language (and hence culture) is 
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characterized by an inescapable heterogeneity. Language is essentially plural- 
always languages. Language is unitary only if considered abstractly, Say, as a 
reified grammatical system of normative fiinctions, as in Saussure, or as a 
"universal grammar," as in Chomsky (1957). But when we look at living 
Ianguage, that is, at Ianguage as it exists in the contingency and particularity o f  
the concrete communicative event, it becomes cIear that there exist diverse and 
conflicting voices and value systems in the social-cultural landscape. 
Accordingly, opposed to centnpetal forces we find the ccunofficial," centrifbgal 
forces of language and culture. Where centripetal forces seek to uni@, 
centrifugai forces tend to disrupt this imposed order. Within any given 
linguistic community, for example, there can exist a number of distinct 
national ianguages (e-g., French, English, Italian, etc.). Bakhtin insists, 
however, that any national language is never unitary and that within any such 
language there exist uneliminable centrihgal forces. The presence of such 
forces is evident in the fact that each national Ianguage is internally stratified 
into diverse "social Ianguages." Bakhtin (198 1) defines a social language as "a 
concrete socio-linguistic belief system that defines a distinct identity for itself 
within the boundaries of a [national] language" (p. 356). These social 
languages constitute 
specific points of view on the world, forms for conceptualizing the 
world in words, specific world views, each characterized by its own 
objects, meanings aud values. As such they a11 may be juxtaposed to 
one another, mutudly supplement one another, contradict one another 
and be interrelated dialogically. @p. 292-293) 
As examples of such languages, Bakhtin (198 1) mentions 
social didects, characteristic group behavior, professional jargons, 
generic languages, languages of generation and age groups, tendentious 
languages, languages of the authonties, of various circles and of 
passing fashions, ianguages that serve the specific sociopolitical 
purposes of the day, even of the hour. (1 98 1, p. 262-263) 
Each social group, then, speaks its own "social dialect7' which refiects certain 
shared values and ideologies. Bakhtin's (1 98 1) term for this 1 inguistic- 
ideological diversity, and for the centrifuga1 forces exerted by this diversity, is 
"heteroglossia." The term implies that cultures or societies are not unified, 
monolithic entities, but rather the sites of linguistic and social diversity, 
characterized by an intense struggle among coexisting voices and their 
corresponding views of the world. It is precisely the interplay and conflict of 
these sociolinguistic perspectives or voices that constitute the life of a given 
comrnunity and that problematizes any unity that might otherwise be posited in 
cultural life.'' 
For Bakhtin, the psyche, like language and culture, cannot be described 
as a system. It too is the site of tension and the play between centripetal and 
centrifûgal forces. Rather than being understood as a univocal, self-instmcted 
ratiocinator the person is supplied with heteroglot voices, opinions, and motifs 
to animate and enrich thought with such sources of creativity as inconsistency, 
conflict, and ambiguity: that which, in short, renders both inner and outer 
dialogue possible and necessary. Consciousness as a "field of battle for others' 
voices" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 88). The self is a "zone of intense struggle among 
several individual consciousnesses" (p. 89). It is precisely this intemal 
divergence and conflict that provides the rhetorical conditions for vocative 
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exchange and the construction of self-understanding. In this regard, the self is 
much more Ioosely organized phenornenon than we find in Mead. The self is 
hardly a unity or a system, but rather an aggregate or relational ensemble of 
differentiated, opposing, and-as 1 elaborate more fùlly below-particularistic 
voices that interanimate one another dialogically and whose idiosyncratic 
configuration is definitive of one's individuality. This internai division is not a 
fiagmentation of the self but the basis for its dialogic expansion. 
On the Bakhtinian fiamework we may still speak of a unity in the self, 
but doing so requires that we move away fiom a systernic conception of unity. 
A dialogical understanding of ünity suggests neither systernatic interrelations 
among the components or voices of the self, nor the existence of a central, 
core, or  general self that ensures the continuity and stability of identity. Rather, 
the notion of a dialogic mity suggests only that the voices of the self engage 
and interanimate one another in some often unpredictable way. They are not to 
be thought of as a collection of insular, windowless, non-interacting monads, 
nor are they to be conceived as deterministically or hierarchically related 
aspects of a self-system. It is a forever provisional unity defined by the 
unsystematizable relation between the voices that comprise our self- 
understanding. 
Abstraction and the Loss of Voice. For Mead (1 934), internalization is a 
process that entails a progressive overcorning of the constraints imposed by 
particularistic others and a correlative movement toward abstraction. Consider, 
in this connection, Mead's notion of the generalized other. In his development of 
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this cornerstone concept, Mead seeks to provide a rnechanism that accounts for 
the stability of the self in the face of particularistic social situations. Self- 
control and character involve moving away from the particularity of self and 
others and responding instead to the more generafized perspective that 
encompasses the particuIar others who comprise the social situation. Achieving 
stability and autonomy for the self, as well as "self-control" and "character," is 
synonymous with moving away from the particuiarity and toward a more 
generalized perspective that abstractly encompasses the particularities of any 
given social situation. 
The developmental progression toward a more stable and autonomous 
self is reflected more specifically in Mead's account of the play and game 
stages in the development of self Each of these phases is characterized by a 
particular form of role taking, and hence by a particular way of being an object 
to oneself During the play stage the child engages in the most elementary form 
of role-taking or of being another to oneself So for example, in chiIdhood role- 
playing, a child may haphazardly play at being a mother, a teacher, a police 
oEcer. The definitive feature of this form of play is that the other enters the 
chiIdYs experience as a specific or particularistic other. And it is precisely 
because the Ievel of self-consciousness associated with play is constituted 
through a process of taking the attitude of particular others, that Mead sees the 
young child's seIf as unstable and unpredictable. At this play stage the self is a 
supremely shifting phenornenon, changing in accordance with whatever 
particular other's perspective the child assumes toward himself or herself. 
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While this, according to Mead, contributes to "the charrn of childhood," it also 
reflects its "inadequacy-" In his or  her lack of predictability from moment to 
moment, the child at this stage is simply undependable, lacking a definite 
character and personality. 
In the phase of the game, in contrast, there is no haphazard quality to 
the taking of roles. The child assumes a definite position, a position defined 
more specifically by the child's organization of the roles, actions, and 
expectations of other participants in the game. In the more complex stage of 
the game, the child is required to internalize the role of a11 others in the game, 
as well as the system of mies which governs the game and its various roIes. It 
is at this stage that the child organizes and generalizes the attitudes and 
responses of particular others to f o m  a broader community perspective, that is, 
a symbolized unity that comprises and brings together al1 the stances of the 
partici pants-in short, a generalized ot her. It is this organized, systematic unity 
that controls the actions of each individual in the game. According to  Mead 
(1934), it is only at the stage of the game, when the child can look at herself 
from the standpoint of the generalized other, that the child attains "self- 
consciousness in the fidl sense of the term" (p. 195). The social responses 
embodied in this other are the abstract attitudes that "constitute just what we 
term a man's character. They give him what we term his principles" (p. 163). 
Developing a complete, unified self, then, requires that we disentangle 
ourselves fiom the attitudes of particular others, for Our reliance on them is, in 
the end, too Iimiting and constraining: it preciudes autonomy and compromises 
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the authenticity ofprincipled self-expression. 
On the Meadian fiamework, it is precisely the supplanting-over the 
course of development-of diverse, particularistic standpoints by a unified, 
generalized other defines the arriva1 of mature, abstract thought. The following 
passage vividly describes this developmental process: 
Thus the child can think about his conduct as good or bad only as he 
reacts to his own acts in the remembered words of his parents. Until 
this process has been developed into the abstract process of thought, 
self-consciousness remains dramatic, and the self which is a fùsion of 
the remembered actor and his accompanying chorus is somewhat 
loosely organized and very clearly social. Later the inner stage changes 
into the forum and workshop of thought . The features and intonations 
of the dramatis personae fade out and the emphasis falls upon the 
meaning of the inner speech . . . But the rnechanism remains social, and 
at any moment the process may become personal. (Mead, 1964, p. 146) 
Children who are rnired in the particularity o f  play, who engage in 
mental conversations with imaginary companions and take the role of  concrete 
others toward themselves, do not have at their disposa1 the rational and 
objective analytic lens that mature thinkers possess and use for understanding 
the world and themselves. It is in conversing internally with the generalized 
other, as opposed to images of specific acquaintances, that we attain "the 
levels o f  abstract thinking, and that impersonality, that so-called objectivity 
that we cherish" (Mead, 1964, p. 288). This objectivity is built into the 
generalized other, indeed defines this other; that is, because it is an abstract 
principle reaecting the organized views of the wider social system, it somehow 
combines the multiple perspectives of the many into an integrated oneness, and 
as a result of this systemic fusion achieves greater objectivity than the 
standpoint of any particular individual considered apart fiom the systernic 
whole. With increasing social experience and symbolic knowledge, the 
individual becomes capable of seeing the world in its larger, more universal 
aspect. 
As we have seen, Mead's understanding of the intemalization process 
entails a progressive overcoming of the constraints imposed by particularistic 
others via the construction of an increasingly abstract generalized other. Here, 
Mead once again exhibits an indebtedness to Hegel, and more specifically to a 
Hegelian conception of Bildunq (education or self-formation). The main goal of 
Bilduns as conceived by Hegel, is to overcome immediacy through thought of 
the universal. As Wood (1998) puts the point, "If there is a central . . . thesis 
underlying Hegel's general theory of education, it is probably that education or 
culture consists fundamentally in disciplining what is particular or individual 
in the human personality so that it conforms to what is universal" (p. 3 13). For 
Hegel, Bildung: is a process that involves overcoming the othemess of concrete 
particularity and immediacy by way of the concept. In this respect, Hegel's 
conception of Bildung involves 
the power to abstract from, transform, and order previously acquired 
concrete knowledge. It is the kind of education that leads the individual 
to internalize a variety of specific experiences in order to overcome 
their specificity by schematizing and then expressing them again as 
general precepts. (Smith, 1988, p. 19) 
On the Hegelian account, by acquiring a rational and articulate and defensible 
understanding of what was previously given as familiar or immediate, the mind 
acquires an independence or freedom that allows it to rise above mere feelings 
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and intuitions. "Only in this fieedom is the will completely with itself, because 
it has reference to nothing but itself, so that every reIationship of de~endence 
on something other than itself is thereby eliminated" (Hegel, as quoted in 
Wood, 1998, p. 302). 
Consistent with this formulation, Mead presents intemalization as a 
process that abstracts out the voices and the reIationships among voices until the 
person becomes an autonomcus and principled individual with the capacity for 
independent thinking principled decision making within formal institutional 
frameworks, and effective mastery of the world. It is in light of this emphasis on 
abstraction, moreover, that Mead's failure to consider the affective dimension 
of the self might be understood. Mead's account of the self is a relentlessly 
rationa1 one. Identieing the self with self-consciousness, Mead leaves no role 
for affective experience in the development of self. He writes, for example, 
that "[slelf-consciousness, rather than affective experience with its motor 
accompaniments, provides the core and prirnary structure of the self, which is 
thus essentially a cognitive rather than an emotional phenornenon" (Mead, 
1934, p. 173). In a world of abstract, generalized others, in a world approached 
from the standpoint of "that so-called objectivity that we cherish" (Mead, 1964, 
p. 288), affect couid serve no purpose other than to impart to the other a 
concrete, hurnan face, to make of the other a real, embodied interlocutor, and 
thereby immerse one in the (regressive) constraints and dependencies of the 
fully contextualized diaIogic situation where, in Levinasian terrns, the other 
demands to be heard in al1 his particularity and othemess. Hence to cal1 the 
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self s relation to  the generalized other a dialogue seems somewhat rnisplaced, 
at least from a Bakhtinian perspective, unless of course we were willing to 
extend the term to actions and thought performed under the weight of what 
essentially amounts to disembodied-and hence voiceless-abstraction. 
Mead's generalized other has about as much personality, as much fleshy 
existence, as a categorical imperative. The generalized other is not an other at 
all, 
Bakhtin (1986) notes that the dialogic relation between the uniquely 
contexted horizons occupied by interlocutors is too often disregarded as the 
site of meaning and creativity. He says that frequently investigators approach 
meaning in dialogue by invoking "an abstract position of a third partv that is 
identified with the objective position as such, with the position of some 
'scientific cognition"' (p. 143). This, it would appear, is precisely the role of 
the generalized other. This abstract other stands in an authoritative position 
vis-à-vis the interlocutors and is what imbues their individual gestures with 
meaning. Indeed, in describing the generalized other, Mead notes that it 
embodies a means of moving away from a dependence on the strictures of  
particularistic others and of appraising oneself from the standpoint of 
impersonal or objective standards. With increasing social experience and 
symbolic knowledge, the individual becomes capable of seeing the world and 
the self in their larger, more universal aspects. 
Bakhtin (1986) certainly does not deny the utitity of adopting this third- 
party position. More specifically, he daims that such a stance 
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is quite justified when one person can assume another's position, when 
a person is completely replaceable. But it is justified only in those 
situations, and when solving those problems, where the integral and 
unrepeatable individuality of the person is not required, that is, when a 
person, so to speak, is specialized, reflecting only a part of his 
individuality that is detached f?om the whole, when he is acting not as I_ 
rnyself. but "as an engineer," "as a physicist," and so forth. In the area 
of abstract scientific cognition and abstract thought, such a replacement 
of one person with another, that is, abstraction fiom the 1 and thou, is 
possible (but even here, probably, only up to a certain point). In life as 
the object of thought (abstract thought), man in general exists and a 
third party exists, but in the most vital, experienced life only 1. thou, 
and he exist. @p. 143-144) 
What Bakhtin is saying here is that concrete value is to be found in the equally 
concrete dialogical situation facing self and other. The appeal to an abstract 
third party or societal standard stands to transcribe away the importance to 
meaning and value of the encounter of uniquely contexted interlocutors. By 
advocating just such an approach, what Mead's account loses is precisely the 
eventness of the dialogical encounter. For Mead, aRer all, the actual other who 
responds is not important in his or her specific, concrete othemess. It is not the 
particularity of the situation that is of interest to Mead, but rather the way in 
which the gesture speaks to our membership in a larger social whoie. Mead 
establishes this common membership as the very basis for the convertibility of 
self and other. Disparate and particularized voices are collapsed into an all- 
encompassing system, one that c m  be comprehended and hlly contained by a 
single, abstract consciousness analogous to the Hegelian conception of Spirit. 
As noted earlier, Bakhtin is critical of the Hegelian model. Bakhtin's 
antipathy to dialectics, for example, is revealed in the following notebook entry: 
Dialogue and dialectics. Take a dialogue and remove the voices (the 
partitioning of voices), rernove the intonations (emotiond and 
individualizing ones), came out abstract concepts and judgments corn 
living words and responses, crarn everything into one abstract 
consciousness-and that's how you get dialectics. (p. 147) 
In keeping with these anti-dialectical sentiments, Bakhtin presents an account 
of the internalization process in which language enters and constitutes the 
human psyche as a diversity of appropriated voices or perspectives engaged in 
inner dialogue. The multiple perspectives we carry on the world and the self 
are always spoken, aiways canied in a particular voice. The notion that the 
language of the psyche takes the form of different voices that a person has 
heard in his or her sociocuItural world is a way of embodying or personieing 
the speaking subject, of retuming us more specifically to the site of language in 
use. "Voice7' brings us to the dialogical event. The particularity and otherness 
of these voices, moreover, is never completely overtaken in the course of 
ontogeny by a progressively decontextualized and abstract process of thought. 
Understanding this last point requires that we take a doser look at Bakhtin's 
views on the process by which we intemalize or appropnate the words, 
discourse, and voices of others (see also Chapter 7)!' 
Bakhtin's account of the internalization process is concemed with the 
way we hear others' words and voices and make them "our own." According 
to Bakhtin (198 l), a word "becomes 'one's O W ~ '  only when the speaker 
populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the 
word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention" (p. 293). The 
conspicuous quotation marks around the expression own" are reminders, 
however, that the individual speaker is never singularly in possession or control 
ofthe meaning of his or her utterance, for meaning, as Bakhtin's metahguistic 
theory of the utterance suggests, is aIways a collaborative accomplishment; a 
speaker's intention always passes through a complex web of  other's past and 
current intentions and meanings and motivations. What this bracketing of "one's 
own" is meant fiirther to suggest is that the appropriation of the other's word is 
only ever partid and incomplete. The other's word becomes "mine" without ever 
losing its othemess. The word is always, as Bakhtin says, "half someone else's" 
(198 1, p. 293). 
The enduringly partial nature of one's appropriation of another's 
discourse stems fiom the fact that the word always belongs to others before it is 
appropriated. As Bakhtin (198 1) writes, 
Pnor to this moment of appropriation, the word does not exist in a neutral 
and impersonal Ianguage (it is not, after all, out of a dictionary that the 
speaker gets his words!), but rather it exists in other people's mouths, in 
other people's contexts, senring other people's intentions; it is fiom there 
that one m u s  take the word, and make it one's own. (pp. 293-294) 
In imbibing the words of others 1 am not intemalking abstract words or forms of 
discourse but concrete words and voices (Tappan, 19%). Words come to us 
precisely as concrete, embodied voices-the voices of parents, siblings, fnends, 
peers, teachers, acquaintances, books, television characters, rnovie stars. Words 
are encountered in the context of their specific use by specific others in the 
process of accomplishing specific ends. Hence, in making a word my own and 
using it for my own purposes, 1 must take it out of that complex environment of  
previous usages and intentions. This process of adapting the word to my own 
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intentions is not always an easy feat. 
Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the 
private property of the speaker's intentions; it is populated- 
overpopulated-with the intentions of others. Expropriating it, forcing it 
to submit to one's own intentions and accents, is a difficult and 
complicated process. (Bakhtin, 198 1, pp. 293-294) 
The word is resistant and carries an autonomy of its own, bearing within it the 
echoes and traces of others' meanings. The word carries the memory, the 
discursive echoes of "its transfer from one mouth to another, fiom one context 
to another conte% from one social collective to another, from one generation 
to another generation" and hence "cannot completely free itself from the power 
of these concrete contexts into which it has entered" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 202). 
The words we intemalize and use in our inner and outer speech remain paitly 
other; they carry an evaluative tone and ideology of  their own and so continue to 
move in directions that reflect alien intentions that are not always consonant with 
Our own. Because it is constituted both by pre-existing meanings and the 
intentions of the other in the dialogue, the utterance is inescapably polysemous. 
"My voice gives the illusion of unity to what 1 Say; 1 am, in fact, constantly 
expressing a plenitude of meanings, some intended, others of which 1 am 
unaware" (Holquist, 198 1, p. xx)-a notion that certainly complicates Mead's 
assumptions about unified meaning. Language is never so pliable that it can be 
unproblematically adapted to the speaker's unique purpose. The enduring and 
inescapable othemess of the word is a paradoxical necessity-paradoxical 
because the appropnated word of others is simultaneously the self s and the 
other's. And it is, again, the residual autonomy of the other's word, its existential 
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surplus vis-à-vis self-its otherness-that productively enables the dialogic 
relation to unfold, 
Po I~honv  and the Self 
Having established the relevance of othemess to a Bakhtinan account of 
dialogue, 1 want to conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of Bakhtin's 
(1984) notion of polyphony-a notion that clearly suggests the importance of 
otherness for genuine dialogue. Polyphony is a term that Bakhtin uses in a 
literary-theoretical context to describe a fonn of interaction between the voice 
of an author and that of her characters. According to Bakhtin, the relation 
between the author's voice and the characters' voices can take at Ieast two 
forms: monologic and polyphonic. Ln monologic or homophonic Iiterary 
works, the author enjoys "ulti mate semantic authority," by which Bakhtin 
means that the author's omniscient intentions and authorial vision are the 
source and foundation of the work's meaning. Accordingly, the author of a 
monologic work creates and approaches the perspectives ernbodied by his or 
her characters in a way that finalizes them, that is, in a way that sees them 
merely as instances of a perspective that is typical to a person or social group 
of this or that sort. Here, a character's autonomy, creativity, and freedom are 
essentially closed off by the monologic voice of the author; the characters' 
voices are relegated to the role of instruments with which to articulate the 
author's own ideological viewpoint. There is no sense that the author is 
engaging her characters' perspectives in a reciprocal fashion, that she is 
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allowing them to speak to her in a way that might challenge or surprise her. Ln 
short, in a monologic literary work the other is not construed as an independent 
voice whose difference fkom the author's might constitute the enabling ground 
of a dialogicall y emergent meaning. Indeed, the other' s typical ity and 
predictability divests the other of her othemess and hence of any power 
actively to contribute to the achievement of meaning? 
In contrast to the rnonologic author's text, there is the polyphonic 
novel, which, on Bakhtin's literary-historical analysis, came most explicitly to 
h i t i on  in Dostoevsky's writings. Part of the explicit "artistic design" of a 
polyphonic novel is to reflect the diversity of socio-ideological perspectives in 
society. On the plane of the novel, this diversity is captured in the plurality of 
characters' voices. These voices, more importantly, are unmerged: they are not 
subordinated to any singular, overarching authorial intention. Indeed, in 
poiyphonic works the author's voice becomes but one of many voices, enjoying 
no essential privilege or authonty with respect to rneaning. In such works, the 
characters are 
not voiceless slaves . . . but free people, capable of standing alongside 
their creator, capable of not agreeing with hirn or even of rebelling 
against him. . . . The consciousness of a character is given as someone 
elseYs consciousness, another consciousness, yet at the same time it is 
not tumed into an object, is not closed, does not become a simple object 
of the author's conscicusness. (Bakhtin, 1984, pp. 6-7) 
In other words, polyphonically constituted works ensure the other's otherness 
by conceiving the other as a subject, as an independent voice that participates 
in the dialogical construction of meaning. Raskolnikov, Myshkin, and Ivan 
Karamazov are al1 author-characters, capable of replying in their own nght, 
Dostoevsky having constmcted their voices polyp honicall y. 
Now, if the self, as 1 have argued, involves a constant interplay between 
differing ofien contlicting perspectives, then polyphony can be offered as a 
mode1 to represent that diversity. Just as the speaking voices represented in 
Dostoevsb's polyphonic novels enjoy a certain autonomy with respect to the 
author's voice, so too may we regard the multiple, intemalized voices that 
constitute inner speech less "as interior, solipsistic aspects of an insular '1' 
[than] as idiolectal entities-voices distinct from the self' (Macovski, 1994, p. 
4). More than merely refIections or passive instruments in the hands of an 
omniscient self, these voices retain the rhetorical contrastiveness and 
autonomy of distinct outside voices. 
The usefulness of polyphony as a mode1 for self-other relations can be 
illustrated by considering the interplay among temporalized versions of the 
self. In an important elaboration of the theme of the self s rnultiplicity, 
investigators have begun to examine the inherent temporal dimension of the 
self, noting the importance of both past selves (Ross & Wilson, 2000) and 
future, "possible selves" (Markus & Nurius, 1986) to one's present or now self. 
More specifically, both past and possible selves are argued to provide an 
evaluative and interpretive context for the current behaviour or for one7 s 
current view of self For example, Markus and Nurius (1986) argue that one 
often judges one's performance or attributes against the contrastive 
background afforded by feared or hoped-for possible selves. Implicit in such 
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accounts is the belief that we are not self-identical, that Our present view of self 
exists in a state of incompleteness. In order to understand ourseives, we need 
somehow to engage past and anticipated versions of ourselves, 
More important for present purposes, however, is the possibility of 
conceiving past and possible selves, at least in some measure, as projections of 
past and present others whose voices are taken into account and shape the form 
and content of a speaker's present self-relevant discourse or self-evaluation. 
On this view, it is in extrapolating, recalling, constructing, or projecting one's 
past and anticipated selves as distinct others that we achieve the 
"exteriorization" or othemess that is necessary for dialogue. The speaker/self 
"1 ike Prometheus, creates (or rather re-creates) living beings who are 
independent of himself and with whom he is on equal termsY7 (Bakhtin, 1984 p. 
284). This progenitive creation enables the individual speaker, in a sense, to 
stand outside himself; and "looking inside himself, he Iooks into the eves of 
another or with the eves of anothe?' (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 287). By engaging past 
and possible selves I achieve a point of support through which my current self 
becomes something determinate, something of  a particular value. "By 
objectiaing myself (Le., by placing myself outside) I gain the opportunity to 
have an authentically dialogic relation with myself' (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 122). In 
this regard, Ross and Wilson's (2000) discussion ofthe significance of past 
selves seems particularIy relevant. These investigators appear to hold the view 
that past selves may, in some measure, be regarded as past others. More 
specifically, they liken past versions of the self metaphoncaIly to "other 
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individuals who range in closeness to current self, and have achievements or 
failures on attributes that vary in importance to the present self7 (p. 240) 
Engaging these earlier or anticipated versions of the self opens up a distance 
that is productive for establishing the meaning of who we currently take 
ourselves to be. Nor, more importantly, are these past self-others to be seen as 
sluggishly acquiescing to the will, needs, and vicissitudes of the present self. 
Like characters in a polyphonie novel, these temporalized versions of the self 
may, at least in part, be capable of exceeding and disputing the present self s 
authorial will, such the current selfs own self-understanding is subject to the 
dialogizing effect of the ternporalized other's voice. The fact that Ross and 
Wilson argue that under some conditions individuals derogate past selves to 
sustain or enhance positive self-regard and to bolster the impression that one is, 
like a bottle of fine wine, improving with age, also should not be read to 
suggest a fblly malleable and ultimately voiceless past self. The very fact that 
past selves have actively to be derogated suggests their ongoing relevance, 
again in certain instances, to the self of the present. Past selves cary  voices 
that continue to matter to us, that continue to be heard and responded to and 
engaged polemically, and to this extent may be said to enjoy a sort of 
autonomy or efficacy with regard to the present self In short, they continue to 
be other and continue to make their presence felt through self-relevant 
discourse. 
The authors themselves stress this possibility in their consideration of 
cases where individuals refrain fiom derogating past selves or, more 
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accurateIy, where individuals find it more difficult to counteract (through 
derogation or rehabilitative action) the evaluative implications of their past 
deeds. This is especially the case where some past immoral act is at issue. In 
such a case the individual may be limited to efforts to justify or minimize the 
immoral connotations of the past deed. Here, 1 would argue, the dialogue 
between past and present selves is likely to be especially conflict-ridden, with 
the voice of the past self emerging as more fùlly valid and autonomous, as 
more distinctly other, and indeed sometimes even asserting itself over the 
present self, perhaps on occasion even overpowering it, and at the very least 
engaging it in an intense dialogical struggle. The relative otherness or 
autonomy of a past self, operationalized in this case in terms of its ability to 
resist derogation at the hands of the present self, must also, 1 imagine, be 
sustained by that fact that other peupl-perhaps those who still comprise 
one's social circle and whose voices continue to be persuasive for one-were 
witnesses to the deeds, words, and cornpetencies of that past self, and hence 
may complicate our efforts to derogate a past self, or at least be around to 
qualiSr any revisionist account of a former self we might entertain. Certain 
conceptions of ourselves in the past rnay be sustained by others' ongoing 
beliefs about us. Simply put, sometimes other people will not let us forget who 
we "once" were. Thus the dialogue, the struggle, expands, becornes even more 
notably multiplex as it incorporates not only one's own intemalized versions of 
past and present, and even possible selves, but also the similarly internalized 
versions of oneself as others see 
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CHAPTER 6 
AUTOEIOGRAPHICAL DISCOURSE IN DIALOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The present chapter explores the methodological utility of the dialagical 
perspective through a consideration of how it might be brought to bear on the 
analysis and interpretation of autobiographical discourse. Toward this end 1 
will examine three self-descriptions provided by children (siblings) in response 
to an age appropriate version of the question "Who am I?" (Harter, 1988). 
These particular self-descriptions are cited and used by Harter (1988) to 
illustrate the typical pattern of changes characterizing children's self- 
descriptions as children move from preschool age, through middle childhood, 
to adolescence. They are enlisted, more specificaIIy, to highlight a structural- 
developmental explanation of the age-related changes that are often observed 
in children's self-understanding. Upon briefly examining these self- 
descriptions in tems of Harter's own analysis, which stresses the roIe of 
children's emergent reason in determining the content and structure of their 
self-portraits, 1 reconsider them in Iight of a Bakhtinian dialogical fiamework. 
My aim is show how these self-descriptive utterances, while monologic in their 
compositional form, bear the traces of multiple voices-voices that are 
anticipated, polemicized with, or simply taken into account in a way that has a 
material influence on the style and content of these utterance. Disceming these 
voices and the nature of their interrelationhips (e-g., stylization, parody, polemic) 
is one of the goals of a dialogical analysis. 
Three Seif-Portraits 
The first of the following self-portraits is provided by Jason, a four-year-old 
preschooler. Jason's self-portrait is followed by that of his ten-year-older 
sister, Lisa, who is in the fifth grade. Fifteen-year-old Jennifer, the eldest of the 
three siblings, is the author c f  the third self-description in the series. 
1 am a boy, my name is Jason. I live with my mother and father in a big 
house. 1 have a kitty that's orange and a sister named Lisa and a 
teIevision that's in my own room. I'rn four years old and 1 know al1 my 
qB,C's- Listen to me Say them, A,B,C,D,E,F,G, &J,L, K, O, M, P, R, 
Q, X, 2.1 can run faster than anyone. 1 like pizza and 1 have a nice 
teacher. 1 can count up to 100, want to hear me? 1 love my dog, 
Skipper. 1 can climb to the top of the jungle gym. 1 have brown hair and 
1 go to preschool. I'm really strong, 1 c m  lie this chair, watch me! 
(Harter, 1988, p. 47) 
I'm in the fifth grade this year a Rockland Elementary School. I'rn 
pretty popular. That's because I'm nice and helpfbl, the other girls in 
my class Say that 1 am. 1 have two girlfriends who are really close 
fi-iends, and I'rn good at keeping their secrets. Most of the boys are 
pretty yukky. My brother Jason is younger and 1 don't feel that way 
about him, tho' sometimes he gets on my nerves too. But 1 control my 
temper most of the time and don't get too angry and I'd be ashamed of 
myself if 1 got realIy mad at him. I've always been smart at school, ever 
since the first grade and I'rn proud of myself for that. This year I'm 
doing realIy weII in reading, social studies, and science, better than the 
other kids. But some of them do better than me in math, like on a test 
where sornetimes I goof up. When that happens, 1 feel really dumb, but 
usually not for long. 1 don? worry about it that much, and most of the 
time I feel Iike I'm smart. I'rn not very good at sports, like 1 don? do 
well at baseball, soccer, or gymnastics. 1 don? really see why they even 
have sports in school since they just aren't that important. I'd like to be 
an actress when 1 grow up but nobody thinks 1 am pretty enough. 
Jennifer, my older sister is really really pretty, but I'm smarter than she 
is. 1 know 1 would make a good teacher, that's what my fi-iends Say and 
that's what 1'11 probably be. Mostly 1 am just me. Some things about 
me might change when 1 get older but a lot [sic] of them will probably 
stay the same. I'rn a pretty OK person. (Harter, 1988, p. 49) 
I'm pretty complicated, actually. Most people don? understand me, 
especiallv my parents! I'm sensitive, rnoody, affectionate, and 
sornetimes self-conscious. It depends on who 1 am with. When I'rn with 
my friends, mostly rny best fiiends that is, I'rn sensitive and 
understanding. But sometimes 1 can also be extremely uncaring and 
selfish. At home, with my parents I'm affectionate, but 1 can also get 
very moody; sometimes 1 get really depressed and go to the opposite 
extreme. I'm usually pretty tolerant of my little brother and sister. But 
I'rn a different person on a date. I'rn outgoing and 1 c m  be a lot [sic] of 
fùn. There's this one guy 1 went out with, tho', and 1 know he was 
trying to analyze me! When that happens I just change on the spot! 1 
get self-conscious and nervous and then 1 become a total introvert. 1 
don? know what to Say or how to act. It really bugs me too. 1 mean the 
& me is fun-loving so why do 1 have to act so weird? 1 also don't 
really understand why I treat my fiiends the way 1 do. I'rn a naturally 
sensitive person and 1 care a lot [sic] about their feelings, but 
sometimes 1 Say really nasty things to them. I'm not a horrible person, I 
know that, but then how can I say homble things that 1 don't really 
mean? Sometimes I feel pretty confused and mixed up about it. Talking 
to my best girl fiiends, Tammy and Sharon, helps. We talk on the 
phone for hours. They understand me better than anyone else, and they 
care about me. You probably don't understand what I'm trying to say.. 
What 1 mean is that 1 can be pretty obnoxious with my friends 
sometimes, but that's not who 1 reallv am as a person. That's not part of 
my personality, it's just the way 1 act sometimes, and it's not that 
important, actuaily, so 1 probably shouldn't even have rnentioned it. 
There are things that are much more important, for example, 1 think 1 
am good-looking. Not exactIy Brooke Shields, understand, but I'rn 
really attractive compared to the other girls in my school, or at least in 
the group 1 go around with, they think I'rn good-looking. My little 
sister Lisa tells me I'rn pretty too, but she really bugs me because there 
are days when 1 look at myself in the mirror and think I look absolutely, 
totally, atrocious, I'rn the ugliest person in the entire world! She tries to 
talk me out of it, but what does she know about looks, she's only IO! 
My mother is the same way. She'll Say "yoii look Iovely, deai' when 1 
really look like a total zero! But then there are days when 1 look great, 
and my mom says "Are you going out with your hair like u?" I hate 
to go to school on days like that, I get really depressed. Besides, I'rn 
pretty bored at school anyway. Nothing they teach is relevant to 
anything in life! 1 think of myself as an inquisitive person but there's 
nothing about school subjects to be curious aboiit. So I'rn a pretty 
mediocre student, I just do what 1 have to in order to get by, but it 
doesn't bother me that much, it's just not that important. I know 
everyone in class is looking at me thinking I'rn really dumb, but 1 only 
care about what my friends think. Besides, I'rn going to be an airline 
stewardess [sic], anyway. Wetl probabl~. So are my best fiiends, 
Tammy and Sharon, we're al1 going to airline school together after we 
graduate, g w e  graduate. I'm confused about what to do. 
Subconsciously 1 want to quit, but then the real me knows 1 should stay 
in schooI for my own good. I really don't know. There are days when I 
wish 1 could just becorne immune to myselfl (Harter, 1988, p. 54-55) 
A Structural-Developmental Intemretation 
In discussing the developmental trajectory of self-knowledge, Harter (1988) 
considers each of the self-descriptions above in terms of the underlying cognitive 
cornpetencies suggested by their particular features. Consider, first, Jason's self- 
description. Jason's discourse about himself is typical of most children his age, 
especially in the preponderance of references to concrete, observable activities or 
characteristics. Children at this age seem to be primarily preoccupied with their 
"overt" self (Rosenberg, 1979), which incorporates such extemal aspects as one's 
body, possessions, behaviour, and demographic information. Leahy and Shirk 
(1985) similarly daim that at this early age children's inner Iife is not an object of 
cognition; imer experiences not being well articulated, the child attends to 
peripheral or observable, physical qualities or activities, features which comprise 
what the authors cal1 the "objective self." According to Harter, also typically 
absent in preschool children's self-descriptions are generalizations or more 
superordinate conceptual categories (e.g., being good at sports) based on more 
concrete characteristics and skills ( eg ,  ruming fast, being a good climber). 
Harter also notes that these self-descriptions are not redistic, that they generally 
reflect inaccurate self-appraisals, often suggesting cornpetencies-for example, 
reciting the alphabet-that the child has not objectively demonstrated. In a related 
vein, these self-descriptions are generally fi-ee of "negativity," that is, they do not 
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contain any reference to the chiIdYs potential shortcomings or to any confiictuai 
dimensions of the self. They are also offered in a rather incoherent, haphazard 
fashion, leading Harter to conclude that at this stage we have "a rather disjointed 
account of 'a11 things bright and beautiful' about the self' (p. 48). 
Following the Piagetian fiarnework Harter accounts for the content and 
structure of preschookrs' self-descriptions Iargely in terms of the cognitive 
limitations associated with preoperational, prelogical thought. The main problem 
for the young child seems to be an inability to think inductively, to move 
Iogically fiom particular instances to a more general claim about oneself This, 
according to Harter, is why we do not see references to more superordinate 
category labels, such as "smart" or "good at sports" in Jason's self-portrait- 
although we should note that Jason does Say he is "strong" and gives an example 
(lifting a chair). Also undeveloped at this age is the capacity for deductive 
thought, a cognitive limitation that rnay explain the inaccuracy and positivity of 
Jason's self-description. Children at this age, writes Harter, "corfuse the wish to 
be competent with reality, and as a result their self-judgements represent 
overestimations of their tme abilities" (p. 48). Invoking aspects of Epstein's 
(1973) view of the self-concept as a theory one constructs about the self, Harter 
adds that this tendency represents not so much a wilful misrepresentation of one's 
abilities, but more simply an inability realistically or logically to test the 
postdates in one's self-theory. More specifically in this case, Jason seems 
incapable of differentiating a postulate that represents his ideai self-image from 
the postdate that relates to his real self-image. Finally, the absence of logical 
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sklls is reflected in Jason's inability to provide an organized, coherent, and 
smooth narrative description of himself. Harter notes that this logical deficiency 
might also account for the fact that a child at this stage may produce different and 
inconsistent self-descriptions if asked to do so at different points in tirne. The 
preoperational child is "unable to recognize such contradictions and is thus 
unconcmed about the lack of logical consistency" (p. 48) reflected in his self- 
description. 
Lisa's self-portrait is illustrative of those provided by children in the 
period nom middle to late childhood. A major developmental change in self- 
descriptions during this period is the appearance of trait labels (e-g., smart). 
Lisa's use of trait labels especially reflects her growing conçern with 
interpersonal circurnstances and relations with others, particularly peers. 
Accordingly, there emerges in Lisa's account a greater sensitivity to others' 
opinions about herselt: a sensitivity that is illustrated precisely by her invocation 
of trait labels that implicate her relation to others (e-g., popular, helpful). Arnong 
the other important features of self-descriptions at this age is the introduction of 
emotion concepts. In particular, children's expression of emotions and their 
efforts to subject them to control become central characteristics of the content of 
their self-concept; notable in this regard are self-affects or emotions that Lisa 
directs to herself (e.g., pride, feeling ashamed) and that are not contingent upon 
others' obsexvations. 
A child of Lisa's age has certainly made a number of cognitive advances, 
many in the area of classification and hierarchization of concepts. These 
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emerging inductive skills, specifically associated with the concrete operational 
stage of cognitive development, allow her to combine and organize specific 
behaviours and characteristics into a more generalized, higher-order concept 
about the self Also, unlike her preoperational counterpart, Lisa offers more 
realistic appraisals of her competencies. She proceeds more scientifically, as it 
were, by fiequently providing the necessary "evidence" for her particular trait 
self-attributions (e-g., she is nice because others have said so). Lisa's self- 
descriptions are also generally more accurate, owing in part to the increasing use 
of social cornparison in the determination of her cornpetence in a variety of 
domains, an ability which is itself seen as an outgrowth of her more general 
cognitive ability to relate, classi@ concepts, and hold their multiple aspects (in 
this case, one's own and other children's characteristics) in mind simultaneously. 
As a consequence, she is also more likely to provide an honest picture of herself, 
one in which both relative strengths and weaknesses across various, differentiable 
dornains (e-g., academic, social) are acknowiedged. Not surprisingly, a concrete 
operational child like Lisa also produces a more thematically organized and 
coherent self-description, a fact Harter considers to be a specific manifestation of 
a broader emerging "organizational penchant" associated with the stage of 
concrete operations. The result is that she can articulate a rather flowing narrative 
account of herself in the different domains that are relevant to her self-definition. 
In a related vein, her narrative also suggens a concern with the self s continuity 
over time, with the stability or constancy of her current trait ascriptions in a 
temporal context that includes both the past (e-g., being smart ever since the first 
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grade) and projection into the future (e-g., aspiring to be an actress or a tacher). 
This too, according to Harter, can be seen as a function of concrete operational 
children's capacity to attend to more than one dimension of the self at the same 
tirne-in this case, to temporalized versions of the self. 
Whereas the concrete operational child can think Iogically and 
inductively, but only with respect to concrete, observable aspects of the world, by 
adoiescence the advent of formal operational thought expands the child's logical 
thinking to include more abstract constructions. For example, where Lisa could 
oniy organize specific behaviours into trait categories, Jennifer can accomplish 
the more cognitively sophisticated task of combining and integrating trait 
abstractions to infer even higher-level abstractions, such as integrating the trait 
labels "depressed" and "fiin-loving" into the psychoIogica1 abstraction "moody." 
Such abstract generalizations, according to Harter, "require much more inference 
about one's latent characteristics than do the self-descriptions of the younger 
child" (p. 55). Accordingly, with the advent of adolescence, there is a decreasing 
reference to concrete and context-dependent overt qualities and a corollary 
increase in allusions to an abstract, psychological, "covert self' (Rosenberg, 
1979) or "subjective self' (Leahy & Shirk, 1985) that comprises an unobservable 
interior realm of thoughts, feelings, attitudes, traits, and motives. 
As Jemifer's self-descriptive utterance also shows, the abstractions 
incorporated in adolescents' self-portrayals are also likely to be more diverse, a 
feature attendant on the development of cognitive differentiation skills and the 
increasing awareness of socialization pressures-that is, of the different 
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expectations imposed on the adolescent by different significant others. By 
adolescence, self-descriptive attributes begin especially to Vary across different 
social roles or relational contexts (parents, tnends, intimate others, and so on) 
(Harter, 1986; Hart, 1988; Rosenberg, 1986; Srnollar & Youniss, 1985). 
Accordingly, adolescents see themselves as possessing a number of role- or 
context-dependent selves, some of which, when juxtaposed and brought into 
awareness, rnay be recognized as contradictions or inconsistencies within the 
self-concept. Such contradictions may partially explain the confusion and 
"intrapsychic conflict" of adolescence, a condition exacerbated, according to 
Harter, by the experimentation, physiological upheavals, mood swings, and 
pressure of new social expectations that characterize this period of life. 
Following Epstein (1973), Harter assumes that adoIescents are driven to 
integrate divergent or contradictory self-attributes by creating a self-theory that is 
coherent and unified. Just as the postulates of a sound and viable scientific theory 
must be intemally consistent, so too must the postdates of a self-theory stand in a 
nor-contradictory relation to one another. Inconsistency in theçe postdates 
presents a threat to one's self-theory and hence a source of motivation for its 
resolution. According to Hmer, the lengthy and often tortured self-descripticns 
of adolescents-Jennifer's is exemplary-attest precisely to this need to achieve 
consistency in one's self-theory. Harter argues, moreover, that by adolescence the 
cognitive skills that enable the construction of a good self-theory begin to 
emerge. The advent of hypothetico-deductive reasoning-the hallmark of 
scientific logic- and the emergent ability to integrate and relate concepts are two 
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developmental achievements that are particularly relevant in this regard. 
More recently, Harter and Monsour (1992) have elaborated on Harter's 
(1988) initial claims about adolescents' increasing ability to integrate 
potentially conflicting self-attributes. Drawing on Fischer's (1980) cogndive- 
developmental theory, Harter and Monsour posit a three-step mode1 to explain 
varying responses to contradictory self-attributes over the period ffom early to 
late adolescence. In early adolescence, the individual finctions at the level of 
"single abstractions." At this level, the adolescent can construct abstract 
attributes about the self but still lacks the cognitive ability to compare these 
abstractions-a state of affairs that explains young adolescent's relative lack of 
concern about potentially conflicting self-representations. 
With the advent of "abstract mapping" in middle adolescence, the 
individual acquires the conceptual tools needed to compare and relate self- 
attributes. The emergence of these cognitive tools enables the adolescent to 
evaluate the interna1 consistency of her seIf-theory and hence to detect 
inconsistencies in the self across roles. What a child at this stage still lacks, 
however, is the capacity adequately to integrate such apparent contradictions. 
Given, on the one hand, these inconsistencies and the adolescent's new found 
ability to detect theni, and, on the other hand, the intense drive to constnict an 
integrated, internally consistent self-theory but the absence of cognitive skills to 
do su, the adolescent at this middle stage is particularly susceptible to confusion 
and psychological distress. 
It is only with the emergence of "abstract systems" in late adolescence 
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that the individual acquires the cognitive skills that enable her to reduce 
interna1 conflict by integrating seemingly opposite self-attributes into 
compatible higher order abstractions-for example, combining "fiin-loving" 
and "depressed" into the higher-order ccmoody." Other sorts of generalizations 
used to cope with apparent inconsistencies in the self also become available to 
the individual. For example, the adolescent may resolve the contradiction in 
self-attributes by coming to a self-conscious understanding of the self as 
flexible or adaptive across contexts. Or, in a related strategy, the adolescent 
may reduce potential c o d i c t  by adopting a more abstract generalization with 
regard to the desirability or normaky of  behaving differently in different roles, 
the understanding being that people act differently in different situations; for 
example, an adolescent rnay Say "It wouldn't be normal to act the same way 
with everyone; you act one way with your friends and another way with 
parents" or "it's good to be different with different people, would be strange 
and boring if weren't." In her earlier a h l e ,  Harter (1 988) also daims that 
adolescents like Jennifer may cope with contradictions in the self by engaging in 
a number of self-protective or self-enhancing strategies, among which is the 
tendency to appeal to the notion of a core, real, or true self: a stable, consistent 
entity that can be distinguished fiom more superficial, and hence more 
inconsistent, self-presentations. A related mechanism for preserving self-esteem 
is the strategy of discounting the importance of negative self-evaluations in a 
particular cornpetence by regarding them as inessential aspects of one's true self 
In sum, the standard structural-developrnental account approaches age- 
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reIated changes in children's self-understanding largely as the epiphenomenal 
product of the children's emergent reason. In keeping with the biases of the 
traditional structural-developmental perspective, typically absent from such 
accounts is a recognition of the role pIayed by children's and adolescentsy 
enculturation into particular language communities in their emergent self- 
understandi ng. Little, if any, consideration is given to the constitutive 
significance of the language and voices that children have heard and intemalized 
in the course of their communicative encounters with others or to the possibility 
that, in talking about themselves, children may be casting their utterances within 
particular socioculturally specific genres or modes of discourse that offer 
particular ways of seeing and evaluating the world and themselves. Nor is 
children's autobiographical discourse considered with a view to discerning its 
rhetorical dimensions. 
The Social Orieins of Sel£hoo~- 
While not disputing the relevance of a child's emergent cognitive skills to the 
child's understanding of the selt the dialogical view put fonvard here proposes 
that autobiographical discourse is sornething whose nature is social and whose 
origins lie, in some good masure, in the interpersonal, social, and cultural matrix 
of which the child is a part. A dialogical perspective argues that understanding 
children's self-descriptions requires an understanding of the social sources of 
children's taik about themselves. It directs us to the fact that a child's 
autobiographical discourse is "scaffolded" by others' words and voices (Bakhtin, 
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1984; cf. Vygotslq, 1987). As Bakhtin (1986) writes, 
1 Iive in a world of others' words. And my entire life is an orientation in 
this world, a reaction to others' words (an infinitely diverse reaction), 
beginning with my assimilation of them (in the process of  initial 
mastery of speech) and ending with assimilation of the wealth of 
human culture (expressed in the word or in other semiotic rnaterials). 
(P. 143) 
It would be surprising, then, if children did not leam to tdk about themselves by 
being interlocutors, by hearing internaIizing, and responding to the utterances of 
others, and by being enculturated into different discursive forms for self- 
understanding. 
That factors other than children's emergent rationality might be 
implicated in determining the particular nature of their seIf-descriptions is readily 
suggested by cross-cultural research which shows that the shift fiom a concrete 
and social to an abstract and psychoIogica1 self-understanding may not take 
place for children raised in collectivistic societies. For example, one group of 
Dutch investigators (van den Heuvel, Tellegen, & Koomen, 1992) reports that 
Turkish and Moroccan immigrant children in the sixth, seventh, and eighth 
grades who corne ftom collectivistic backgrounds understand themselves more 
readily in terms that implicate their relation to the social environment, whereas 
Dutch children refer more often to psychologica! qualities. In anotfier study, 
Miller (1987) examined deveIopmenta1 shifts in person perception in Amencan 
and Hindu Indian children of 8, 11, and 15 years. On open-ended descriptions, 
older American children were found to refer to general psychological 
dispositions in describing others, a finding consistent with the structural- 
developmental explanation considered above. In contrast, Hindu Indian children, 
while capable of invoking such abstract dispositions as fiequently as American 
children when asked for them explicitly, did not employ them spontaneously; 
rather, these children were more likely than their American counterparts to 
provide relationally oriented, context-sensitive descriptions of others. The 
findings of such research cast at least some doubt on the view that the 
developmental change from concrete to abstract self-understanding is one 
guided solely by increasing cognitive cornpetence-by the mental ability, Say, to 
differentiate general properties from the contexts in which such properties are 
displayed. 
The findings of cross-cultural research with older subjects show a 
pattern that is generally consistent with the research cited above. Much of this 
research has been aimed at documenting and expioring the contrast between the 
Western-individualistic-independent self-concept, on the one hand, and the 
Eastern-collectivistic-interdependendent self-concept, on the other (Cousins, 1989; 
Markus & Kitayama, 199 1; Miller, 1987; Oyserman & Markus, 1993; Shweder 
& Bourne, 1984; Triandis, 1989). The distinction speaks to the difference 
between understanding one's actions in terms of transcontextual regularities and 
generalities usually embodied in abstract psychological dispositions attached to 
the self (the independent self-concept), and understanding the self in terms of the 
more concrete, social contexts in which actions occur (the interdependent self- 
concept). Cousins (1989), for example, reports that when asked to describe 
themselves in no particular context, Amencans more often rely on abstract, 
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psychological amibutes in their self-descriptions than do Japanese subjects, who 
are more likely to describe themselves in terms of specific cases and contexts. 
While Japanese individuals do use psychological self-attributions, they do so with 
respect to particular social contexts; they do not see these psychological 
attributions as qualities abstracted fiom any particular context. Again, results like 
these suggest that factors other than those associated tvith the basic, universal 
features of cognition may ùifluence the particular shape that autobiographical 
discourse takes. More specifically, the culturally variable pattern in chiIdrenYs 
and adults' self-descriptions would appear to reflect the importance to these self- 
descriptions of factors pertaining to social transmission. Being raised in a 
particular culture involves acquinng certain genres or modes of discourse for 
talking about oneself and others and for explaining one's own and others' action. 
Over the course of a life, and with increasing participation in cultural forms of 
life, one adopts or appropriates an increasingly wider array of social- 
communicative practices and genres, each of which can-ies its own themes, 
typical forms of expression, and so forth. In many Western cultures, for example, 
children' s increasing use of psychoIogica1 abstractions in their self-descriptions 
rnay be a social-discursive phenornenon. Adolescents' autobiographical discourse 
may be characterized by the use of mental tenns and abstractions not because 
they have acquired a more cognitively sophisticated understanding of a 
substantive, inner, private world, but because, perhaps more than rnost 
preschoolers or middle children, they have been enculturateci into social forms of 
Iife in which the use of such abstractions is explicitly promoted. As children grow 
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into the social-ideological environment of Western culture, they are likely to 
come to believe in the modem orthodox view that "to know oneself is to know 
the hidden self deep within us" (Morson, 1988, p. 520). This is a view that says 
that meaning unfolds in an abstract expanse of ime r space. It is in comection 
with this inner space, a space populated with individual intentions, psychological 
qualities, and other mental entities, that meaning accrues to an individual's 
actions. Moreover, the identification of tliis abstract interiority with what is rnost 
essential about our personhood gives rise to a fùndamental cleavage between 
and-as Jennifer's discourse suggests-a great concen about the ''inne?' and 
"outer" self, the "real" and "fiIse" self, and so forth. Children and adults in 
Western cultures, it would seern, learn how to think and talk like philosophicai 
rnodemists. 
Consistent with the assumptions of the dialogical framework are the 
findings of recent research on the socialization of children's self- 
understanding. Working within a narrative framework, Miller and her 
colleagues (MiIler, Potts, Fung, Hoogstra, & Mintz, 1990; Miller et al., 1992; 
Miller & Moore, 1989; Miller & Sperry, 1988; Sperry & Sperry, 1995) have 
demonstrated how preschool children leam to constmct a sense of self from the 
verbal content of their parents' and caregivers' discourse, and more 
specifically fiom the conversational narratives of their child's persona1 
experience toId in face-to-face interaction. This research suggests that children 
leam culturally constituted ways of talking about themselves and their 
experience through their exposure to and participation in "local narrative 
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practices," practices which "becorne a resource to the extent that the growing 
child resists, accedes to, seizes upon, or in some way makes use of the self- 
relevant messages embodied therein" (Miller et ai., 1990, p. 294). h o n g  the 
more specific narrative practices related to children's self-constmction are 
caregivers' stones about the child's experience told in the child's presence but 
not addressed to the child; caregivers' intervention in the child's narratives; and 
children's appropriations of other children's stones as their own (Miller et al., 
1990). In their analysis of caregiver interventions in children's narrative 
accounts of personal experience, for example, Miller et al. (1990) show how by 
asking questions, challenging, supporting, or introducing comments that orient 
the child to the particular features of some self-relevant event, caregivers 
cornmunicate to the child a particular version or rendition of his or her 
experience. cc13y intervening in these ways," the authors argue, "the mother 
carved out for the child the reportable or publicly claimable parts of his 
experience" (pp. 299-300). Hence, consistent with a Bakhtinian account, this 
research supports the notion that children acquire a particular sense of self- 
understanding not simply "by reworking and transforming their experience in 
solitary contexts but by virtue of hearing how significant others portray and 
respond to them in conversational contexts" (Miller et al., 1992, p. 48). 
Research drawing explicitly on Bakhtinian concepts has similarly 
stressed children's intemalization of the concrete voices they encounter in the 
rounds of everyday communicative activities. Dore (1989), for example, 
interprets the cnb speech and language development of a two-year old child in 
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terms of the concepts of voice and genres. More specifically, he provides 
evidence to suggest that the child's "narratives from the crib" entail a re- 
envoicing of the particular generic features of the child's previous dialogues with 
his or  her parents, dialogues pertaining to such routine activities as preparing for 
bed. More recently, Tappan (199 1, 1992, 1997; Day & Tappan, 1996; Tappan & 
Brown, 1996) draws on Bakhtin's dialogical fiamework to elaborate a 
socioculturaI account of children's moral finctioning. In particular, he examines 
how children's Iinguistically mediated responses to moral problems invoke the 
voices of "justice" and "care" that the child has internalized in the course of his 
or her concrete communicative encounters with others. These research prograrns 
converge in presenting us with the image of a developing child who, far fiom 
being a self-constituting, unitary subject, is nurtured by and oriented toward 
social interaction and speech communication. Children actively partake in a 
social-communicative process through which their own unique discourse or 
speech experience is shaped and formulated in an ongoing interaction with 
others' utterances. This research also suggests that language is more than 
merely an instrument used to express previously understood dimensions of the 
self. Language emerges, rather, as "the means by which self is transformed 
and created . . . through the dual capacity of language to be both reflective of 
and embedded in interpersonal experience" (Miller et al., 1992, ph 47). As 
Tappan (1997) has similarly argued, children's self-understandings do not 
emerge sui neneris from their own experience of relationships-that is, children 
do not construct texts of self-understanding merely on the basis of their 
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extralinguistic expenence of relationships with others. Rather, in learning to 
speak in certain ways-say, about c'fairness"-through their dialogues with 
others, children corne to experierice the world in ways that correspond to the 
fanguage they appropriate. Nor, in keeping with the Bakhtinian premise, are the 
child's self-descriptive utterances wrought out of abstract words and discourses. 
Rather, children's taIk about themselves is an expression of the concrete voices 
they have heard and appropriated. In the course of her concrete communicative 
encounters, the child actively appropriates the words of others barents, 
siblings, fiiends, teachers, and so on). As we imbibe more voices we find new 
ways of reaccenting the words of others and hence new ways of knowing 
ourselves. 
Bakhtin's Discourse T w o l o q  
Earlier, we saw how Bakhtin's theory of the utterance establishes the 
constitutive importance for any utterance of the already-spoken and anticipated 
words of others. On the Bakhtinian account, every utterance is invariably 
dialogical in that it necessarily engages the other's word in some way. In his 
more expressly literary-critical writings, Bakhtin (1984) establishes another 
sense of dialogicality, one that speaks less to dialogue as an inescapable feature 
of discourse than to its status as a variable quality. On this alternative sense, it 
is possible to speak of an utterance as being monologic or dialogic, depending 
on the degree to which it more or less self-consciously or explicitly establishes 
a relation to the other's discourse. In this regard, Bakhtin (1984) makes a 
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findamental distinction between single-voiced (or monologic) and double- 
voiced (or dialogic) discourse. In the remainder of this chapter, 1 provide a 
selective exposition of these discursive categones and, in an analysis that is 
admittedly meant to be more suggestive than rigorously exhaustive, explore their 
potential analytic relevance to the self-descriptions provided by Jason, Lisa, and 
Jemi fer. 
Sinele-Voiced Discourse. In single-voiced or monologic discourse, 
which encompasses "naming, informing, expressing, representing" (p. 186), a 
referential orientation prevails. This is a direct, object-onented discourse that 
"recognizes only itself and its object, to which it strives to be maximally 
adequate" (1984, pp. 186-187). In its object-directedness, direct discourse 
performs its task confidently, never containing linguistic or paralinguistic 
markers that might otherwise suggest a seif-questioning regarding its ability to 
accomplish its purpose. The speaker of direct discourse simply names his or her 
referent, speaking as if there were no "spectral dispersion" of the word. In 
speaking in a direct, unmediated way, there is also, by definition, no e f f i  to see 
the phenomenon through the optic of another language; that is7 the speaker's 
design does not require a consideration of how the object is located in different 
languages and in others' already-spoken words about the topic. Single-voiced 
discourse is not mediated by a relation to another's speech, does not respond to 
it, take it into account, or anticipate it in some way. Accordingly, there is no 
effort to represent the other's discourse in the utterance, for example, by alluding 
to it in some fashion-at least not in a way that would erode or challenge the 
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author@ of the speaker's own speech on the ~ u b j e c t - ~ ~  So, for example, a 
scientist may talk about a phenornenon in his or her "own" language without 
feeling any need to consider some other way of talking about it that may be more 
adequate. 
It should be stressed that direct, object-oriented, single-voiced discourse, 
while monological in the senses noted above, is no less diaiogically related to 
others' words-as Bakhtin's metalinguistic theory of the utterance clearly 
suggeas. In the context of single-voiced speech, however, this relation to other's 
words and voices amounts to "scaffolding, which is not incorporated into the 
architectural whole even though it is indispensable and taken into account by 
the builder" (1984, p. 187). It is not included in the actual design of the 
utterance or, as Bakhtin (1984) puts it, does "not enter into the project that 
discourse has set itself' (p. 187). It does not figure as an intentionai part of 
what, elsewhere, Bakhtin (1986) calls the writer's or speaker's "speech will" or 
"speech plan." The writer or speaker is simply not interested in making the 
scaffold of other people's w~rds  about the topic detectable in the utterance, 
although cited elements could, under deeper analysis, be discerned in it. If the 
speaker were interested in incorporating this scaffolding in his or her speech 
and making the use of other people's words an express aspect of the utterance, 
the speaker would have used double-voiced discourse. 
Double-Voiced Discourse. According to Bakhtin, linguistic and stylistic 
analyses of literary discourse have traditionally limited themselves to studying 
how a discourse relates only to its referential object. Bakhtin claims, however, 
direct object-oriented discourse is rather uncommon in Iiterary discourse; for 
an author's or speaker's intention "is realized not in his direct discourse but 
with the help of other peopie's words, created and distributed specifically as 
the words of others" (p. 188). Literary artistic prose, while directed, like 
ordinary discourse, toward the referential object of speech, is aiso fiequently 
oriented "toward another's discourse, toward someone eIse1s s~eech"  (p. 185), 
incorporating "a relationship to someone else's utterance as an indispensable 
element" (p- 186). In pointing up these possibilities, Bakhtin is broaching the 
problem of double-voiced discourse. Whereas in direct, single-voiced discourse, 
the author's intention predominates, in double-voiced discourse the author 
makes use of another's discourse such that two intentions or speech centres are 
present in the discourse. More specifically, double-voiced discourse is a way of 
discursively embodying the speaker's stance toward and valorization of the 
other (or the other's discourse). This can b e  accornpIished in at least two 
general ways. A speaker maya for instance, incorporate another's language 
directly into his or her own speech, where it is reaccented according to her own 
discursive aims and intentions, Alternatively, the other's language may exert 
its effect on the other's discourse fiom without; that is, whiIe the other's 
language may not be incorporated into the speaker's discourse, it may 
nonetheless shape the tone and semantic orientation of the speaker's words. In 
either instance, however, the speaker's discourse is formulated in a dialogic 
interplay with the word of the other. 
Although discussed by Bakhtin largely in comection with literary 
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discourse, the phenornenon of double-voiced discourse is no less, and perhaps 
even more, commonly encountered in everyday speech. Our "practical," 
everyday speech is f i I l  of others' words, words we relate to in diverse ways. 
We may, for example, take others' words as supplementing and affirming our 
own words. Alternatively, we may use another's discourse in such a manner 
that we convey intentions that are in some measure hostile or  alien to it, Say, 
through parody, irony, or sarcasm. In a face-to-face dialogue, for example, a 
speaker may repeat another's statement, "investing it with new value and 
accenting it in his own way-with expressions of doubt, indignation, irony, 
mockery, ridicule, and the like" (p. 194). Something as simple as repeating 
someone's statement as a question may lead to a clash of voices or intentions 
within a single utterance: one simultaneously asks a question and conveys the 
problematic nature of the other's statement. In short, and more generally, we 
often introduce another's words into Our own speech, casting upon them an 
evaluative interpretation and thereby making our discourse double-voiced. 
Bakhtin subdivides double-voiced discourse into three main types: 
unidirectional, vari-directional, and active. Each of these discourse types 
defines a particular way of relating dialogically to the word of  the other. 
Double-voiced discourse is cal 1ed unidiredona1 when it carries a 
convergent relation between the individual purposes or aspirations of the speaker 
and those of the other. The paradigm case for Bakhtin is what he calls 
"stylization." In stylization, the speaker or author's thought has considered 
another's discourse and "made its home in it, does not collide with the other's 
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thought, but rather follows &er it in the same direction, merely making that 
direction conventional" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 193). The other's word, no longer 
accepted unwittingly or naïvely-say, as in direct unmediated discourse-has 
been questioned or tested and its authority found (and not simply assurned) to be 
reasonable and adequate to the task at hand, and hence also to the speaker's, if 
not to any other person's, discursive aims. Indeed, it is precisely the speaker's 
acceptance of the other's tested word that the speaker seeks consciously to 
convey in his or her discourse. The stylizer actively constmcts an utterance in 
such a way that the other's voice will be heard to resonate convergently with 
his or her own. The speaker wants the voice of the other to be heard and, more 
importantly, wants to be heard agreeing with or even reinforcing that voice. If 
the speaker's speech p!an were not characterized by this aim, that is, if the 
speaker were simply interested in making a straightfonvard daim about some 
object that corresponded simply to his or her own individual intention, then the 
speaker would construct a single-voiced utterance. In this latter instance, the 
other's voice, rather than being expressly heard in the utterance, wouId become 
invisible scaffolding. 
To construct a double-voiced utterance that expresses a relation of 
agreement is to make the other's voice both visible and conditional. That the 
other's voice is accepted conditionally follows fiom the very nature of 
agreement. Agreeing with an other on some matter always implies the 
possibility of disagreeing with that other. Agreement with the other 
presupposes, as noted above, that the speaker has considered or tested the 
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other's position and corne to the conclusion that the other's discourse and 
referential intention is ccnght'7-aIthough the speaker may have certainly 
concluded otherwise. But the very fact that the other's discourse has been 
tested in this fashion alters the nature of the authority o f  the other's voice. That 
voice is now accepted conditionally. Another way to put this is to Say that 
stylization involves using "another's discourse precisely as other, and in so 
doing [casting] a slight shadow of objectification over it" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 
189). The original intent of the direct object-oriented discourse of another is now 
used in the service of new purposes, which internally dialogize it, thereby 
rendenng it conditional. 
To stress the preceding point, Bakhtin (1984) contrasts stylization with 
imitation, which "does not render a form conditional, for it takes the imitated 
material seriously, makes it its own, directly appropriates to itself someone 
else's discourse" (p. 190). What happens in the case of imitation is that we 
completely merge our own voice with that of the other. This sort of merging, 
and hence the erasure of  stylization, may occur, for example, under conditions 
where one's enthusiasm for the other's discourse effaces the distance between 
self and other and weakens "the deliberate sense of  a reproduced style as 
someone' else's style. For precisely distance had created the conventionality" 
(p. 190). Here, the speaker's utterance becomes such that it conveys a single 
intention. With imitation, the speaker's distance fiom the other is Iost, the 
objectification of the other's discourse is attenuated, resulting in a merging of 
the author's and the other person's voice, and hence in an attenuation of the 
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double-voicedness of the speaker's discourse. Where two voices were once 
sensed, we now sense a single voice: "stylization becomes style" (p. 198). Of 
course, stylization may reassert itself if the distance from and authonty of the 
other's discourse were to change. 
In vari-directional double-voiced discourse, the other's discourse 
becomes the object not of agreement but of criticaf or even hostile treatment. 
The other's word has been found wanting, has failed to pass the test, and now 
needs expressly to be chdlenged. Accordingly, the author introduces into the 
other's discourse a semantic intention that opposes or introduces an accentua1 
shift in its original intention. Parody is an exemplary case of vari-directional 
discourse. Whereas in stylization the author's voice follows in the same 
direction as the other's voice, in parodic discourse the author's voice, 
once having made its home in the other's discourse, clashes hostilely 
with its primordial hast and forces him to serve directly opposing aims. 
Discourse becomes an arena of battle between two voices. In parody, 
therefore, there cannot be that fiision of voices possible in stylization. 
(P- 193) 
In parodic discourse, the aspect of the other's discourse that is objectionable is 
made evident in the speaker's or author's words. In effect, the speaker uses the 
other's discourse to challenge that discourse. As Bakhtin notes, moreover, 
parody is a diverse phenornenon. One may, for example, make parodic use of 
another person's speech style or of another's socially typical or idiosyncratic 
way of perceiving, thinking, and speaking. Parody may also Vary in terms of 
the depth of its focus: on the one hand a speaker may parody rather superficial 
verbal forms, and on the other he or she rnay parody the deepest pnnciples, 
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values, and assumptions informing another's discourse. 
A third variety of double-voiced discourse, one to which Bakhtin 
accords the sharpest focus, c m  be distinguished fiom the others in terms of its 
active orientation. In both stylization and parody, the other's discourse is a 
relatively passive tool in the hands of the author: the author simply reaccents 
the other's words to express his or her own intentions and purposes. In 
contrast, in active vari-directional discourse the other's word exhibits greater 
resistance to a speaker's authorial wiIl and intention. The other person's words, 
while taken into account or referred to in some way, retain a measure of 
autonomy from the author's discourse, suggesting a greater reciprocity or 
dialogical equality between the speaker and the other's discourse. We sense this 
discourse more specifically as a struggle between two equally valid voices, a fact 
that cornplicates the speaker's project and introduces into it an element of 
extreme intemal dialogkation: "Another's discourse in this case is not 
reproduced with a new intention, but it acts upon, influences, and in one way 
or another determines the author's discourse, while itself remaining outside it" 
(p. 195). People's self-descriptions, for example, may be permeated with a 
sensitivity toward the previous and anticipated words and reactions of others, a 
fact that influences the style and semantic structure of the speaker's self- 
utterances. Bakhtin discusses several subvariants of active, double-voiced 
discourse, among which are dialogue, hidden dialogue, and hidden or intemal 
polemic. 
Bakhtin (1984) argues that a rejoinder fiom "real and profound 
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dialogue" (p. 197) is both oriented toward its referential object and at the same 
time a reaction to someone else's word. In a dialogue, my words are always 
answers to an other's word. In formulating my rejoinder 1 anticipate the other's 
word, rework the other's replies, and in the process the structure of the 
dialogue changes, bringing the object of discourse into a new light, 
illuminating aspects of it otherwise conceaied in monologic or singIe voiced 
speech. 
In hidden dialogue, a discourse exhibits the effects or traces of another's 
words on a given utterance, but unlike overt dialogue, that other is invisible. One 
speaks or writes as if responding to this absent other. While in such speech only 
one person is actually speaking, the effect of the invisible other's presence, of the 
other's unspoken words, can still be sensed in the speaker's utterances. 
Imagine a dialogue of two persons in which the statements of the second 
speaker are omitted, but in such a way that the generd sense is not at al1 
violated. The second speaker is present invisibly, his words are not there, 
but deep traces left by these words have a deterrnining influence on al1 the 
present and visible words ofthe first speaker. We sense that this is a 
conversation, although only one person is speaking, and it is a 
conversation of the most intense kind, for each present, uttered word 
responds and reacts with its every fiber to the invisible speaker, points to 
something outside itself, beyond its own limits, to the unspoken words of 
another person. (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 197) 
According to Bakhtin, hidden dialogicality characterizes much discourse in both 
the Iiterary and everyday redms. 
In hidden polemic, the category that most interested Bakhtin, the 
other's discourse is-as in the case of stylization, parody, and hidden 
dialogue-not actually present or reproduced in the speaker's discourse, but 
rather is merely inferred. Still, the other's discourse enters actively into the 
construction of the speakerYs utterance. The most criticat feature of this 
inferred discourse is its antagonistic treatment by the author-speaker. 
In a hidden polemic the author's discourse is directed toward its own 
referential object, as is any other discourse, but at the same tirne every 
statement about the object is constructed in such a way that, apart fiom 
its referential meaning, a polemical blow is stmck at the other's 
discourse on the same theme, at the other's statement about the same 
object. A word, directed toward its referential object, clashes with 
another's word within the very object itself. (p. 195) 
In hidden polemic, then, it is this antagonistic treatment of the other's words, 
no less than the very topic being discussed, that determines the shape and 
cor?tent of the speaker-author's discourse. While directed toward its referential 
object-which it names, expresses, portrays-internally polemical discourse 
also assumes an intentional orientation toward-takes a "sideward glance" 
at-someone else's (the addressee's) word about the object. Internally 
polemical discourse anticipates a hostile response €rom the other and that 
anticipation enters the utterance fiom wit hin; the speaker's reaction to the 
other's implied or anticipated rejecting words affects the syntactical stxucture, 
style, intonation, and content of his or her speech. This sort of discourse, 
Bakhtin (1984) adds, is relatively common in everyday life and speech and can 
be heard in "al1 words that 'make digs at others' and al1 'barbed' words" (p. 
196). But the sideward gIance of the internally polemical word need not be 
aggressively oriented. It can also be fearfùl: "here belongs all self-deprecating 
overblown speech that repudiates itself in advance, speech with a thousand 
reservations, concessions, loopholes and the like" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 196). This 
is speech which "cringes with a timid and ashamed sideward glance at the 
other's possible response, yet contains a muffled challenge" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 
205). 
One particularly interesting variant of internally polemical discourse is 
the "word with a loophole," which, in Bakhtin's analysis of Dostoevs~ 's  
"underground man," manifests itself in a pathologically extreme fonn in the 
(anti)protagonistYs constant efforts to elude the other's power to define him, to 
prevent his "finalization" at the hands of the other. The underground man is 
relentlesdy anticipating and potemicizing against the impressions h e  senses his 
words might make on others. His long, tortured utterances seem continually to 
be formulated with the aim of e1uding and undermining any stable definition 
the other might form of him. The "word with a loophoIey' is not only a form of 
double-voiced speech, moreover, but a whole ideology and view of the world: 
"A loophole is the retention for oneself of the possibility of altering the 
ultimate, final meaning of one's words" (1984, p. 233). This is a theme with 
which Bakhtin was concerned over the course of his writings: from the extra- 
aesthetic 1-for-myself to the semantically open "internally persuasive" word 
(see Chapter 7)' to the unfinalizable nature of dialogue itself 
Three Self-Portraits Reconsidered. 
Having briefly considered Bakhtin's categories of single-voiced and double- 
voiced discourse, let us now return to the self-descriptions of Jason, Lisa, and 
Jennifer. More specifically, let us see how Bakhtin's discourse typology can be 
22 1 
used to highlight what is obscured in a traditional stnictural-developmental 
account: namely, the dialogical nature of these children's autobiographical 
utterances, 
At first blush, Jason's self-description appears strikingly univocal in its 
content and construction. It seems, for the most part if not exclusively, to be 
composed of direct, object-oriented discourse and, correspondingly, 
characterized by a single semantic orientation: namely, objective self- 
reference. Accordingly, he simply lists features and qualities and affiliations 
pertaining to hirn in a way that seems largely unrnediated by others' words in 
the senses discussed above. Jason's speech does not "cringe" under the weight 
of the other's anticipated word, nor does it engage that word polemically or 
antagonistically in any way. His own words about himsetf, in short, betray the 
monologic confidence of speech that is Iargely unencumbered by a concern 
with the evaluative dimension of discourse of others on the question of his self. 
The singIe-voiced character of Jason's seIf-portrait is supported, 
moreover, by the fact that it lacks any sense of temporal extension. Its time is 
concentrated in the present, with Iittle intimation of a past or fiture perspective. 
This interpretation certainly jibes with Harter's (1988) observation that the 
preschool child's self-description lacks narrative structurethe imposition of a 
narrative structure on experience does, aiter all, presuppose a sense of temporal 
extension. In the absence of temporal duration, the child offers not a narrative but 
a iist of attributes and accornplishments associated with the present. If Jason's 
self-description tells a tale at all, it is a very fiagmented tale of externally 
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verifiable qualities and accomplishment~, one in which events and attributes can 
be rearranged without loss of sense. These attributes and events appear as 
discomected and isolated points, their meaning unrelated to a temporally 
extended whole. Accordingly, the image of the self reflected in Jason's verbal 
self-portrait is that of a univocal and static object domain. The self is an object 
whose features may be straightforwardly tisted or aff~rmed-hence the seeming 
prevalence of single-voiced discourse about the self. 
InterestingIy, however, Jason's concentration on the here and now 
establishes the rhetorical significance to his self-description of the reciprocating 
presence of his immediate interlocutor. In several places he solicits his 
c'interviewer's" attention or responsiveness to some specific accornplishrnent. 
Consider, for example, the following segments of his self-description: "1 know 
al1 rny qB,CYs. Listen to me sav them, A,B,C,D,E,F,G, H,J,L, K, O, M, P, R, 
Q, X, Z . . -1  can count up to 100, want to hear me? . . . I'm really strong, 1 can 
lift this chair, watch me!" (italics added). In each of these three segments, the 
interviewer becomes the child's audience, an iri-terlocutor for whom the child c m  
display his particular achievements. In this "show-and-tell" respect, the 
investigator is hardly, as Harter (1988) has occasion to note, "a neutral adult who 
was merely recording . . . self-descriptions" (p. 58). Rather, the investigator's 
presence cornes to exert a material influence on Jason's discourse about himself 
The substantive influence of the interviewer on Jason's autobiographical 
discourse is aiso apparent in his statement that he has "a television that's in my 
own room." What is especially notable here is Jason's stress on "own." The use of 
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this intonationai pattern readily suggests a sensitivity to the anticipated response 
(perhaps praise or astonishment) of the interviewer-interlocutor. On the 
Bakhtinian fiamework more generally, the intonation of an utterance always 
refiects a particular dialogicai relation between the speaker and his or her 
addressee. While this segment of Jason's utterance does, like many others in his 
self-description, simply convey information about personal, material possessions, 
and talents and skills, its intonational form would also appear to incorporate an 
awareness of his immediate interlocutor. This is a case, too, where we hear a 
ventnloquation of the parental voice. In his emphasis on "own," this voice bursts 
into view. 
The fact that aspects of Jason's self-portrait seem to reflect the 
influence of a responsive (even if silent) interviewer is in some respects hardly 
surprising. M e r  aI1, it must be recalled that Jason's self-description, no Iess 
than that provided by Lisa and Jennifer, is a rejoinder in an overt dialogue 
initiated by the interview's question. In virtue of their being answers to an 
explicitly formulated question posed by an other, these self-portraits are al1 in 
some measure, and perhaps even by default or definition, double-voiced 
utterances. The fact that these self-descriptions are provided orally in the 
presumably reciprocating presence of an addressee-and not, Say, inscribed as 
entries in a journal or  spoken silently to oneself-invariably exerts some 
influence on their shape and content, as 1 hope to have illustrated through an 
examination of Jason's discourse about himself. Tuming to the self- 
descriptions of Lisa and Jemifer, we see even further manifestations of the 
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effect of the interviewer's responsive understanding on children's 
autobiographical utterances. 
Early in her self-description, Lisa describes herself as being "pretty 
popular," and adds "that's because I'rn nice and heIptù1, the other girls in my 
class Say that 1 am." Toward the end of her self-portrait, she provides a 
sirnilarly structured reflection on herself, stating "1 know 1 would make a good 
teacher, that's what my fi-iends say." What is particularly notable here is Lisa's 
reference to the supporting voices of her fnends. In 
each case, her positive self-evaluation passes through or is offered in the 
context of others' corroborating evaluations of her. The inclusion of these 
evaluations is open to a number of interpretations. Harter (1988) understands 
Lisa's allusions to others' opinions about her, in part and following Cooley 
(1902), as a particular manifestation of the emergence of a "looking-glass self." 
In other words, Lisa displays a growing sensitivity to what other people think 
about her-about her sociability, attractiveness, and ability to be a good 
teacher-and she incorporates these significant others' opinions and 
evaluations into her own self-description. For Lisa, it is the voices and 
opinions of peers that are particularly important to her sense of self As others 
(e-g., Crittenden, 1992; Harris, 1998) have noted, group membership is critical 
during the preadolescent period. Children of Lisa's age typically exhibit a need 
to conform to group standards and this often rneans having a keen awareness of 
others' opinions. As Crittenden (1992) observes, the child of this age enjoys 
little critical distance from her peers: "the child is captured by their viewpoints, 
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opinions, and expectations, and thus conforms to them" (p. 47). Invoking what 
her fiiends say about her, then, may be one way of establishing her solidarity 
with the group. Elements of stylization may be at play here. In appealing to 
what her fiiends Say or think about her, she wants to be heard agreeing with 
them. 
Alternatively, however, Lisa's allusions to her fnends' opinions about 
her qualities and cornpetencies may reflect a more internally polemical reIation 
to her fiiends' voices. The need at this age for solidarity and loyalty to the 
group works against any presentation of self as better or worse than others 
(Fine, 1987). This would mean that self-praise has somehow to be qualified by 
deference to the sentiments of the peer group if it is not to disrupt the child's 
sense of group affiliation or to evoke the censure of her peers. On this 
interpretation, appealing to what her friends Say and think about her 
praiseworthy qualities becomes an instance of double-voiced internally 
polemical speech. In other words, these appeals are constructed in light of the 
anticipated reactions of her peers to any statement that might otherwise serve 
to distinguish her from the group and thereby compromise the group's 
solidarity. This sort of solidarity is similarly maintained through Lisa's 
statements about her relative strengths. For example, whiie stating that "This 
year I'm doing reaily well in reading, social studies, and science, better than 
the other kids," she imrnediately adds "But some of them do better than me in 
math, like on tests where 1 sometimes goof up." This latter qualification, again, 
seems to suggest a certain loyalty to the group characteristic of preadolescent 
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children. 
Lt needs to be mentioned, however, that in attaching certain 
qualifications to statements about her praiseworthy qualities, Lisa's double- 
voiced speech may also betray the infiuence of the anticipated evaluation of 
her more immediate addressee, namely, the interviewer. Referring to the direct 
or  implied evaluations of others may allow Lisa to talk about herself in ways 
that might be frowned upon when speaking plainly or in a direct, object- 
oriented way. In other words, making reference to others' evaluations of her 
could be seen as a rhetorical play of self-presentatioil to the interviewer. Self- 
praise, in this case, can only be rendered persuasive to her interlocutor by 
presenting it as coming from other people's mouths. Lisa offers peer 
evaluations as evidence to her interlocutor and recognizes that her listener will 
be more impressed with the reported evaluations by others than with any 
unsupported self-evaluations. Similarly, including negative self-evaluations in 
her self-description may reflect an attempt to present an honest portrait of 
herself by herself', "warts and all," and may equally reflect an awareness of 
rules of discourse and reportage. To the extent this is tme, then Lisa's self- 
descriptive utterances becorne instances of internally polemical, double-voiced 
discourse. They are words in whose formation we sense the child's "sideward 
glance7' at the potential response of her addressee. 
Relative to Lisa's self-description, Jennifer's is characterized by a 
greater degree of dialogic complexity, this owing in large part to a more acute 
awareness of others' opinions about her. As Harter (1988) notes, for Jemifer 
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there is an intensification of the looking-glass self, which means that othersy 
opinions about the self become even more critical to her emerging self- 
definition. From a structural-developmental perspective, this intense 
preoccupation with other's images of the self is in keeping with the nature of 
formal operational thought, and in particular, with its peculiar brand of 
egocentrism (Inhelder & Piaget, 1955/1958): namely, the inability to 
distinguish the abstract perspectives of self and others. According to the 
stnictural-developmental view, adolescents' capacity to think abstractly, in 
concert with the experience of various physicat changes, is especially 
conducive to their thinking more about themselves. One particular 
manifestation of this elevated self-consciousness is the "imaginary audience" 
(Elkind & Bowen, 1979), that is, the adolescent's phenomenological sense of 
being always on stage, of continually being the focus of others' attention, 
concem, and evaluation. Understandably, the idea of an imaginary audience 
suggests a particularly intense sensitivity to public criticism and censure. 
Under the weight of this audience, adolescents are constantly monitoring the 
actual or  anticipated critical remarks of others. In Jennifer's case, for example, 
the acute concem with how others see her is manifested in her claims about 
being on a date with a boy who "was trying to analyze mey' and, in another 
context, in knowing that "everyone in cIass is looking at me thinking Iym really 
dumb." Interestingly, in his literary analysis, Bakhtin (1984) claims that this 
sort of intense self-consciousness is the artistic or characterological dominant 
in Dosteovsky's novels. 
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The hero's attitude toward himself is inseparably bound up with his 
attitude toward another, and with the attitude of another toward him. 
His consciousness of self is constantly perceived against the 
background of the other's consciousness of him-'1 for myself against 
the background of '1 for another.' Thus the hero's words about himself 
are stmctured under the continuous influence of sorneone else's words 
about him. (p. 207) 
Like Dostoevsky's hero from the underground, it seems, Jennifer is constantly 
"eavesdropping" on other's words about her, constantly wondering if others 
are thinking or talking about her. This heightened self-consciousness and 
sensitivity to others' opinions is fertile soi[ for double-voiced discourse. Where 
Lisa appeared to take what others said to her at face value-that is, without 
suspicion-Jennifer appears increasingly concerned about what others say, or 
even think, about her, which suggests a growing hermeneutic suspicion on her 
part about others. 
Unli ke Jason's speech, Jennifer's does not gravitate largely toward 
itself or toward its referential object (the self, autobiographical experience, and 
so on), but rather is characterized by an orientation toward another's speech 
and consciousness. Jennifer seems to think mostly about what others think or 
might think about her. We sense in the tone, style, and semantic structure of 
Jennifer's speech an acute awareness of the anticipated evaluations of these 
others, including her immediate interlocutor. Accordingly, generalry absent 
fkom Jennifer's discourse is the monologic confidence we sense in her younger 
brother's self-description. As it is constantly structured under the weight of the 
actual or imagined rejoinders of others, her speech becomes less sure of itself. 
It becomes speech with a "sideward glance" at the other's possible reactions 
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and possible replies. Indeed, much of Jennifer's verbal self-portrait is 
permeated by an intense sensitivity toward the anticipated words of others 
about her and with others' reactions to her own words about herself. Her self- 
consciousness and self-aff~rmation unfold against the background of other 
alien consciousnesses or voices. 
Jeennifer engages in a sort of dialogue with herself. The initial segment 
of her seIf-description involves a tension-filled dialogue between, on the one 
hand, a self that she identifies with generalized attnbutes (e-g., moody, 
affectionate, seIf-conscious) and, on the other hand, a series of selves that she 
associates with specific interpersonal roles and contingent circumstances. 
E v e v  seerningly single-voiced reference to her personal attributes is 
accompanied by an understanding that the trait label in question somehow does 
not fit, somehow remains inadequate to her self-understanding as "pretty 
complicated." Her reflections in this initial segment of the self-description 
seem to culminate in a self-addressed question that retains the tension between 
the consolations afforded by her ownrnost sense of herself as  a person with 
certain given (positive) qualities and the inescapable eventness associated with 
acting in the world: "I'm not a horrible person, I know that, but then how can 1 
horribIe things that I don't really mean?" Here, the dialogue that is merely 
irnplied or hidden in the opening lines of her self-description takes on a more 
overt quality. 
Jennifer's self-description is especiaily rich in its polemical tones. Her 
affirmation of self resonates and unfolds like a continuous polemic or dialogue 
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with some other person on the theme of herself. The other's words are present 
invisibly, determining the structure and style of speech fiorn within. That 
Jennifer's discourse is characterized by a "sideward giance" at another's word 
is reflected most clearly in the numerous reservations, hedges, and 
qualifications she offers about her behaviour toward others. Consider, for 
example, the following excerpts: 
What 1 mean is that 1 can be pretty obnoxious with my friends 
sometimes, but that's not who 1 really am as a person. That's not part of  
my personality, it's just the way 1 act sometimes, and it's not that 
important, actually, so 1 probably shouldn't even have mentioned it. 
1 think 1 am good looking. Not exactly Brooke Shields, understand, but 
I'm realIy attractive compared to other girls in my school, or at least in 
the group 1 go around with. 
1 hate to go to school on days like that, 1 get really depressed. Besides, 
I'm pretty bored at school anyway. Nothing they teach is relevant to 
anything in life! I think of myself as an inquisitive person but there's 
nothing about school subjects to be curious about. So I'm a pretty 
mediocre student, 1 just do what 1 have to in order to get by, but it 
doesn7t bother me that much, it's just not that important 
I know evervone in class is looking at me thinking I'm reaIly dumb, but 
1 only care about what my fiiends think. Besides, I'm going to be an 
aidine stewardess, anyway. Well probably. So are my best fiiends, 
Tammy and Sharon, we're al1 going to airline school together afier we 
graduate, if we graduate. 
In each of these segments, we sense a discourse that "cringes" anxiously under 
the weight of the other's possible negative evaluation or response. Jennifer's 
discourse is hl1 of interruptions and reservations, al1 of which betray her 
intense preoccupation with others' characterizations of her. And there is a 
sense, too, in which she tries to stay one step ahead of these characterizations. 
She is constantly trying in advance to destroy the impression that will be 
created by her claims about herself. She simulates independence fiom or 
indifference to the other's word, 
On other occasions, Jennifer's polemical relation to the other assumes a 
more overt quality, breaking out into the open as the other's response takes 
root in her self-description. In contrast to hidden polemic, overt polemic "is 
quite simply directed at another's discourse, which it refutes, as if at its own 
referential object" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 196). In overt polemic, the other's voice 
or discourse is the openly acknowledged object of discussion and evaluation. 
For examp le, Jenni fer practicall y begins her verbal self-portrait with the 
defensive utterance "Most people don't understand me," an utterance whose 
theme she reiterates when she turns to her immediate interlocutor and says 
"You probably don? understand what I'm trying to say." We also see this 
polemical treatment of the other's word in Jennifer's reflections on Lisa's 
impressions of her older sister's physical attractiveness: 
My little sister Lisa tells me I'm pretty too, but she really bugs me 
because there are days when 1 look at myself in the mirror and think 1 
look absolutely, totally, atrocious . . . She tries to taIk me out of it, but 
what does she know about looks, she's only 10! 
Jennifer works with Lier mother's impressions of her in the same way. 
My mother is the same way. She'll Say 'you look lovely, dear' when 1 
really look like a total zero! But then there are days when 1 look great 
and my mom says 'Are you going out with your hair like w?' 1hate 
to go to school on days Iike that, 1 get really depressed. 
In both these instances, Jennifer seeks to destroy others' words polemically as 
not adequate to her. But while she tries to stay one step ahead of these 
characterizations, she cannot fully deprive them of their import. For example, 
while Jennifer is able to parodically reaccentuate her mother's "you look 
lovely, dear," and in the process undermine its authority for her by investing it 
with atone of ridicule, exaggeration, and perhaps even mockery, she is not 
filly capable of coming out fi-om under its authonty. Jennifer seems less 
successful in parodying her mother's question "Are you going out with your 
hair like u?" Here, the mother's discourse is no longer the passive object of 
parody but rather emerges as a word that enjoys a more substantial activeness 
and autonorny vis-à-vis Jennifer's discourse. The authority of her mother's 
word resists Jennifer's parodic intentions and is enough to make her "hate to 
go to school on days like that" and "get really depressed." 
Jennifer's word about herself is not only a word with a sideward 
glance, but also a "word with a loophole." The loophole word is an intemally 
polemical word that reflects the individual's investment in securing a sense of 
uniqueness and fieedom from the other's word, and more specifically, from the 
finalized images that others' words may carry. This loophole accompanies 
Jennifer's discourse like a shadow and reflects a particular attitude toward her 
own self. The construction of a loophole finds its most fundamental expression 
in Jennifer's various aIlusions to a real or authentic self The word with a 
loophole is particularly evident in the following passages: 
1 mean the & me is fùn-loving so why do 1 have to act so weird? 
1 . . . don't really understand why 1 treat my fiends the way 1 do. I'm a 
naturally sensitive person and 1 care a lot about their feelings. 
What 1 mean is that 1 can be pretty obnoxious with my ffiends 
sometimes, but that's not who 1 reallv am as a person. That's not part of 
my personality, it's just the way 1 act sometimes. 
Subconsciously 1 want to quit, but then the real me knows 1 should stay 
in school for rny own good. 
Jennifer's rather fiequent references to her "real meyy might be interpreted as 
attempts to construct a loophole self, or, better, a loophole other, that preserves 
the hopeful sense that the self can be other than what others perceive it 
presently to be. The loophole in this case is one that leads out of negative self- 
evaluation (as though there is a "bad Jennifef' who, & Three faces of Eve, 
cornes out every now and again). 
The presence of these IoophoIe selves recalls several of Broughton's 
(198 1) observations on the dualism of adolescents' beliefs about the self. 
Broughton notes, more specifically, that adolescents are especially fond of 
making the conceptual distinction between an authentic inner self and a sham 
outer self or exterior. What is most essential to the self is believed to be 
independent of one's outwardly observable activity in the world. There is an 
awareness of outside pressures to conform, which precludes anyone's ever 
really coming to know the essence of one's self. Moreover, as a rationale for 
preserving and protecting this inner sanctum, adolescents make allusions to 
"the humanistic belief that self-disclosure and publicity profane the sacredness 
of the individual" (Broughton, 1981, p. 21). The adolescents interviewed by 
Broughton expressed the view that "there is a danger of reification in others 
coming to know the self. . . a 'taking apart' that would destroy the living 
nature of an individual, rnaking it into a thing" (p. 21). In short, making the 
inner self public would mean that "it is n<i longer your own" (p. 21). Sharing o r  
disclosure of unique thoughts robs the self of its essential uniqueness: 
"personal essence becomes absorbed into impersonal appearance" (p. 22), 
implying a loss of the purely mental, and hence a loss of the self. Broughton's 
position, however, seems somewhat overstated. One generally wants others to 
know one's inner self while appreciating that only a "superaddressee" could do 
that. The loophole self allows one paradoxically to present oneself without 
ever finalizing or "pinning down" the self Jennifer conveys her awareness of 
al1 possible objective definitions of herself, but retains the final word on her 
self. It is as if by expressing her awareness of these possibilities, she renders 
them powerless in advance, denying them any finalizing import. Jemi fer can 
make them al1 inadequate because she has the final word, and she does 
whatever she can to retain that final word about herself, to convey that sense 
that "you really don't know me after all" or that "this is not al1 of  me." Her 
c'consciousness of self," Bakhtin (1984) would Say, "tives by its 
unfinalizability, by its unclosedness and its indeterminacy" @. 53). 
Constructing loopholes is not entirely positive, however, as the person 
may become "ambiguous and elusive even for himself' (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 
234). To be sure, Jennifer is in places as elusive as  Dostoevsky's hero fiom the 
underground. In attempting to elude the other's finalizing word, Jennifer 
travels a long and circuitous path, and in the end remains uncertain as to whose 
opinion-her own or othersY-is ultimately to be the final judgment on her. 
Jennifer does not even know even her own final word on herself: "1 really 
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don't how.  There are days when 1 wish 1 could just become immune to 
myself" This is almost a wish to escape into altemate selves, identity disorder 
being an extreme case in which there is an imrnunity or impermeability of the 
various selves. The most desired self no longer need deal with the bad seIves. 
Self-Description and Dialoeic Complexity 
To conclude, the preceding dialogical analysis offers an alternative means of 
interpreting the form and content of children's autobiographical discourse. 
UnIike the structural developmental interpretation, which emphasizes how 
changes in the structure and content of children's self-descriptions follow fiom 
age-related changes in cognition, the dialogical interpretation stresses the 
appropriation and interplay of voices thzt populate the child's self-relevant 
discourse. This interpretation is premised on the notion that we are born, live, 
and die in a richly polyphonic world, in a world that reverberates with others' 
words, with others' meanings and accents and intentions and voices. And not 
surprisingly, given this ubiquitous presence of others' words, our talk about 
ourselves is invariably shot through with the speech of others, with a 
polyphony of other pnor, curent, and anticipated voices, voices that we are 
continually engaging dialogically in Our efforts to know the world and 
ourselves. 64 
While this dialogical analysis is not, strictly speaking, a developmental 
one-it does not, &er all, attempt to document naturally occumng, age-related 
changes in children's self-descriptions-it does offer some suggestions as to 
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how we might conceive of the process of change in children's autobiographical 
utterances? On the dialogical account, change is not to be viewed as a 
necessary, progressive unfolding of increasingiy mature conceptions of 
identity. The rnaturity of children' s self-descriptions cannot, for example, be 
regarded as tending inevitabiy or ideally toward the surmounting of 
contradictions and conflictual multiplicity within the self (e-g., Harter & 
Monsour, 1992). As Sidorkin (1999) has recently noted in his critique of the 
cognitive-developmental orientation, this view "wants to overcome the 
complexity of the self, to achieve the constancy of a single voice representing 
the self. The main point is that in order to achieve integrity, one's multiple 
identities should be 'integrated' into a harmonious whole" (Sidorkin, 1999, pp- 
58-59). 
From a dialogical perspective, in contrast, development does not tend 
toward the production of such coherent and unified selves. Rather, change in 
self-description "tends" toward what might be called dialogic complexity 66 
Compared to her siblings' self-descriptions, for example, Jennifer's 
autobiographical discourse is characterized by a wider range of voices and by a 
more complex interplay of these voices-by a greater degree, for instance, of 
hidden and overt polemic. That children's self-descriptions might, with age, 
corne increasingly to be characterized by dialogic complexity follows fiom a 
rather simple fact: As children grow older and come to participate in different 
forms of social activity, they are likely to encounter and appropriate an 
increasing range of voices and their associated perspectives on the world- 
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voices that populate both their inner and outer speech and that, accordingly, 
allow children increasingly to ilIuminate themselves from multiple points of 
view. As we have seen, this multiplicity is fertile ground for dialogue. As we 
imbibe more and more voices in response to social experience-and more and 
more words about us spoken by others-new dialogues, new ways of 
accenting, refkting, challenging, a&rming, and supplementing the words of 
others-and hence new ways of knowing ourselves-are encouraged." Of 
course, this increasingly polyphonic state of the self is not to be conceived in 
essentialist terms: it is not an automatic process, nor is it IikeIy to characterize 
al1 cases (cf. Gagnon, 1992). 
CHAPTER 7 
IDEOLOGICAL BECOMZNG AND THE DIALOGICAL IMPERATIVE 
It is increasingly argued that theory in developmental psychology, and in the 
human sciences more generally, both reflects and unavoidably promotes 
particular images of human beings (Kaplan, 1983; Wat-tofslq, 1986). Kaplan 
(1983), for example, expresses this position in his daim that ideas of 
development (e-g-, deveiopment as a progressive movement toward higher or 
more advanced foms) do not onginate in the "mere facticity of what is 
observed" (p. 59), that is, in the domain of empirical and experimental inquiry, 
but rather derive from axiological and eschatological concerns, nom concerns 
about values and final ends. Development, on this view, is an inescapably 
ethical notion which, "however dimly held or vaguely apprehended" (p. 59), 
insinuates itself in our theoretical ventures no less than in our practical 
engagements with children and in what we, as specialists, advocate for 
children's lives. 
In keeping with the spirit of these claims, the purpose of this 
concluding chapter is to address the notion of a dialogical self as an ethical 
ideal or imperative for development, as a pam'cular vision of what a mature self 
should be like. Up to this poiilt in my discussion, 1 have considered the dialogical 
self iargely as a descriptive category, as a statement of what the self simply is- 
beyond our willing and doing, as it were. In speaking (or writing) we invariably 
engage the previous and anticipated voices of others in some fashion. 1 have also 
addressed the notion of a dialogical self as a more variable phenomenon. In the 
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preceding chapter, for exarnple, 1 approached the question of  dialogicality fiom 
the standpoint of the aims one has more or less consciously set for one's 
discourse-hence the distinction between single-voiced (monologic) and double- 
voiced (dialogic) discourse. In the present chapter, in contrast, 1 want to consider 
the dialogical self as a sort of project, as a particular valorized way of orienting 
ourselves among or  engaging the voices of othersS6' 
Preliminarily, 1 want to situate this claim about the importance of 
engaging others' voices by considering it against the contrastive backdrop of  
the individualistic image of the self alIied with the modern philosophical 
tradition. In the opening, 1 noted how modemity inscribes the individual subject 
as the seat and origin of meaning and how, correspondingly, the authenticity and 
rational autonomy of this subject is secured by its ability (or courage, as Kant 
might say) to disengage itself fiom the words and ways of the other. Reflecting 
on the Western conception of the individual, MacIntyre (1990) daims that one of 
the inheritances of the modem phiIosophical legacy is the image of 
a divided selÇ often enough a self-divided self. . . . From the 
individualism of the Enlightenment there derives a capacity of the self to 
abstract itself fiom the particular social role which it happens to inhabit 
and indeed from the whole social order of which that role is a constitutive 
part, so as tu reflect upon itself as an individual qua individual, rather than 
qua family member or member of this or that social group. This ability of 
individuals to stand back fiom the social is quite compatible with a 
recognition by each such individual that he or she is up to this point in his 
or her life in large part a product of the influences of his or her social 
environment but it involves a belief that the individual is £?ee to withdraw 
him- or hcrself from these influences and take toward them whatever 
attitude he or she chooses to adopt in accordance with those preferences 
which are huly & or hers qua individual. So there is this part of the self 
which views itself as beyond al1 social roles, capable of escaping fiom its 
past history and of making it new. (p. 123) 
In the wake of modem thought, people tend to think of their own essential 
natures not as something fashioned out of their encounters with others but 
rather as something to be found by appealing to some freely chosen, self- 
authenticated standard that inhabits a realm beyond al1 social-cultural and 
historical influences and entanglements. Indeed, finding one's most authentic 
self-ne's "real me," as it wer-requires that one peel off the layers of 
sociality to reveal what is most essential about oneself. 
We see this theme articulated quite expressly, for example, in Descartes' 
(1 985) writings. Descartes was clearly aware that in our upbnnging and 
education we establish close, trusting relationships with Our parents and teachers. 
And unavoidably, too, we acquire the habits of tnisting what we have learned 
from others (as well as from Our senses), thereby creating fertile soi1 for the 
formation of prejudices. During the course of life these habits and prejudices 
become so riveted to our minds that we are almost incapable of questioning, let 
alone rejecting thern. Even worse is the fact that these habits and the long-held 
opinions to which they give rise are so deep-seated that they tend to preclude 
reason from presenting its evidence in the first place. Emerging from the 
immaturity of this predicament and asserting our natural autonomy, however, 
requires that the unquestioned belief system we have acquired fiom others be 
thematized and critically suspended so that reality-as-such can be known. This, as 
1 intimated earlier, could be accomplished bath through an act of fiee will and 
through the exercise of methodic doubt. In the act of doubting al1 that can be 
doubted, and, correspondingly, in striving to resolve whatever confronts my mind 
into a multiplicity of items which present themselves clearly and distinctly, 1 am 
able ultimately to disengage myself fiom the context of my existence, to 
disencumber my mind of al1 the "knowledge" which 1 have not built upon my 
own individual foundations. For Descartes, then, it is by distancing ourselves 
fiom al1 that we are in virtue of our inhabiting a social, cultural, and histoncal 
world that we can let individually-experienced, self-authenticated reason guide us 
in Our reflections upon the world and upon ourselves- 
The emancipatory movement suggested by Descartes' defence of 
"disengaged reason" (Taylor, 1989) finds a more current expression in 
Habermas' (1 97 1) modernist ideal of undistorted understanding and 
communication. According to Habermas, achieving the "ideal speech 
situation"-a communicative arrangement disencumbered of potentially 
distorting influences, such as power imbalances between speakers-requires a 
neutralization of those forces that might otherwise compromise or constrain the 
mutually reciprocal nature of dialogue between interIocutors. 
Developmentally, the Piagetian concept of cognitive decentration faciIitates 
this process, for it allows us to stand back fiom Our sociocultural 
entanglements-to objectiS. them, so to speak-and t hereby subject them to 
critical scrutiny, ultimately supplanting them with self-chosen (Le., 
unconstrained) ideals. Cognitive decentration allows the individual subject to 
appropriate different viewpoints and thereb y to 
comprehend itself in its own self-formative process. An interpretation can 
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only grasp its object and penetrate it in a relation in which the interpreter 
reflects on the object and himseif at the same time as moments of an 
objective structure that likewise encompasses both and makes them 
possible. (Habermas, 197 1, p. 18 1) 
In this rational and criticd process of reflection, we objectiQ or make transparent 
to ourselves Our oun individual or collective life-history. The distance afforded 
by the ability to decentre allows us to view traditions objectively, to see precisely 
how they shape Our lives. Through this awareness, autonomous action is possible. 
Hence, in keeping with the modemist injunction, rational autonomy and 
authenticity are achievements that require a disengagement from the word and 
ways of the other. 
Within psychology, Leahy and Shirk (1985) present a structural- 
developmental account of the development of self that converges in many 
respects with Habermas' position. Leahy and Shirk defend the view that the 
growth of reason enables children to disentangle themselves from the 
particularity of their social engagements, and thereby corne to a more purely 
individual and objective self-understanding. Their proposa1 is offered more 
specificaI1y as a corrective to the symbolic interactionist position (Mead, 1934), 
which, on their reading, posits a socially constmcted self which comes 
increasingly to incorporate the values and attitudes of the comrnunity and which, 
as a consequence, suggests the "submersion of the individud in the group" (p. 
129). In contrast to symbolic interactionist accounts, Leahy and Shirk argue that 
over the course of development the influence of others on one's self-concept may 
in fact decrease. For these authors, development entails not so much the 
submersion of the individual to group standards as the individual's gradually 
developing ability to disengage his or her views from any particular group. 
Leahy and Shirk garner support for this claim by drawing on the Iiterature 
on role-taking and on Kohlberg's (1976) theory of moral reasoning. For example, 
they cite the Kohlbergian view that underlying the shift from conventionaI to 
postconventional moral judgment is a transition fiom other-directed to self- 
directed forms of reasoning. Where the conventionai thinker is oriented to the 
expectations of significant others or of the social group of which he or she is a 
part-defemrrg to those others or to that group in the interpretation of reaiity, 
moral action, or autobiographical experience-the more morally mature 
postconventional individual is unburdened by such expectations, having acquired 
the ability to "constmct impressions of themselves that are relativeIy independent 
ofothers' beliefs and expectations about them" (p. 13 1). PostconventionaI 
thinkers have the ability to evahate their behaviour by referring "to values that 
are experienced as interna], that is, values that depend on their validity by 
considering the self s own moral code or principles" @p. 13 6- 13 7). The authors 
relate the attainment of postconventional thought more specifically to the ability 
to decentre fiom conventions, an ability they fùrther associate with advances in 
role-taking capacities. The increasingly abstract understanding of reciprocity and 
relationships attendant on these emergent abilities constitutes the cognitive 
prerequisite for reflecting on the social sources of the self, indeed for separating 
the self fiom its social sources. With the advent of higher cognitive functions one 
becomes capable of decentring fiom, and thereby capable of questioning, one's 
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own values and reiationships. One develops the capacity to refocus fiom long- 
Iearned and established vaiues (fiequently the values of others or ofthe dominant 
cuIture) to reflect on the shortcomings inherent in those values. So, while the 
social environment is important in providing the interactions and categorïes that 
will determine who 1 become, in a paradoxical sort of way the self 1 becorne is 
defined and understood in terms of its power to separate me fiom others, to make 
me independent fiom my admittedly socid sources. 
Voice. Authenticity, and D i a b u e  
Interestingly, and in some respects like the modems, Bakhtin too is 
preoccupied with the question of establishing one's own foundations for 
knowledge and with the importance of the self s liberation from a state of 
unquestioned allegiance to the word of the other. The central difference, 
however, is that for Bakhtin this is not a process that entails silencing, 
ignoring, or methodically disentangling oneself from the other's word. Nor is it 
a competence that emerges invariably and universally with the advent of more 
sophisticated cognitive skills. Rather, the Bakhtinian view describes individual 
authenticity, responsibility, and fieedom precisely in terms of the individual's 
capacity and willingness to dialogize the other7 s word, to bring it into a critical 
interanimating relationship with other words. DiaIogic participation in Iife is 
presented as a spoken process of questioning and responding. As Bakhtin 
(1984) writes, "The single adequate form for verbally expressing authentic 
human life is the open-ended dialogue. . . .To live means to participate in 
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dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agee, and so forth" (p. 293). 
It is oniy through such engagement with other's words and voices-through 
afinning them, redefining the- differing with them, developing thern-that 
one reveals one's "own" voice. Rather than understand "thinking for oneself' 
as suggesting an unmediated relation to oneseff, Bakhtin (1984) sees it as a 
process of actively and responsibly situating one's voice among those of 
others. 
To find one's own voice and to orient it among other voices, to 
combine it with some and to oppose it to others, to separate one's voice 
fiorn another voice with which it has inseparably merged-these are 
the tasks that the heroes solve. . . . And this determines the hero's 
discourse. It must find itself, reveal itself among other words. (p. 239) 
To know one's o m  word entails understanding how one's own kfiowledge is 
situated in relation to that of others. Voice is about how my discourse relates to 
yours and to other discourses 1 have heard and which speak to whatever topic 
is at hand. As Bialostosky (199 1) writes, 
Voice is never something speakers have before they speak but 
something they create by defining a relation to the other voices that 
have already opened the discussion and to those that wait to enter into 
it- '1' am-and 'my self is-created in the course of my assimilating, 
responding to, and anticipating the voices of others. (p. f 3) 
Defined in these terms, the process of finding one's own voice is sure 
to be a long and complicated one, certainly one that stretches over a lifetirne. 
Over the course of experiential time, we hear and internalize an increasing 
number of voices. Inevitably, we face the complexity and contradiction of 
these heteroglot voices and discourses and their associated points of view on 
any given subject-including, of course, the subject of one's own self. The 
presence of these tensions presents the person with the difficult, stmggle-filled 
task of having actively to choose her orientation arnong these discourses. One 
must decide how one is to participate in or orient ourselves toward any given 
subject and toward others' utterances about that subject. (Jennifer's 
autobiographical discourse provides a particularly vivid example of how an 
identity is negotiated through a complex web of others' voices.) 
For Bakhtin, the task of orienting oneself actively to the discourse of 
others is one that entails, and indeed requires, a dialogical (or novelistic) 
attitude or sensibility. Elaborating on this notion, Bakhtin (1 98 1) writes that 
the "linguistic consciousness of the educated person" (p. 294-295) is one 
which, like the (polyphonie) novelist's discourse, involves not "a single 
language but a dialogue of languages. . . . a highly specific unity of several 
' languages' that have establ ished mutual contact and rnutual recognition with 
each othef' (pp. 294-295). Bakhtin offers the following elaboration of the 
novelistic task: 
Concrete socio-ideological consciousness, as it becomes creative . . . 
discovers itself already surrounded by heteroglossia and not at al1 a 
single, unitary language, inviolable and indisputable. The actively 
literary linguistic consciousness at al1 times and everywhere cornes 
upon 'languages' and not language. Consciousness finds itself 
inevitably facing the necessity of havine: to choose a l a n ~ u a ~ e .  With 
each Iiterary-verbal performance, consciousness must actively orient 
itself amidst heteroglossia, it must move in and occupy a position for 
itself within it, it chooses, in other words, a 'lanpage.' (295) 
What is critical to add here is that choosing a language involves not simply 
seeing the world, exclusiveIy or senally, through the eyes of a single language. 
Choosing a language or languages is not a question of moving fiom one 
language to the next "as if these languages were in different chambers" (1 98 1, 
295). To illustrate this sort of insulation of discursive domains, Bakhtin 
considers the life of a hypothetical illiterate peasant who uses a variety of 
Ianguages in the course of his daily life: he prays in one language, sings in 
another, speaks to his family in yet another, and so on. He moves from the 
language of church to the language of family to the language of official 
transactions automatically, without pausing to consider the differences in the 
points of view they embody. This is a case where each language is activated by 
and considered adequate to the demands of the situation, topic, or task at hand. 
In this situation, the peasant's languages do not dialogically interanimate one 
another; instead, each is in its own place. 
The notion that one may rnove fiom one closed-off discourse to the 
next finds a mor2 theoretical instantiation in certain classic role-based 
conceptions of the self s multiplicity (Cooley, 1902; James, 19SOa; Mead, 
1934). The assumption in such cases is that each of the multiple roles we adopt 
expresses a particular unity-a unity not at al1 compromised by the fact that in 
the presence of any given other we may adopt multiple roles. As we noted 
previously, this view suggests that I can be many things, many selves, to you, 
no less than you can to me. This account, however, suggests a rather 
relativistic Pakhtin wcdd Say monologic) rendering of the self s multiplicity. 
For, in effect, such a conception seems to be saying that we adopt, successively 
or simultaneously, many more or less insular roles and hence are possessed of 
many more or less insular selves, each perfectly or ideally adequate to the 
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situation that cails out for it. Multiplicity is certainly present here, but it is of a 
monologic sort, a multiplicity consisting in the existence of many well- 
bounded, non-interacting, monadic wholes. It is multiplicity without dialogue, 
and more specificaIly, without a dialogue across differences, without the 
interanimation of different roles, discourses, or, for that matter, selves. Any 
given performance or utterance ernerges on this view as a Iargely unitary 
phenornenon, uncomplicated by other rofe demands and unencumbered by 
multiple, perhaps even confiicting perspectives and allegiances. Like 
languages in separate chambers, these roles "do not collide with each other in . 
. . consciousness, there is no attempt to coordinate them, to look at one of these 
languages through the eyes of another language" (p. 295). From a Bakhtinian 
perspective, as long as one moves fiom one discourse to the next without 
considering one from the point of the other, consciousness remains 
rnonologized. 
Elaborating the Bakhtinian alternative to this sort of discursive 
insularity requires that we retum to the case of the illiterate peasant. Imagine, 
more specifically, the same peasant capable of approaching one language and 
its associated view of the world in tems of another Ianguage-for exarnple, 
Iooking at the language of everyday life through the language of prayer or 
Song. In such a case we have an interaction of languages and world views. The 
languages have entered into a diaiogical relationship characterized by their 
interillumination. This interanimation effects a transformation in these "verbal- 
ideological" positions, a transformation that can be expressed in terrns of a 
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"loss of naiveté" with respect to the vaIues and beliefs of any given language. 
The unquestioned, taken-for-granted status of a given language as & way of 
conceptualizing this piece of the world is lost. Even if the language is still 
deemed most apposite to the task at hand, its loss of unself-consciousness with 
respect to itself, its self-objectivization, as it were, disputes its unquestioned 
authority vis-à-vis the topic in question. A Ianguage that sees itself from the 
outside perspective of another language comes to see how its own values and 
beliefs appear to the other language. A speaker comes to compare different 
verbal-ideological positions, to examine how the same topic may be addressed 
in terms of different viewpoints. It is only when the multiple discourses and 
voices that make up our social-linguistic space dialogically interanimate one 
another, when we are able to "regard one Ianguage (and the verbal world 
corresponding to it) through the eyes of another language" (p- 296), that our 
discourse becomes dialogized. Again, it is not the fact that we are polyglossic, 
that we speak in a variety of Ianguages, that is the critical point. Rather, 
speaking, if it is to be more than reciting or the saying of prescribed lines, must 
comprise an understanding of the diversity of Ianguages and their associated 
semantic positions and, attendant on this understanding, must reflect an active 
effort to engage this diversity responsibly and dialogically. Only by proceeding 
in this fashion do speakers situate themselves responsibly, answerably, in the 
ideo Iogical worId. 
In his earliest ethical writings, Bakhtin (1993) daims we al1 enjoy (or 
suffer) a "non-alibi in Being" (p. 40), which is to say we are each individually 
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responsible for the way we Iive Our lives and that we are each answerable to 
others for Our actions. It is this non-alibi in existence, the fact that 1 occupy a 
unique and unrepeatable time and place in existence in which 1 stand to 
accomplish what no one else can, ever, that ethically obliges me to impart my 
own "tone" or "signature" to, or to bear a singular "answerabiiity" for, my own 
acts. What 1 am answerable for is the authorship of rny responses. What this 
means in the present context is that we must be self-consciously thoughtful 
about and productively engaged with the multiple discourses that make up Our 
social-ideological horizon. We must engage the language of others, and their 
attendant worldviews, responsibly, self-consciously, and openly-al1 of which 
make for an authentic voice. "An independent, responsible and active 
discourse," says Bakhtin (198 l), "is the kndamentai indication of an ethical, 
legal, and poiiticaI human being" (Bakhtin, 1981, pp. 349-350). We achieve an 
authentic, responsible voice by being aware of where we stand relative to past 
and ongoing discourses about a topic. 
Ideological Becoming 
Bakhtin (198 1) refers to this process of finding one's own voice amidst the 
polyphony of  speaking voices as the "ideological becoming of a human being" 
(p. 341). An individual's ideological becoming is not just about the learning of 
information, directions, rules, models, but involves the individual in a "process 
of selectively assimilating the words of others" (341). It is about the stmggle to 
make the other's word one:s own, and to resist being completely owned by or 
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to avoid fiilly coinciding with alien discourses. The "history of an individual 
ideoiogical consciousness" (p. 342) is about the dialogic interrelationship and 
"struggle within us for hegemony among various avaitable verbal and 
ideoIogical points of view, approaches, directions, and values" (p. 3461, a 
struggle ultimately between what Bakhtin calls "authoritative" and "intemally 
persuasive" discourse. 
Bakhtin's (198 1) distinction between authoritative and internally 
persuasive discourse is meant to address the question of how we experience the 
other's words and voices in our verbal consciousness, how they operate and 
make their claims on Our IinguisticalIy constituted psyche. Here, it is important 
to bear in mind that neither authoritativeness nor intemal persuasiveness is a 
quality inherent in the discourse itself, but rather reflects an attitude or 
disposition toward it, a way of receiving and evaluating the discourse. 
AccordingIy, since individuals may differ in terms of how they perceive or 
internalize a particular discourse, we can say that what may be for one person 
internally persuasive may for another be authoritative. 
In elaborating these two ways of relating to the voices or discourses of 
others, Bakhtin (198 1) draws on a metaphor from education. He notes that in the 
context of pedagogy "two basic modes are recognized for the appropriation and 
transmission-simu1taneously-of another's words (a tex% a rule, a model): 
'reciting by heart' and 'retelling in one's own words' (1981, p. 341). Reciting by 
heart is about passive reception ofthe other's word and, in the Bakhtinian 
scheme, corresponds to authoritative discourse. RetelIing in one's own words, on 
252 
the other hand, corresponds to Bakhtin7s conception of  internally persuasive 
discourse and suggests a more active engagement of the other's word. Let us 
examine each of these modes in turn. 
Authoritative Discourse. While it takes many forms, authoritative 
discourse often addresses political, ethical, moral, or religious issues. The 
authority attached to authoritative discourse can be associated with and enforced 
by any person or social group (e-g., the monologic word of parents, teachers, 
elders) or discursive set (e.g., tradition, acknowledged scientific truths, a popular 
or fashionable treatment of some issue, inherited narrative fiameworks that 
estabiish the propriety of a particular life course, and so on). But it is not 
authority as such that makes a word authoritative, but rather the place fiom 
which that authority speaks. According to Bakhtin, authontative discourse is 
discourse that speaks to us fiorn a "distanced zone," fiom a valorized, 
hierârchicalty privileged "past"- metaphorically speaking, a time of firsts and 
bests. But whether it is a word that originates in the past or the present, or even 
the füture, what remains critical is that the authontative word is held 
reverentially at a distance. It is perceived by its hearers as untouchable, 
removed, and remote. From this distanced plane, authoritative discourse speaks 
commandingly and Our attitude toward it can only be one of one-sided adoration 
and respect. Indeed, it makes a daim on our psychic lives precisely by virtue of 
its own unconditionally accepted authority. As Bakhtin (198 1) writes, 
authoritative discourse "demands that we acknowledge it, that we make it our 
own; it binds us, quite independent of any power it might have to persuade us 
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internally; we encounter it with its authority already fùsed to ity' (Bakhtin, 1981, 
p. 342). 
Because it is sensed as so removed and untouchable, authoritative 
discourse remains aloof fi-om and resists dialogic interaction with other 
discourses. We can only passively receive it and repeat it. We camot agree or 
disagree with al1 or only part of if dispute its authority fiom the standpoint of 
another discourse, question it, modify it, or respond to it. Authoritative 
discourse allows "no play with the context framing it, no play with its borders, 
no gradual and flexible transitions, no spontaneously creative stylizing variants 
on it" Bakhtin, 198 1, p. 343). Authoritative discourse remains what it is no 
matter who speaks it or under what circumstances. Confined to a monologic, 
single-voiced mode of being, the authoritative word remains relatively closed 
to growth and transformation. It cannot enter into hybrid or ccdouble-voiced" 
constructions which might incorporate semantic changes into it. Authoritative 
discourse makes its claim on us as an already finished discourse, a discourse 
with a single, stable, unified meaning. The word that operates in an authoritative 
way does not need what is other to reveal its potential to mean. It is (understands 
itself as) self-sufficient. It is a word closed to dialogue. 
In many respects, authoritative discourse fùnctions in imer speech in 
much the same way that adult authority and constra.int fùnction, according to 
Piaget (1932), in the young child's understanding of morality. The young child 
approaches questions of ethical duty and rules fiom the standpoint of what 
Piaget cafls "moral realism." More specifically, the child regards duty and the 
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values on which it is based as extemd to and independent of the mind, "as 
imposing itself regardless of the circumstances in which the individual may find 
himself' (Piaget, 1932/1977, pp. 105- 106). And Iike authoritative discourse, 
these rules are not so much fieely elaborated or interpreted by the mind, as they 
are aIready given, ready made, and demanding of unquestioned respect and 
unconditional aliegiance. For the child at this stage, tmth amounts to whatever 
conforms to the word of the adult and is reinforced by adult constraint. This 
gives rise, moreover, to what Piaget calIs an "'annunciatory' conception of truth: 
the mind stops affirming what it likes to affiirm and falls in with the opinion of 
those around it" (p. 389). In mechanistic fashion, the child sirnply repeats or 
transmits what the adult has said. 
As 1 have argued at various points in this work, a child's initiation into 
language is foundational for the development of self We are born into a 
conversation that precedes us and it is through our communicative encounters 
with those who care for us that we first leam who we are. The authoritative 
figures in our tives establish the tone of our earliest self-definitions. 
Everything that pertains to me enters my consciousness, beginning with 
my name, fiom the extemal world through the mouths of others (my 
mother, and so forth), with their intonation, in their emotional and value- 
assigning tonality. I realize myself initially through others: from them 1 
receive words, forms, and tonalities for the formation of my initial idea 
of myself. . . . Just as the body is formed initially in the mother's wornb 
(body), a person's consciousness awakens wrapped in another's 
consciousness. (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 13 8) 
Our first words, in other words, are authoritative for us. They serve to shape 
and define us fiom without such that we initially coincide with the other's 
discourse about us. In this respect, the Bakhtinian view finds an interesting ally 
in R. D. Laing (1969), who writes: 
The others tell one who one is. Later one endorses, or tries to  discard, 
the ways the others have defined one. It is difficult not to accept their 
story. One may try not to be what one "knows" one is, in one's heart of 
hearts. One may try to tear out fiom oneself this "alien" identity one 
has been endowrd with or condemned to, and create by one's own 
actions an identity for oneself, which one tries to force others to 
confirm. Whatever its particular subsequent vicissitudes, however, 
one's first social identity is conferred on one. We learn to be whom we 
are told we are. (p. 78) 
A child's first sense of self no doubt refiects an unquestioned interiorization of 
others' perspectives on the self Being who others tell us we are-that is, 
coinciding with others' authoritative words about us-is a critical first step in 
the process of  acquiring a self and in ideological becoming more generally. Tt 
is a process, too, that lasts a lifetirne. It is not oniy for the young child that the 
other's word first fiinctions authoritatively. Every new discourse that we 
encounter and that matters to us exerts its initial effects on us in an 
authoritative fashion. The authoritative word is always a point of departure for 
subjectivity. It is what sets up the task of making the other's word one's own. 
"One's own discourse is gradually and slowly wrought out of others' words that 
have been acknowledged and assimilated, and the boundaries between the two 
are at first scarcely perceptible" (Bakhtin, 198 1, p. 345)!' 
If authoritative discourse were the only discourse constituting imer 
speech people would fully coincide with others' views of them, and hence with 
themselves, and be perfectly predictable and fùlly definable to others. A person 
would be already everything she could be. Both the "intemal" and "extemal" 
worlds would lie on the same plane, which is to Say there would be an absence 
of a gap between the other's authoritative "outer" word and one's "inner" 
discursive orientation to the world. Using Bakhtin's (1990) earlie- 
phenomenological language, one might Say that in such a case my 1-for-rnyseif 
would be completely fused with my 1-for-the-other. Such a state of affairs 
would suggest an inadequacy in the self. 
1 see myself through the eyes of another. This coincidence of foms- 
the view 1 have of myself as self, and the view 1 have of myself as 
other-bears an integral, and therefore naive, character-there is no 
gap between the two. . . The one doing the depicting coincides with the 
one depicted. . . . He sees and knows in himself onIy the things that 
others see and know in him. (Bakhtin, 198 1, p. 34) 
Recafl, however, that ideological becoming is also a process that involves 
"emancipation" or "liberation" of one's discourse from the "authority of the 
other's discourse" (BaWitin, 198 1, p. 348). This process of emancipation is not 
one that involves ignoring the other's word, but rather engaging it in such a 
fashion that it loses its status as an unconditionally accepted or even 
dogmatically revered word and begins to fitnction in our psyches in an 
internally persuasive fashion. 
Internallv Persuasive Discourse. In contrast to the authoritative word, 
internally persuasive discourse exerts an effect on Our psychic lives precisely 
through its persuasiveness. For a word to fùnction for us in a persuasive fashion 
suggests that this word has been subjected to a much more active, creative, and 
selective process of appropriation. Internally persuasive discourse makes a 
clairn on the speaker which, while carrying authority, is open to transformation 
through questioning. Intemally persuasive discourse is not passively received 
or inherited, but rather actively assimilated. On the Bakhtinian view, 
assimilation deals with the process of making something that is initially other, or 
part of the non-self, one's "own." A language "becomes 'one's own' only when 
the speaker populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when he 
appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive 
intention" (Bakhtin, 198 1, pp. 293-294). Assimilation is an active process that 
involves responding to and transforming others' utterances as we use them for 
our own emergent purposes. 
Such an exposition [of internally persuasive discourse] is always a free 
stylistic variation on another's discourse; it expounds another's thought 
in the style of that thought even while applying it to new material, to 
another way of posing the problem; it conducts experiments and gets 
solutions in the language of another's discourse. (198 1, 347) 
This process therefore involves a fundamental reorganization or reworking of 
what has been eaken in. Working with discourse that hnctions for us in an 
internally persuasive manner takes us beyond the mechanical and monological 
act of blindly reproducing or reciting the other's language. Rather, it becomes a 
question of creatively developing it, varying it stylistically, applying it in new 
ways and allowing it to mean differently as it encounters new contexts. In 
invoking the word in new contexts, in light of new others and new addressees, 
it acquires the capacity to mean in ways that go beyond the intentions 
originally expressed in it. The internally persuasive word is hence an 
unfinished, semantically open word, a word whose meaning changes in 
response to participation in social life and social experience, a word whose 
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creativity and productiveness inheres precisely in its ability to corne into 
interanimating relationships with other words and in particular with other 
intemaIIy persuasive discourses. 
Unlike the distant authoritative word, then, intemally persuasive 
discourse occupies a "zone of familiar contact," which means that it speaks to 
or touches us more personally as we negotiate the process of establishing Our 
own authority over it. It is in this respect that one can Say that an internally 
persuasive word is an other's word that one has reworked and reaccentuated to 
the point where it is "tightly intenvoven with 'one's own word"' (Bakhtin, 1981, 
p. 345). Bakhtin (1981) writes that "the intemally persuasive word is half-ours 
and half-someone else's" (p. 293)-only "half-ours" because, as 1 noted earlier, 
no word is ever fiilly our own. What this suggests is that the internally 
persuasive word always exists on the border or frontier between two speaking 
subjects, in the space of eventfui communicative praxis. 
The vicissitudes of the internally persuasive word recall what Bakhtin 
(1993), in the period before his linguistic-dialogical turn, called the I-for- 
myself. Like the 1-for-myself, the internally persuasive word lives in the 
immediacy of the emergent present, never coinciding with itseIf but rather 
inhabiting the ever-changing chronotopic platform of the self-(or word)-in-the- 
making. The intemally persuasive word, again like the phenomenologically 
intuited self of lived expenence, exists in a perpetual state of becoming, is 
always unfinished and incomplete, always accming new meaning with each act 
of expression. Just as the 1-for-myself, in appropriating the image that the other 
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forms of it, takes that image and makes it immanent to its own consciousness, 
that is, translates and transforms it into its own language-where, in virtue of 
the self s living a restless, forward directed life, that image does "not attain any 
consolidation and self-sufficiency in Our consciousness" (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 
16)-so too cm we Say that the interna11 y persuasive word never coincides 
with its presently existing makeup but rather exists in the space of its 
discursive movement. 
Assimilation: Bakhtin Versus Piaget. Since Bakhtin uses the term 
"assimilation" to refer to the process of actively engaging the other's word, it 
may be instructive briefly to contrast this usage of the term with Piaget's. While 
both Bakhtin and Piaget use the term to suggest an active process that results in 
a mental reorganization of sorts, it is important to stress that for Piaget this 
process and the reorganization it engenders tend toward a centripetal end, that 
is, toward greater unity and stability in the cognitive system. Piaget 
understood assimilation, and the chiId's initiative in development more 
generally, as subject to the structural, organizational constraints of a bio- 
cognitive system which, with development, becomes increasingly unified and 
systemic in its fûnctioning. For Piaget, every act of assimilation constitutes a 
progression or improvement over previous assimilations, a feature consistent 
with his view of development as the transition f?om "weaker" to "stronger" 
structures (Piaget, 1970). This movement toward improved structures is 
coterminous with the eradication of the othemess of the assimilated "abject." 
"The subject-object dynamic is a vector directed at the narrowing of the space 
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of difference, of othemess. Assimilation is a condensing or internalizing 
movement, redefining both the 'subject' and the 'object' in ever more integral 
ways" (Soffer, 1994, p. 172). Schemas become multiplied and systemica1Iy 
interrelated and Iinked such that constnied objects and events are increasingly 
experienced as consistent with previous ones. As schemas become 
progressively differentiated and integrated, we encounter less in the world that 
can surprise us. 
For Bakhtin, in contrast, the process ofassimilating others' voices may 
betray centrifuga!, dispersive effects, leading to increased conflict or stmggle 
among voices, to a more tension-filled, diversified, discursive self. As I argued 
in Chapter 5, the psyche is not the site of a harmonious equilibriurn of 
contending voices, where al1 voices are equally available, but rather one of 
conflictual, non-systemic plurality. Accordingly, Bakhtin describes the process 
of ideological becoming in terms of a struggle-often enough a power 
stmggle-arnong voices. Just as the social world is characterized by the 
struggle among the many languages of heteroglossia, so too is the psyche the 
ground-and perhaps even the battleground-of an intense interaction among 
many unmerged voices, each of which embodies a particular semantic position 
and a different kind and degree of authonty, and each of which participates in a 
stmggle for influence on the plane of inner speech. An individual's ideological 
becorning entails a conflict or dialogic interaction between intemally persuasive 
and authoritative discourses and between the heteroglossia of internally 
persuasive voices and their attendant values and attitudes. This struggle is 
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critical for development of verbal consciousness, as the conflict of voices is 
productive of new experience and hence occasions the transformation of  the self. 
R is a struggle, too, that reflects the constant battle-within language, culture, 
and the psychebetween centripetal forces that strive toward unity, stability, 
and sameness, and the centrifùgal forces of openness and becoming. Like 
centrifuga1 forces that decentralize, disuni@, and stratiQ, intemally persuasive 
discourse questions the centiipetal authority of the authoritative word, thereby 
working away from any single, original meaning. 
Overcoming Authoritativeness: Valorizin~ the Internai I V  Persuasive Word 
The foregoing remarks suggest that internally persuasive discourse is a much 
more critical aspect of an individual's ideological becoming. "Such discourse," 
Bakhtin (198 1) writes, "is of decisive significance in the evolution of an 
individual consciousness" (p. 345), for it speaks directly to the question of how 
we achieve an individual voice amidst the many dominant and dominating 
discourses that characterize Our social and mental worlds. Implicit in Bakhtin's 
argument, moreover, is the assumption that an individual consciousness is 
deficient and closed to growth in the measure to which it speaks under the 
weight of the other's authoritative word. A consciousness in which 
authoritative discourse is preeminent is one in which dogmatic thought 
prevails. This "thought . . . like a fish in an aquarium, knocks against the 
bottom and the sides and cannot swim farther or deeper" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 
162). As authontative discourse is closed to ~ ~ n a l i z a b l e ,  creative 
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transformation, so too must be the self for which such discourse is 
predominant. As Morson and Emerson (1990) claim, "The truly novelistic, 
mature, and responsible self knows a minimum of authoritative discourse" (p. 
220). Extending this logic to the probtem of the development of self- 
understanding, Day and Tappan (1 996) have noted that 
The goal of development is not simpiy a matter. . . of speaking in one's 
own true or 'authentic' voice. Rather, it is a matter of engaging in 
ongoing dia!ogue with the words of others, and thereby coming to a 
more "self-persuasive," and less "authoritative" sense of self- 
understanding. (p. 72) 
The presence of internally persuasive discourse in an individual's verbal 
consciousness suggests a consciousness that is responsive and responsible to 
the other's word. As an ethical ideal, ideological becoming is a process that 
involves acquiring a critical, increasingly dialogized consciousness. In this 
respect, ideological becoming may be likened to Freire's (1970) notion of 
"conscientization," that is, the development of a capacity and willingness to 
question the power and a~thority of the statu quo. 
In Iight of this valorization of the intemally persuasive word, a critical 
developmental question concerns how an authoritative discourse can be 
dialogized-assimilated or reaccented-so that it cornes to fùnction for us in a 
more semantically open ended, internally persuasive manner? How, in other 
words, can a discourse be chaIIenged and deprived of its absolute and 
unconditional authority? Interestingly, a clue to the conditions that enable one's 
ernancipation fiom the unquestioned authority of the oiher's discourse is to be 
found in Piaget's (1932) discussion of the factors that support a child's 
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developmentd shift fiom a moral orientation based on constraint to one based on 
cooperation and reciprocity. Piaget notes how in the child's cooperative 
interactions with peers who hold difEerent viewpoints fiom his or her own, the 
child's heteronomous sense ofjustice and morality is dislodged fiom its 
moorings in external, adult constraint. As a result of his or her interactions with 
peers-interactions governed by solidarity and bilateral respect, as opposed to 
social constraint-the child achieves a more flexible and contextually sensitive 
morality, one based on personal judgement and reciprocity. In Bakhtinian terms, 
we have here a situation where the adult's word has ceased to be authoritative 
for the chiId, its authority dialogically challenged and supplanted by a word- 
the word of peers in this case-that makes its claim on the chld as an internaily 
persuasive word. 
On the Bakhtinian view, the erosion of the authoritative status of the 
other's discourse presupposes that one has achieved a certain objectifLing 
distance fiom it. This self-distanciation fiom the authoritative word is not, 
however, one that is gained through a process of rational decentration (as the 
Piagetian view ultimately suggests), but rather is granted through the encounter 
with another concrete voice, with a viewpoint that affords the outsideness or 
alterity from which we can objectiQ the discourse under whose otherwise 
authoritative, unchallenged horizon we see the world and ourselves. 
Multiplicit~ and Othemess. The process of objecti@ing an authoritative 
voice or discourse is facilitated by the fact that language exists in an 
interlinguistic space. We live in what Bakhtin (198 1) calls "an actively 
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polyglot world" (p. 12), which is to say in a world where multipIe discourses 
and their associated forms of life are available to us. We al1 belong to a 
specific age group, are of a particular social class, inhabit a particular 
geographical region, work in a specific profession, have different sets of close 
relationships; and each of these affiliations is associated with different ways of 
speaking and seeing the world. For Bakhtin, it foIIows that when we 
experience and represent the world to ourselves, we ofien do so not in a single, 
unitary, shared language, but rather in a multiplicity of Ianguages-official, 
everyday, t echni cal-some overlapping, some conflicting, each in any event 
associated with a particular sphere of activity and carrying a set of views and 
evaluations. This sort of multivoiced existence is, of course, foundational for 
dialogue. In the present context, however, what is important also to emphasize 
is that the multiplicity of our IifeworIdly affiliations is itself a (centrifbgal) 
force that carries the potential to dialogize or undermine the monologic purity 
of a language that would otherwise exert an authoritative (centripetal) effect on 
Our speech. The idea here is that simply belonging to multiple, overlapping 
groups, is Iikely to set in motion the dialogical interanimation of voices-the 
transposition, Say, of cultural elements from one discursive-ideological group 
into another. The discursive multiplicity associated with our participation in 
diverse spheres of communication is especially conducive to objectifiing the 
other's word. As Bakhtin (1 98 1) writes: 
One's own discourse and one's own voice, although born of another 
and or dynarnically stimulated by another, will sooner or later begin to 
liberate themselves from the authority of the other's discourse. This 
process is made more complex by the fact that a varïety of alien voices 
enter into the struggle for influence within an individual's 
consciousness Qust as they struggle with one another in surrounding 
social reality). Al1 this creates fertile soi1 for experïmentally 
objecti@ing another's discourse. . . . it is questioned, it is put in a new 
situation in order to expose its weak sides, to get a feel for its 
boundaries, to experience it physically as an object. (p. 348) 
We begin, in other words, to see the world and ourselves in a different way. 
More specifically, this sort of dialogic interplay of voices or discourses has the 
effect of disrupting the sense that the authoritative word is the only adequate 
word to describe the world. Only under conditions of multivoicedness is there 
a disruption of "the sense of an absolute h i o n  or bonding of a use of words to 
a concrete ideological meaning" (La Capra, 1983, p. 3 12). Or as Bakhtin 
(198 1) also puts it: "Only polyglossia fully frees consciousness from the 
tyranny of its own language and its own myth of language" (p. 61). 
Mu ttivoicedness (or heteroglossia), then, is a meliorative phenomenon, 
a source of relative tieedom. For if each of us had only one voice, we would be 
trapped within it; it would have exclusive power over us. The philosopher Odo 
Marquard (1991) puts the point in connection with having many histories or 
persona1 stories. 
It is necessary for human beings to have not only one unique history or 
story, or a few of them, but many of them. For if they-each individuai 
human being, and al1 of them together-had only one unique history or 
story, they would be utterly in the power and at the mercy of this sole 
history or story. Only when they have many histories or stories are they 
f'reed, relatively, Eom each story by the other ones, and thus able to 
develop a manifoidness that is, in each case, their own-that is, able to 
be an individual, be it only a desperate individual, who knows that only 
one thing reallv helps him to get past one desperate situation, and that 
is the next one. (pp. 66-67) 
Our need for such multiplicity, adds Marquard, speaks directly to Our need for 
others. It is only through Our communication with others-al1 of  whom Iead a 
number of different lives-that it is possible for us to have a number of Iives, 
and hence to have many stones at Our disposal. Indeed, it is precisely the 
motley otherness of the historical or cultural others we engage-their 
differentness fiom us-"that is needed and important, and must therefore not be 
expunged, in our communication with them, but fostered and protected" (p. 
67) .'O 
As Emerson (1 997) has remarked, given the benefits of otherness, a 
Bakhtinian prescription for mental health would suggest stnving to expose 
oneself to a multiplicity of voices and perspectives. More specifically, a 
Bakhtinian view wouid insist 
that 1 not seek out people just Iike mvself for the sake of security or 
identity. It narrows my scope and thus is too rnuch of a risk; should 1 
change or the environment change, 1 might become extinct. . . . Any 
instinctive clustering of Iike with like threatens to reduce my "1" and its 
potential languages to a miserable dot. Those who surround themsehes 
with 'insiders-in heritage, experience, appearance, tastes, attitudes 
toward the world-are on a rigidifying and impoverishing road. In 
contrast, the personality that welcomes provisional finalization by a 
huge and diversified array of "authors" will command optimal literacy. 
It feels at home in a variety of zones; it has many languages at its 
disposai and can learn new ones without trauma. From its perspective, 
the world appears an invitingly open, flexible, unthreatening and 
unfinalized place. (Emerson, 1997, pp. 223-224) 
Surrounding the self with different others, then, is the distinctive imperative of 
a mature, dialogical consciousness. It is only through one's dialogic encounter 
with otherness-with the other's questions, challenges, and contrasting 
experiences-that one's own meanings are revealed in al1 their depths and that 
one overcomes the dogmatic "closedness and one-sidedness" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 
7) of any particular semantic position. Indeed, this sort of plurality allows us to 
see ourselves from multiple perspectives, each giving rise to an image or story 
of a self that one can engage, draw on, criticize, and bring into interaction with 
other such images and stones, thereby further disclosing-in an unpredictable 
and unfinalizable process-the self s potentials.7' 
PIav and the Inversion of Authority. The phenornenon o f  play also 
carries the potential to deprive the authoritative word of its unconditional 
authority. This possibility inheres, more specifically, in the fact that play can 
take a given language, serious and straightforward in its tone, and subject that 
language to a reaccentuation of some End. Play, and particularly dramatic 
play, is a means of drawing an otherwise lofty discourse into a zone of 
(sometimes crude) familiarity that relativizes o r  renders conditional whatever 
authority that discourse might enjoy. Vandenberg's (1986) discussion of play is 
certainly congenial to the conception 1 am putting forward here. Vandenberg 
argues that children's reality is much more labile than that of  adults, a feature 
that accounts for children's ability more quickly to reinvest belief in alternative 
realities. This flexibility is evident in children's dramatic play with peers. In 
this brand of play, according to Vandenberg, children playfùlly engage the 
myths o r  narratives of a culture. And in doing so, children become both more 
rooted in those cultural narratives and more capable of exercising control over 
and emancipating themselves from their grasp. In socio-dramatic play, children 
often make social norms and rules and scripts they acquire fiom authoritative 
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others suit their own purposes; indeed, play often affords children the creative 
license precisely to transform theses noms, rules, or scripts. So, for example, 
in playing house, children may write roles that redress the power differential 
that otherwise exists between children and adults. As Vandenberg observes, in 
playing the role of a parent, the child rnay refiact that role through the optic of 
the child's own concerns, and hence play that role in a way that af3ords the 
"child" a greater degree of empowerment. In the sociological tradition, Fine 
(1 987) reports a similar observation. More specifically, he notes how, wïthin 
the peer group, the play of pre-adolescent boys' often involves reworking the 
codes established by their fathers, such that the boys' speech and behaviour 
provides "a world that both reflects and distorts adult male behaviors" (p. 79). 
This distortion follows from the fact that children experience a gap between 
the ideals their parents project for them and the worId they experience. In sum, 
then, each of these accounts of play illustrates the inversion of  authority that 
arises when one language (that of parents or adults) is seen through the optic of 
another language (that of children). In the context of play, the parent's 
authoritative word is drawn into the immediacy of children's lives and brought 
into contact with the discourse and concerns of children themselves, where it 
loses its otherwise unquestioned authority. 
Carnival. Parod~.  and Laughter. The argument that children's play may 
contain a subversive element is curiously reminiscent of Bakhtin's (1968) 
discussion of the process by which official unitary fanguages are overtumed at 
the hands of marginalized, "low" voices associated with the less valorized 
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areas of society. After the mode1 of medieval carnival, Bakhtin (19868) calls 
this inversion of the social hierarchy "carnivalization." For Bakhtin, camival 
ceIebrates the temporary Iiberation from the prevailing truths and wisdom of 
the established ~ r d e r . ~ *  
The world of carnival is one of a topsy-turvy heteroglossia where 
nothing remains pure. Everything is mixed, hybridized, subjected to rituals of 
degradation and defiIation by way of a diverse array of irreverent discourses: 
oral and written comic verbal pieces, parodies, curses, oaths, slang humour, 
popular trïcks and jokes, scatological forms, and so on. Most important for the 
present argument is that these irreverent carnival activities, while not directed 
toward the total rejection or dismantling of the established social order, serve 
to question and challenge that order. Parodies, for example, invert social noms 
and hierarchical relations of power. In the middle ages, as Bakhtin (198 1) 
notes, parodies were an element in "school festivals" and played a role in the 
cultural and inteilectual Iife of the times. "The medieval monastic pupi1 (and in 
later times the university student) ridiculed with a clear conscience during the 
festival everything that had been the object of reverent studies during the 
course of the year" (1981, p. 72). In a more recent discussion, Sidorkin (1997) 
has explored the role of carnival in contemporary educatiorial theory. His 
analysis, which focuses on Moscow schools, centres around the sbor, a spnng 
retreat in which teachers and students participate in a variety of activities, 
including the performance of skits, serious discussions, physical work, sports, 
and games. In keeping with the spirit of medieval carnival, the sbor is 
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characterized by the inversion of school and social conventions. For example, 
the othenvise all-powerful principal acts like a small child and teachers 
relinquish control over their students, allowing them to regulate and determine 
their own conduct and affairs. Sidorkin (1997) conceives of the sbor as a 
conciliatory phenornenon, an event that helps to establish connectedness 
arnong the various groups represented in the school and to smooth out confiicts 
that might adversely affect the school year. The sbor is a temporary "retreat 
into a utopian worid" (Sidorkin, 1997, p. 237). It is seen not so much as an 
expression of oppressed voices as an outlet for the expression of fieedom. But 
while Sidorkin (1997) downplays the critical function of such inversions, it can 
reasonably be argued that such activities allow children to see the 
conditionality of al1 discourses and the instability of ail meanings, and 
especially of those that may otherwise function authoritatively for them. 
Through such activities, the distant authoritative word is "contemporized," that 
is, "it is brought low, represented on a plane equal with contemporary life, in 
an everyday environment, in the low language of contemporaneity" (Bakhtin, 
1981, p. 21). 
Parodies are also a characteristic element of chiIdrenYs play (Fine, 
1987; Jorgensen, 1983). Fine (1 987), for example, notes how preadolescents' 
Song parodies often spread quickly within the preteen subculture and are often 
performed in the earliest stages of a child's entry into another group. 
Jorgensen's (1983) research examines anti-school Song parodies-parodies of  
traditional, solemn, anthem-Iike songs (e-g., "Mine eyes have seen the glory of 
271 
the buming of our schooV We have tortured al1 the teachers and have broke the 
golden rule/ We are going to the ofice and we crippled the principal/ Our 
troops go rnarching on!"). Her analysis is centred around the various knctions 
of such parodies, which incfude, on the orre hand, establishing and maintaining 
peer cohesiveness, and, on the other, constructing a make-believe world where 
the peer group rules and rebels against authority, thereby allowing the child 
vicariously to transcend the social and structural limitations that characterize 
childhood and the chiIdYs experience in school. In this Iatter respect, parodies 
are ccforms of social commentary in which resentment toward the institution of 
the school is being expressed" (p. 100). While Jorgensen, like Sidorkin (1997), 
interprets such activities largely in terms of the emotional release they afford 
and in terms of their facilitation ofchildren's efforts to cope with the conflicts 
and pressures toward conformity that the socialization process engenders, it is 
clear that such parodies of authoritative discourses have the effect of bringing 
these discourses, and the view of the world they embody, into a zone of contact 
where they are interanimated-and hence rninirnized in their authority and 
finality-by the everyday, sometimes even crude, discourse of children's peer 
groups. 
Parody reminds us that reality is much more complex and contradictory 
and that there is no authoritative word that c m  semantically exhaust the object 
of its focus. "Language is transformed tiom the absolute d o p a  it had been 
within the narrow fiamework of a sealed-off and impermeable monoglossia 
into a working hypothesis for cornprehending and expressing reality" (Bakhtin, 
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198 1, p. 6 1). In other words, the previously authontative discourse becomes 
the "imagey7 of a discourse, and as such loses its unquestioned authority. On the 
Bakhtinian view, forming an image of, or "representing," a discourse is 
coterminous with objectifying a discourse. Only through representing or 
forming an image of a discourse can it be held as something to be questioned 
or dialogicaily engaged in some way. Moreover, one discourse can be 
foregrounded only by perceiving it through the optic of another discourse. 
Parody introduces a gap between the authontative word and its object, between 
the word and reality, surface and centre, potential and reality. 
The language that more specifically exposes this gap between the word 
and the world is the language of laughter. In laughter, reality stops coinciding 
with the word. In laughter, one ceases to be contained by a discourse. 
Laughter has the remarkable power of making an object corne up close, 
of drawing it into a zone of crude contact where one can finger it 
familiarly on al1 sides, tum it upside down, inside out, peer at it from 
above and below, break open its extemal shell, look into its center, 
doubt it, take it apart, dismember it, lay it bare and expose it, examine it 
freely and experiment with it. Laughter demolishes fear and piety 
before an object, before a world, making of it an object of familiar 
contact and thus clearing the ground for an absolutely fiee investigation 
of it. Laughter is a vital factor in laying down that prerequisite for 
fearlessness without which it would be impossible to approach the 
world reaIistically. As it draws an object to itself and makes it familiar, 
Iaughter dehers the object into the fearless hands of investigative 
experiment-both scientific and artistic-and into the hands of free 
experimental fantasy. (198 1, p. 23) 
Laughter is, in this respect* the antithesis of dogmatism. It erodes the "one- 
sided seriousness of the lofty direct word" (1981, p. 5 9 ,  overcoming 
authoritative distance and establishing a more conditional acceptance of the 
other's word. Laughter is a reminder that the self does not coincide with itself, 
that it aIways remains the site of unrealized potential and unrealized demands. 
CONCLUSION 
OPEN TIME, DEVELOPMENT, AND DIALOGISM 
In this concluding chapter, 1 address the relevance of diaiogism as a 
metatheoretical discourse for developmental psychology. Dialogisrn, I argue, is 
allied with a particular image of temporality which has implications for how 
we conceive of the process of change and development vis-à-vis the self. More 
specifically, dialogism supports an open sense of time (Morson, 1994), a 
temporality which accommodates the eventness-that is, the unpredictability 
and moment-to-moment creativity-of self-formation. The following 
discussion is divided into four parts. 1 begin with a consideration of the 
implications for understanding change of an open conception of time. 1 argue 
that ongoing, creative change is a defining feature of the dialogicat self. 1 then 
address the issues of human identity and individual development. Here, my 
basic claim is that development in open time is non-teleologicaI; rather it is an 
event-hl phenornenon characterized by risk and unpredictability. In this 
comection, I also have the occasion to reflect on the peculiarly modern, 
essentialist distinction between "childhood" and "aduIthood," and to argue that 
this distinction or binarisrn is undermined by a dialogicai fkamework, in which 
maturity is conceived as an open-ended process of continual becoming. Next, 1 
consider the nature and role of the past or the already-given in the development 
of self, and in the interpretive process more generally. 1 conclude that while a 
Bakhtinian view acknowledges the influence of the past on present action and 
thought, that influence cannot be conceived in deterministic terms. The past is 
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a dialogical participant-a voice that is neither privileged nor devalued-in the 
ongoing interplay between past and present. This dialogical conception of the 
past further suggests that the selfS while constrained by what is already given to 
it, is nonetheless free; indeed, its tieedom is enabled precisely by such 
constraints. Finally, 1 address the reIation between individual development and 
the cultural-historical context in which such development occurs. Against the 
view, often ascribed to social constructionist beliefs-and erroneously to 
Bakhtin-that individual psychologica1 fùnctioning c m  be reduced to cultural 
and linguistic categories, 1 argue that the Bakhtinian seIf never simply 
reproduces such categories, but rather that while the self assimilates those 
categories, it enjoys a surplus relative to the ideological world they reflect-a 
surplus which, in the final scheme of things, is precisely the source of the 
difference that is required to sustain the diaIogue between self and other. 
How Change Happens 
The emphasis on eventness that characterizes the dialogicaI view implies that 
change in the self proceeds incrementally; it is the product of the small, 
moment-to-moment choices and decisions we make, the result of the ongoing 
dialogues that we carry out, both with external interlocutors and within 
ourselves, over the course of our Iives. This conception of  change is premised 
on an open sense of time, according to which a hndamental indeteminacy 
characterizes al1 moments (Morson, 1994). Open time allows for eventness 
and unpredictability in development. Each event, each dialogical encounter, 
276 
however unremarkable, carries the potential for transformation, Hence, rather 
than stress the "epic7' transformations in the life of the self-transformations 
wrought through critical moments and crises, through "major Iife eventsn- 
dialogism orients us also to prosaic change, to the creativity inherent in every 
unrepeatable moment. On the dialogical view, each moment has real 
developrnental significance. 
The notion that the self is a site of constant, prosaic change is at odds 
with reigning assumptions in psychology, and in particular with those held by 
investigators working within the metatheoretical fiamework known as social 
cognition. Heavily influenced by developments in information-processing 
psychology, social cognition stresses the storage, processing, and retrieval of 
information about the self and the social world and the effect of these processes 
on social behaviour. According to proponents of the social-cognitive 
perspective, the self is a cognitive structure that consists in abstracted and 
organized information about individuals' life experïence. One of the central 
questions addressed by social-cognitive research pertains to the conditions for 
change in the content and structure of stored self-knowledge (Sherman, Judd, & 
Park, 1989). On this point, there is a fiindamental agreement that the self (Le., 
self-concept) is somewhat resistant to change, that it is a fairly conservative 
structure, one characterized by a good deal of "inerha" (Sherman et al. 1989). 
Greenwald's (1980) classic description of the "totaiitarian ego," for example, 
certainly supports this conclusion. According to Greenwald, one of the central 
"biases" characterizing the self-a bias argued to serve an adaptive, ego- 
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preserving fùnction in "intrapsychic evo1ution"- is "conservatisrn," which he 
defines as "the disposition to presewe that which is already established . . . the 
disposition to preserve existing knowledge structures, such as percepts, 
schemata (categories), and mernories" (p. 606)~" In keeping with Greenwald's 
argument, there is much social psychologicai literature that documents how 
social behaviour serves to veriSl, protect, and maintain one's existing sense of 
self-to preserve the self s "statu quo," as it were (Banaji & Prentice, 1994; 
Sedikides & Strube, 1997). To be sure, investigators recognize that the 
self-concept does change in spite of such biases. The self-concept is bound to 
change, for example, as a person encounters new people, grows apart from 
others, takes up new activities, in short as the person confronts the inevitable 
vicissitudes of life and day-to-day coping. Still, the empirical research 
emphasizes the sameness of the self over time. In a recent review of the 
Iiterature in the area, one group of investigators offers the following sumnary 
remark: 
In light of the impressive evidence for maintenance of the self, it is 
somewhat surprising that self-concepts ever change at aII. Indeed, the 
literature contains many demonstrations of temporary changes in the 
self-concept, but relatively few examples of enduring self-concept 
change. (Banaji & Prentice, 1994, p. 324) 
This finding of stasis in the self-concept is, at least in part 1 imagine, a 
firnction of the mode of inquiry used to study the self-concept. It is also 
presumably a function of the unit of analysis in such investigations: namely, 
the self-concept. As for the mode of inquiry, most psychologists-and in 
particular those who approach the subject of self fiom a scientific, empirical 
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vantage point-pursue a nomothetic strategy: they are interested in speciQing 
lawful generalizations about some feature of the self. Here, the self is 
understood not in tems of its creative, lived-experiential movement in open 
tirne-that is, in terms of its situationally-specific, moment-to-moment 
vicissitudes, but rather in terms of its generalizable elements. Compared, for 
example, to a "thick description" of the dialogic event, the nomothetic 
approach is not particularly well adapted to capturing the eventness of the self- 
in-the-making. The particularities of individuals, accordingly, are of rather 
little concern-a fact that finds expression in statistical practice of 
conceptuaiizing individual, non-systemic variance as ccerror." As for a unit of 
analysis fike the self-concept, it is by definition a cognitive abstraction, and as 
such inhabits the closed temporal realm of already-completed deeds. 
Conceptions of Human Identitv and Individual Development 
It follows fiom dialogism's reliance on an image of time as open, and on the 
eventness that such an image suggests and supports, that change or 
development cannot be conceptualized as an unfolding or as a necessary 
progression toward some preestablished terminus or telos. On the dialogical 
fiamework, development is neither progressive or teleological-that is, events 
are not linked in such a way that there is movement dong an evaluative 
dimension over time to some goal state. In this regard, a dialogical conception 
of development can be distinguished from that allied with a Piagetian account. 
Piaget's developmental theory suggests that development is progressive and 
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teleological. Each person's t ife, consisting of a fixed sequence of hierarchical 
stages and culminating in formal operational thought, exemplifies this 
progressive life cycIe. The progressive character of development in Piagetian 
theory is premised on a cyclical sense of time inasmuch as the essential 
processes of development are repeated within the life of each individual and in 
the sense that each stage transition is an epicycle governed by the functional 
invariants (Le., accommodation and assimilation) (Cheyne & Tarulli, 1999). 
Also, development is thematized pnmarily as a natural and intrinsic 
development rather than a process of extrinsic worldly social transactions. 
Although Piaget is clearly sensitive tu the impact of social relations, their 
function is merely to activate maturationally inevitable biological and logico- 
mathematical structures (Rogoff, 1990; Wartofsky, 1983). 
Following Morson's (1994) analysis of temporality, the Piagetian view 
of development as a progressive unfolding of maturational inevitabilities may 
also be described as one that reflects a closed sense of time. Time is closed in 
the sense that development follows a path articulated in advance in the form 
of an overarching developmental blueprint. Logico-mathematical operations 
are situated in a developmental framework in which they become a terminus ad 
auem, the point to which knowledge proceeds. For Piaget, there is no eventness 
in human cievelopment. The "growth" of reason is characterized, rather-and in 
keeping with Piaget's Kantian roots-by its universality and necessity; it does 
not allow for what Morson calls "surprisingness." For Piaget, individual 
cognition merely unfolds in tirne, predictably, without surprises or eventness. 
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In contrast to the closed sense of time that predominates in the 
Piagetian view, the dialogical fiamework understands development not as an 
unfolding of abstracted cornpetencies, but rather as a genuinely creative 
process characterized by moment-to-moment changes. On this view, 
development can folIow many possible paths, paths not given in advance in 
some overarching blueprint for development, nor in some implicit teleology. 
The temporal openness of the dialogical view allows for surprisingness or 
eventness Pakhtin, 1993). "For there to be eventness," writes Morson (1994), 
there must be alternatives. Eventfiil events are performed in a world in 
which there are multiple possibilities, in which sorne things that couId 
happen do not. Ln such a world, tirne ramifies and its possibilities 
multiply; each realized possibility opens new choices while precluding 
others that once could have been made. The eventfirl event must also 
be unrepeatable, that is, its meaning and weight are inextricably linked 
to the moment in which it is performed, Choice is momentous. It 
involves presentness. The same act performed later would not be quite 
the same act. It is therefore constituted in part by important 
particularities that no abstract and timeless system could foretell. (p. 
22) 
Hence, an approach to development premised on an open sense of time would 
daim that people change throughout life, both in response to particular, 
unpredictable circumstances and through their own action. We are always 
making and remaking ourselves. And such change, moreover, tends to no 
preestablished goal. As Morson concludes, we "do not [ive in completed 
selves" (p. 108). 
The orientation to open time undermines the logic of possession and the 
conception of maturity or adulthood that characterizes essentialist assumptions 
about development. According to Misgeld and Jardine (1986), in a "technical" 
approach to adulthood, adults possess "specifiable 'competencies' that can be 
understood, developed, and possessed independently o f  the ongoing, 
contingent, and fluid way in which they actually appear over the course of 
everyday Iife" (p. 262). Such competencies can be described objectively and 
incuIcated to the point where their possession is no longer in question. To use 
MisgeId and Jardine's example, becoming Iinguistically competent will, on 
this technical view, corne to mean the acquisition of  a fixed, univocally 
determinate set of competencies, the possession of which has been objectively 
demonstrated such that their possession, again, is inviolable and beyond 
dispute. As an adult then, 1 can describe myself as  having linguistic 
competence or being compassionate. As a skilt o r  competence that 1 possess, 
my linguistic competence can be called upon and applied in al1 manner of 
communicative situations. To be sure, 1 may on occasion fail to do  with words 
what 1 would have liked to: for exampIe, 1 may, with seeming ineptitude, 
stammer, hedge, perhaps even fa11 silent in the face o f  some pointed question 
addressed to me by an interlocutor. But even on such occasions, it is not my 
competence, linguistic o r  othenvise, that is undermined by my inability 
effectively to  speak, nor is my self-understanding as one who is linguistically 
competent, for such competence is what 1, as an educated adult member of our 
culture, invariably and unquestionably have. What such occasions demonstrate, 
rather-assurning that one does indeed possess the underlying talent in 
question-is a mere failure in g~dicat ion,  a failure in particularizing what I 
otherwise unquestionably possess-a failure that stems perhaps fiom the 
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instability of certain environmental variables-for example, an unresponsive 
interlocutor, a noisy room, and so forth. My success, or lack thereof, in 
applying what 1 possess (in advance of any specific encounter) is what is at 
issue here, not that I possess it. Sirnilarly, in defining myself as a 
compassionate person, 1 may on occasion find rnyself lacking in compassion, 
perhaps even acting rather calIously. But even here, my compassion is secure 
and objectively beyond dispute: "One can never fail to be what one objectively 
'is"' (Misgeld & Jardine, 1986, p. 264). Or, altematively, when one fails, what 
is is a failure. -
As 1 intimated above, the logic of possession informs our received 
conceptions of "maturity" or "adulthood" and, by implication, those of 
"childhood" as well. On the modern conception, according to Archard (1993), 
"cfiildhood is a stage or state of incornpetence relative to adulthood. The ideal 
adult is equipped with certain cognitive capacities, rational, physicall y 
independent, autonomous, has a sense of identity and is conscious of its beliefs 
and desires" (p. 30) Childhood, in contrast 'Ys defined as that which lacks the 
capacities, skills and powers of adulthood. To be a child is to be not yet an 
adult" (p. 30). Now, premised on an open conception of time, the dialogicai 
fiarnework problematizes this understanding of adulthood, as well as the 
essentialist distinction on which it is founded. As Misgeld and Jardine (1986) 
argue 
HermeneuticaIly [or dialogicaIlyJ conceived, adult and child are not 
taken to be univocal object domains, but are conceived as constantly 
interpreted and re-interpreted events whose meaning and relation to 
each other is always yet-to-be decided- Adulthood is not a fixed set of 
properties, as if it were never in question. Rather, to be an adult, to be 
mature, requires the unceasing effort to establish for ourseIves courses 
of action, indicating possibilities of self-understanding, which are not 
there as a matter of course, simply open for theoretical examination and 
ascription (p. 267) 
In other words, adulthood or maturity is not defined in terms o f  the 
unquestionable possession of certain objective properties, properties whose 
absence, in turn, defines childhood or irnmaturity. On the dialogical account, 
adulthood is not an achieved state in which one has ceased, once and for aI1, 
to be a child. Rather, adulthood or maturity is understood as an event that is 
brought forth situationally, as something that comes into existence for the first 
time, as it were, in the moment of our practical, dialogical engagement with 
the world. Maturity is a performance ever to be renewed and enacted, As 
Archard (1993) similariy claims in this regard, 
Adulthood as a process is a continual becoming, a never-completed 
maturing. it is not a plateau of age but the asymptote of Iife's 
developmental curve. The individual can become more and more of an 
adult, but there is no guarantee that ageing automatically brings with it 
maturity as understood normatively. Childhood is not necessarily left 
behind forever when one grows older; its characteristics may be 
retained to lesser or greater degree in later years. To that extent 
childhood is construed not so much as an actual perïod of one's life, but 
more as a metaphorical irnmaturity which can be present to some extent 
throughout a lifetime. (pp. 3 6-3 7) 
A processual understanding of maturity, then, stresses the situational bringing- 
into-being of adulthood. So, to return to our previous example, compassion is 
not a fixed attribute or an objective property that I can ascribe to  myself and 
that can be secured or achieved in advance of my involvement in a situation 
that requires me to act compassionately. My compassion, rather, is contingent 
upon the unique circumstances that 1 encounter. My compassion is an 
unfinalizable, concrete, dialogical accomplishment; it is not something 
achieved or accomplished once and for all. Being compassionate is always 
about becoming compassionate, with al1 the risks, contingencies, and 
uncertainties that such becoming entails. From within an open temporality, my 
self-understanding as a compassionate person enters the realm of the uncertain 
present where it stands continually to be transformed in dialogue. Self- 
understanding, like any kind of understanding, is therefore better conceived as 
a venture, an undertaking full of risk and whose outcome is uncertain. 
ccUnderstanding," as Gadamer (198 1) writes, "is an adventure and, like any other 
adventure, is dangerous" (pp. 109-1 10). The risk and danger lie precisely in the 
eventness of open tirne- 
This processual conception of maturity bears a clear mnity with 
Bakhtin's (198 1) understanding of ideological becorning. Such becoming can 
be distinguished, more specifically, fiom the notion of development 
traditionally understood as progressive change. Ideological becoming is non- 
teIeological in the strict sense: it is neither directional nor cumulative, nor does 
it tend necessarily and universally-unfoldingly, so to speak-to some given 
end state. Rather, it implies process, unfinishedness, unfinalizability, an 
orientation to the open future, and an emphasis on centrifuga1 (event-hl) over 
centripetal (systemic) forces. The inner voices that comprise our self- 
understanding continue to interanimate one another in dynamic and complex 
ways, continually and creatively giving rise to new meanings as they engage 
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one another dialogically. Our selves, on this view, exist in a perpetual state of 
incompletion. We never stop becominq who we are. Accordingly, there is a 
sense in which Bakhtin's notion of ideological becoming makes children of us 
all. Like children, and by definition too, we are dways-al1 of us-yet-to-be. 
Sensing the Past 
Bakhtin has been called an "apostle of constraints" (Emerson, 1988, p. 507). 
One of those constraints is what is already-given to us, or, more simply, the 
past-tradition, past images of the self, mernories of better, or worse, times. In 
short, the dialogical view recognizes the reafity of biographical continuity and 
the fact that individual development is Iinked to the historical process- 
whether that process be conceived in terms of the history of an individual Iife 
or, more encompassingly, in terms of the history of an entire cultural-linguistic 
community. In claiming this much, however, Bakhtin is not appealing to a 
conception of "genesis" in which the past deterrnines the present. A re!iance on 
an open sense of time clearly undermines such a view of the past's influence. 
Bakhtin's notion of becoming is inimical to the belief that the past plays such a 
deterministic role in individual or cultural-histoncal developrnent. The past 
constrains but does not detemine development. It is not surprising, then, that 
Bakhtin rejected the Freudian view, according to which a child's experiences 
in the first five or six years of life are responsible for the shape of personality 
in adulthood. Indeed Morson (1994) argues that Bakhtin's antagonism toward 
Freudianism was based on "its sense of the essential completion of the 
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personality at a young age" (Morson, 1994, p. 108). 
In contrast to the Freudian account, a Bakhtinian view argues that while 
we are constrained in some measure by the past, the eventness and 
incompleteness of the present opens up multiple possibilities for development. 
In the Freudian world in which tirne is closed and eventness is forestalled, 
actions are not tmly creative and cannot exceed what is given in the past. 
"Oedipal" development involves no reaI historical emergence, no genuine 
novelty. It is an oft-told tale of eternal recurrence. But for Bakhtin, the 
possibility of novelty inheres in the fact that individuals enjoy a certain 
measure of freedorn fiorn the past. As Bakhtin (1990) argued in his early 
phenornenological account of the subject, the 1-for-myself enjoys a "loopho1e 
out of time, out of everything given, everything finitely present on hand. I do 
not, evidently, experience the whole of myself in time" (p. 109). In other 
words, 1 (as subject) never coincide with who I have been time. Any past 
image of myself is brought into contact with "the incomplete process of a 
world-in-the-making," that is, with the open present, and so becomes "stamped 
with the seal of inconclusiveness" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 30). 
For Bakhtin, the past and the present are dialogically interwoven, This 
dialogical interplay, and the productive possibilities for self-understanding it 
affords, are in fact enabied b~ temporal separation, by the difference between 
the horizon of the past and the open horizon of the present. Bakhtin defends the 
productivity of temporal distance most clearly in his consideration of the 
interpretation of historical texts. More specificall y, Bakhtin (1 986) argues that 
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the meaning of literary texts cannot be contained in the cultural circumstances 
of their creation, that is, in their writers' own time. In their efforts to stay close 
to the phenomenon at hand, to the text's original voice or meaning, 
investigators may try to regain the historical and biographical circumstances of 
a work's creation by somehow disentangling themselves frorn their own 
present horizon and entering-empathically, methodically, or othenvise-into 
the horizon of the past. The movement here would seem to be toward an 
eradication of the temporal distance that invariably opens up between the 
production of a text and its interpretation in subsequent times. According to 
Bakhtin, however, uncovering a work's "semantic depths, " its potentials to 
mean, requires just this sort of temporal separation. The temporaI distance 
between the text and the interpreter contains the productive possibility for new 
meanings to emerge frorn the work. Indeed, literary works "break through the 
boundaries of their own time, they live in centuries, that is, in preat time and 
fiequently . . . their lives there are more intense and fuller than are their lives 
within their own time" Pakhtin, 1986, p. 4). Works originate out of a tradition 
and continue to lead a c'posthumous Iife" in subsequent epochs, characterized 
by new, e ~ c h e d  meanings: "it is as though these works outgrow what they 
were in the epoch of their creation" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 4). Crucial to this 
awakening of new meanings is temporal distance, the interpretive possibilities 
afforded by the passage of time. One should be carefùl to note here that 
Bakhtin's claims in this regard do not entai1 an absolute pnvileging of the 
present; rather, it is the relation between past and present, the dialogue between 
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the two, that Bakhtin is stressing." Meaning is achieved neither in recreating 
the horizon of the past nor in subsuming that horizon under the interpretive 
interests of the present, but rather in the interlocative relationship between past 
and present voices. The past enters into the present via memory and "expresses 
itself like a 'thou"' (Gadarner, 1989, p. 358), and like a participant in dialogue 
enjoys a certain autonomy and efficacy, a voice if you will, with regard to the 
construction of meaning. 
The result of this encounter of past and present voices is something 
genuinely new. Each present utterance responds in some fashion to past 
utterances-one's own and others'-and in doing so "always creates 
something that never existed beforey' (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 120). Thus, any novel 
creation-any new way of understanding oneself, for example-contains both 
the "given" and the "created," and as Bakhtin reminds us, what is "created is 
aiways created out of something given [past]" (p. 120). Freedom, then, is not 
defined in terms of the absence or overcoming of constraints. Indeed, on the 
Bakhtinian view, the acknowledgment of such constraints over individual 
creativity is a precondition for the existence of fieedom. As Bakhtin (1986) 
wntes, "The better a person understands the degree to which he is externslly 
detennined . . . the closer he cornes to understanding and exercising his real 
fieedom" (p. 139). 
The Relation Between Individual and Cultural-Historical Develo~ment 
In recent years, there has been an increasing awareness both within and outside 
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of psychology of the importance for individual development of both 
macroenvironments (Bateson, 1972; Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Foucault, 1975, 
1988) and microenvironments (Mi nuchin, 1984; Watzlawick, Beavin, & 
Jackson, 1967). Within the discipline, the metatheoretical discourses of social 
constructionism in particular have stressed that human mental processes cannot 
be separated fiom social and discursive context (e-g., Burr, 1995; Edwards & 
Potter, 2992; Gergen & Davis, 1985; Harré & Gillet, 1994; Shotter, 1993a). 
Generally, social constructionism is characterized by its Wittgensteinian 
critique of positivistic science and foundational, originarist epistemology, and 
by its ongoing poiemic against the Cartesian view of the self as a private, self- 
present inner realm to which individuals have unique and privileged access. 
Social constructionists argue that people's interpretation of experience, their 
natural inclinations and behaviour, are generated and mediated not by reaI 
psychological structures housed in the mind but by discursive and cultural 
practices. Hence, rather than conceive of things tike mernory, emotion, self- 
and individual subjectivity more generally-in essentialist terms, that is, as 
objective mental entities, they are regarded as social types, as ways of making 
sense of the world that are grounded, again, not in the realm of individual o r  
private experience, but in the institutional or social contexts of discursive 
negotiations. We learn to be selves and we learn to experience emotions, then, 
by intemalizing sociaIly and discursively grounded habits of thought. More 
generall y, social constnictionisrn reflects the recent postmodern trend within 
psychology toward the "extemalization of the person" (Kvale, 1992). On this 
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account, meaning, memory, beliefs, and other presumably psychoIogica1 
entities "are actually out in the social world of  action and interaction7' (Gee, 
1992, p. xvii). 
Given the foregoing description of the social constmctionist position, it 
is not surprising that some investigators have noted its resemblance to 
Bakhtinian dialogism. In this regard, recall once more Bakhtin's (198 1) notion 
of the "ideological becoming of a human being" (p. 341). The term 
"ideological" is appropriate in this context as it serves as a clear reminder that 
the psyche and selfhood are inescapably social phenornena. The term is 
appropriate, too, as it suggests, at least etymologically, the connection between 
the social systen of ideas (ideo) and speech or the word (logos). At least 
preliminarily, then, we might Say that ideological becoming is about how we 
grow into social ideas (of others) through the use of language (also of others). 
As we have also seen, a dialogical perspective on the self highlights not o d y  the 
more immediate interpersonal context in which the self develops, but the larger 
historical and sociocultural context as well. Bakhtin's (1986) notion of speech 
genres, for example, clearly orients us to the latter dimension. In sum, and 
generally in keeping with social constmctionist tenets, the dialogical self is 
shaped both by Our dialogicd involvements with the real, interpersonal others 
that inhabit Our lives and with the broader sociocultural and historically situated 
discourses which, as a sort of omnipresent third interlocutor, materiaIly frame and 
enable our more immediate dialogues. 
That Bakhtin affirms that individual identity is constructed within 
social reality is not inconsistent with his rejection of a deterministic view, 
which sees the individual as imprinted by histoncal and cultural forces. To 
argue that the self is a fiinction of the social, of dialogue, is not to argue that 
the self is in the thrall of sorne omnipotent other. Indeed, in this respect, 
Bakhtin's view is capable of eluding recent criticisms that point up the 
apparent inability of social constructionist thought adequately to accommodate 
notions of individual agency and responsibility, the existence of personal, non- 
shared expenence, and the creativity of individual thought (Fisher, 1995; 
Throop, 2000; Wong, 1999). Increasingly, critics are reacting sharply to the 
view that the self, emotion, and agency are simply fictions that disguise the 
construction of social reality through discourse; that the creative activity of 
individuals can be reduced to the passive reception of socially and culturally 
grounded knowledge systems; that dissention tiom sociocultural expectations 
and demands is a delusion. 
The Bakhtinian view, 1 contend, readily accommodates these 
concems-without, however, lapsing into the essentialist vocabulary which 
characterizes some of the above-mentioned critiques (e-g., Throop, 2000). 
According to the Bakhtinian view, it is true that subjectivity, because it 
consists in inner speech, is saturated with the social and the ideological. 
Language, after all, is the social-ideological medium par exceilence. But 
despite the apparently deterministic tenor of this claim, the Bakhtinian view 
escapes the charge of sociological or linguistic reductionism. In this 
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connection, consider the following selection of excerpts from Bakhtin's 
writings: 
Even if we succeeded in encompassing the whole of our consciousness 
as consummated in the other, this whole would not be able to take 
possession of us and really consummate us for ourselves: our 
consciousness would take that whole into account and would surrnount 
it as just one of the moments in its own unity (which is not a unity that 
is given but a unity that is set as a task and, in its essentials, is vet-to- 
be). The last word, that is, would still belong to our consciousness -
rather than to the consciousness of another, and Our own consciousness 
would never Say to itself the word that would consummate it. After 
looking at ourselves through the eyes of another, we always return-in 
life-into ourselves again, and the final, or, as it were, recapitulative 
event takes place within ourselves in the categories of our own Iife. 
(Bakhtin, 1990, pp. 16-17) 
1 am not-for myself-entirely connatural with the outside world, for 
there is always something essential in me that I can set over against that 
world, namely, my inner self-activity, my subjectivity, which confronts 
the outside world as an object, and which is incapable of being 
contained in it. This inner seIf-activity of mine exceeds both nature and 
the world: 1 always have an outlet along the Iine of my experience of 
myself in the act . . - 1  always have a loophole, as it were, through 
which 1 can Save myself from being no more than a natural given. 
(Bakhtin, 1990, p. 40) 
An individual cannot be completely incarnated into the Besh of 
existing sociohistorïcal categories. There is no mere form that would 
be able to incarnate once and forever all of his human possibilities and 
needs, no form in which he could exhaust himself down to the Iast 
word, like the tragic or epic hero. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 37) 
In a human beine there is always something that onlv he himself can 
reveal. in a fiee act of self-consciousness and discourse. something; that 
does not submit to an extemalizine secondhand definition. (Bakhtin, 
1984, p. 58) 
As long as a person is alive he lives by the fact that he is not yet 
finalized, that he has not yet uttered his ultimate word . . . man is fiee, 
and can therefore violate any regdating noms which rnight be thnist 
upon him. (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 59). 
Any truly creative text is always to some extent a free revelation of the 
personality, not predetermined by empirical necessity. Therefore, it . . . 
admits neither of causal explanation nor of scientific prediction. 
(Bakhtin, 1986, p. 1C7) 
Bakhtin is arguing here that as individuals we enjoy a certain existential 
surplus vis-à-vis the social-ideological world, a surplus that inheres not in the 
fact that we inhabit a reaIm of pure individuality-that is, a realm apart fiom 
the social-but rather in the fact that we occupy a unique tirne and place in 
social-historical existence, that we live in an emergent present that is moving 
into an unpredetermined fiture. Our freedom or surplus, in other words, stems 
not fiom our capacity to elude the sociocultural and ideological space into 
which we are thrown and exist but frorn the fact that we are always in a 
position of responding to and creatively appIying the generalized, appropriated 
aspects of our social and ideological heritage to the unique, once-cccurrent 
situations in which we continuously find ourselves. A corollary to this daim is 
that ideology is at the same time an inescapably individual phenornenon. 
"Every ideological product bears the imprint of its creator or creators" 
(Volosinov, 1986, p. 34). Indeed, ideology has no objective existence outside its 
realization (and continuous transformation) by particular individuals. 
On the Bakhtinian view, the ideology cauied in public speech must live 
amidst the flow of imer speech: "it must ring with subjective tones in order to 
remain a living sign and not be relegated to the honorary status of an 
incomprehensible museum piece" (Volosinov, 1986, p. 39). Through verbal 
interaction, "the social is drawn into the particular individual and continues to 
live and change-as an ongoing part of his private imer world and speech. It is 
through the shared process of language use . . . that the social is actualized and 
the individual is realized" (Volosinov, 1986, p. 39). Hence, the individua1 and 
the social interanimate each other. The individual psyche expands and develops 
by being drawn into the social sphere, which in tum is challenged, transformed, 
and individuated on the plane of individual fûnctioning (cf Cheyne & Tarulli, 
1999; Valsiner, 1994). Subjective life, while taking its ongins from culture and 
social structure, does not simply mirror or reproduce culture and social 
structure, nor is it deterrnined by them. Becoming enculturated is not a 
question of mechanical socialization. Bakhtin presents us with the image of an 
individual who rather than passively receiving the other's word, actively 
responds to the other's word, who reworks and reaccentuates it in the process of 
making it "one's own." And it is this active process that Bakhtin (198 1, 1986) 
has in mind when he speaks of our ideological becoming as the more or less 
creative assimilation or appropriation of the words and voices of others. 
AssimiIating an other's word, making it "one's own," is a productive, 
transfomative process. The complex social-psychological process of 
assimilation involves developing the other's word, allowing it to mean 
differently as it is placed into dialogue with other voices, voices that agree with 
or challenge it, or change it in some fashion. Our inner speech constitutes a 
hermeneutic writ small-a " Iiving hermeneutics" that allows us to contextualize, 
understand, and respond to the other's words. 
m e r  d l ,  it is not a mute wordless creature that receives an utterance, but 
a human being full of inner words. Al1 his experiences-his so-called 
apperceptive backgrouild-exist encoded in his inner speech, and only to 
that extent do they come into contact with speech received from the 
outside. Word cornes into contact with word. (Volosinov, 1986, p. 118) 
A rejection of both individualism and sociologism, the Bakhtinian view 
stresses the complex, open-ended dialogical relation between individual 
development and cukural-historical development. It stresses both the evolution 
of cultural tradition and the historicity of identity and the interplay between the 
two. Both individual and society, self and other, are continually becorning, 
continually entering the uncharted temtory of history-in-the-making. The 
world itself is changing, along with and indeed through, the experiences of 
individuals-individuals whose existential surplus, in effect, is the enabling 
basis for the dialogue between the individual and the social world. Like any 
dialogical relation, the dialogue between self and society requires difference, 
and this difference is ensured precisely by the self s existential surplus vis-à- 
vis-its non-coïncidence with- the other of society, culture, and ideology. As 
Holquist (1990) reminds us, however, we should not understand this surplus 
"as yet another Romantic clairn for the primacy of the absolute subject: self for 
Bakhtin is a cognitive necessity, not a rnystified privilege" (p. 22). Stnictured 
in terrns of othemess, the self is at the same time not the other. Rather, the self 
is the dialogic relation between self and other. 
NOTES 
1 While the self occupies a prominent position among the concems of 
contemporary psychology, historically within the discipline interest in the problem of 
the self has waxed and waned. ï h e  earliest period of interest in the self was 
coextensive with the pioneering efforts of psychologists, such as Wundt and 
Titchener, to establish a scientific approach to the study of consciousness. Though the 
self \vas far kom being considered an integral subject matter for the structural and 
fbnctional psychoIogies of the day, or an indispensable feature of the program of 
scientific psychology, the general preoccupation with introspectively analyzable 
conscious contents offered a clearing for the study of the self. In this regard, 
intellectual hornage must be paid to early theorists such as James (1950a), Baldwin 
(1897), and Caikins (1900), and in the sociological tradition, Cooley (1902) and Mead 
(1934)-both of whom 1 consider in another context below. In spite of their 
efforts, however, turn-o f-the-centu ry theorists' prospecl for seIf did not 
corne immediately to fniition. The conceptual, anecdotal, and empirical analyses they 
carried out generalIy failed to initiate within rnainline psychology a tradition of 
sustained and unintempted scholarship in the area. With the rise o f  logical positivism 
in philosophical circles and with the corresponding advent of behaviourism within 
psychology, the self was virtually exiled fiom among the discipline's central concem. 
The theoretical and methodological dominance enjoyed by the behaviourist paradigm 
cast a net of suspicion over what, ultirnately, were viewed as fictitious inner contents: 
min& consciousness, and dong with these, self, were constructs that could find no 
home within the folcis of behaviourism's inhospitable scientific vocabulary. 
(Interestingly, however, in this act of exclusion, the self remained a sort of 
"serviceable other" for behaviouristic psychology, that is, a determinate other wbich 
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exceeded the conceptuai grasp of behaviounst thought and whose denigration could 
serve to legitimate behzviourism's own clairns to knowledge.) On the canonid 
account, the so-called 'kognitive revolution" in psychology is generaily credited with 
bringing about the conditions for the current revival of interest in the self. The notion 
of self \vas readily incorporateci into the conceptual, linguistic space opened up by 
cognitive psychologists' preferred metaphors for human mentality (cf. Greenwald & 
Pratkanis, 1985). 
' Early proponents of the self atternpted to impart to the study of conscious 
experience a more concrete, persona1 aspect than that accorded it by structuralist and 
hnctionalist schools-schools whose penchant for abstraction seemed to occlude 
what for James (1950a) \vas the simple, uncontestable fact that every thought and 
experience belongs to someone. It is never just a matter of thought or experience per 
se, argued James, but of thought or your thought, "every thought being owned" (p. 
226). For this reason, James urged that psychologists focus on the "the personal seIf," 
as opposed to abstracted, disembodied thought. hdeed, James  vas insistent in 
declaring that "No psychology . , . can question the eistence of personal selves" and 
that, indeed, "The worst a psychology can do is so to interpret the nature of these 
selves as to rob them of their persond ~vorth" (p. 226). 
Rosenberg (1979) similarly remarks that 'The 'self stands as a concept 
foremost in the ranks of confbsion" (p. 5) .  
4 Reflecting on the problem the child fàces in leaming the meaning of the pronoun 
"1," Cooley (1908) remarked that while "An apple is an apple to aU dike  - . . '1' is 
different for every user of the word" (p. 340). 
5 Orie might argue here that Cordelia's uttetance simply reflects the constraints of 
the speech situation: How does one disagree with the monarch? How does one express 
dissent? Such questions suggest that Cordelia's reticence may be socially 
(discursively), as well as psychically, produced. 
6 In his essay, "Dream and e.xistence," Binsivanger (1 963) elaborares an account 
of existential disappointment-of fiustrated hopes and expectations-that certainly 
jibes with the sentiment 1 am expressing here. 
7 There is an ongoing debate conceming Bakhtin's authorship of the tex* signed 
by Volosinov and Medvedev. Clark and HoIquist (1984) support the view that Bakhtin 
was the sole author of the "disputed te?rts," while Morson and Emerson (1990) argue 
that these te- were in fact wvritten by Medvedev and Volosinov. See Morson and 
Emerson (1989, 1990) for a concise summary of the controversy surrounding the 
"disputed texts." For present purposes, 1 take an agnostic stance. 1 will refer to 
Bakhtin, Medvedev, and Volosinov as the authors of the particular tex% ascribed to 
them. 1 will use the expression "Bakhtinian" to refer to ideas that are congenial to the 
Bakhtin Circle more generally. 
8 Bakhtinian concepts have proven k i t f i l  in diverse areas within the humanities 
and social sciences, including: film criticism (Stam, 1989; Montgomery, 1993); 
feminist theory and cnticisrn (Bauer, 1988; Bauer & McKinstry, 199 1); socio-politicai 
theory and cuttural criticism (Gardiner, 1992; Hinchkop, 1999; Hirschkop & 
Shepherd, 1989); anthropology (Clifford, 1983; Quantz & O'Connor, 1988); bibIical 
interpretation (Reed, 1993); rhetonc (Klancher, 1989 McCIeIIan, 1990; Schuster, 
1985, 1990); the visual arts (Haynes, 1995); Iiteracy and composition studies (Famer, 
1998; Hdasek, 1999; Hirnley, 199 1; Cooper, 1994; Nysti-and, Greene, & WiemeIt, 
1993; Dyson, 1995; Hicks, 1994; Lensmire & Beals, 1994; Ward, 1994; Berkenkotter 
& Huckin, 1993; Welch, 1993); second-language acquisition (Bialystok & Hakuîa, 
1994); bi-lingual education (Moraes, 1996); education theory (Hoel, 1997; Sidorkin, 
1997, 1999); and geography (Folch-Serra, 1990). Within the scholarly psychology 
community, Bakhtin's writings are beginning to enjoy sorne currency arnong both 
Russian and English-speaking investigators (Bandlamudi, 1999; Baxter & 
Montgomery, 1996; BibIer, 1984; BuzzelIi, 1993, 1995, 1997; Cheyne &TaruIli, 1998, 
1999; Day & Tappan, 1996; Dore, 1989; Dore & Dorval, 1990; Dorval, 1990; Dorval & 
Dore, 1990; Eiy & McCabe, 1993; Evans, 1991; Fernyhough, 1996; Florenskaya, 1989; 
Hermans & Kempen, 1993, 1995; Hermans, Kernpen, & van Loon, 1 992; Hermans, 
Rijks, & Kernpen, 1993; McNamee, 1996; Meacharn, 1989; Radukhovskii, 1991; 
Sarnpson 1993; Shotter, 1993% 1993b7 1993c; 1997; Tappan 1989, 1991,1992, 1997; 
Tarulli, 1994, in press; Wertsch, 1980, 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992; Wertsch & 
Smoika, 1993). M i e  these appropriations of Bakhtuiian concepts span various content 
areas in psychology, each contributes to a significant emerging project within the 
discipline, namely that of foregrounding the social, cultural, and historical contex.9 of 
h u m  thought and action, and of psychological theory itself. For esample, in some of 
Our own work (Cheyne & Tarulli, 1 999), ive draw on Bakhtin's (198 1, 1986) historical 
analysis of Iiterary genres-fiom the travel novel, to the novel of ordeal, to the 
Bildunesroman-to suggest a m t i v e  framework for understanding the current 
methodological and theoretical preferences of mainline academic psychology. We see in 
Bakhtin's implicit psychology a way of pursuing the ontological and episternological 
openings provided In recent efforts ro reconstrue the psychological person dong cultural- 
hermeneutic lines. 
Other prominent theorists of dialogue include Buber, Gadarner, Levinas, and 
Freire. To date, relatively little attention has been paid to explorïng the relationship 
between Bakhtin's conception of dialogue and that put forth by these thinkers. Some 
exceptions include Perlina (1984) and Sidorkin (1999) on Buber and Bakhtin; 
Gardiner (1992) on Bakhtin and Gadamer; and NeaIon (1997), Paîterson (1988), and 
Ponzio (1994) on Bakhtin and Levinas. 
IO Quoted fiom Discourse on method, 4.3 1. 
'* Quoted from Meditations on first philosophy, 3.34. 
'' Iùid., 2.28. 
l3 Descartes' understanding of the mind as a realm of interiority constituted a 
radical depamire nom received classical and medieval epistemologies wherein mind 
or reason was taken to be coextensive with nature and the cosmic order (Dallmayr, 
199 1; Taylor, 1989). For Aristotle and his medieval philosophical descendants, for 
example, knowledge or tmth entailed a conformity of intellect and reality. On the 
Aristotelian account, what determines the nature or essence of an entity is its fom; 
and this fom, embodied in some particular piece of matter, also informs the intellect 
of a particular knower, thereby ensuring that the nature or essence of the entity is 
knowable. On this understanding, the human faculty of reason is not inscribed within 
the metaphoncal texture of the inner-outer dichotomy; reason is located neither 
"inside1' nor "outside" the human being, but rather equally in both. 
l4 Loeb (198 1) argues that the traditional distinction between Continental 
Rationalism and British Empincism is, in contrast to 'the standard theory" espoused 
by most philosophers and intellectual historians, "broken-backed." According to 
h e b ,  Descartes' and Locke's respective epistemologicaI stances are not so diverse. 
Indeed, he clairns that both thinkers might be better regarded as rationalists. More 
specificatly, Loeb argues that 
Locke shares with Descartes the foliowing clairns with respect to the 
standards, sources, structure, and extent of human knowledge: (1) certainty is 
a condition for knowledge; (2) truths knoïvn by intuition are perceived all at 
once, are self-evident, and do not require argument; (3) truths *hown by 
deduction or demonstration are perceived in a succession or progression, are 
certain but not self-evident, and are established by arguments consisting a 
senes of intuitively grasped steps; (4) intuition and deduction or 
demonstration are the sole sources of knowledge, at least ïvith regard to al1 
general truths; (5) not only do propositions known by intuition not require 
argument, they do not admit of argument, and in that sense they fhct ion as 
the foundation of a11 our knowledge; (6) we have intuitive knowiedge o f  
propositions about the content of our present sensory States; and (7) 
demonstrative knowledge of general or universal truths in principle extends 
well beyond mathematics, to morality and natural science" (p. 54) 
l5 Quoted fiom An essav concernins human understandinq, 2.1.2. 
l7 Ibid., 2.1.3. 
l 8  Ibid., 2.1.4. 
19 Ibid., 2.1.4. 
" Bishop George Berkeley moved the empiricist epistemological program along 
by denying that reflection constituted an inherent activity of mind and by redefining 
ideas as particulanstic images. He did not, however, reject Locke's belief in the mind 
as agent. David Hume, taking as a point of deparhire the ernpiricist d o c t ~ e  that al1 
knowledge cornes through observation and only observation, challenged the view of 
mind as agent, proposing that mind, self, soul, and persona1 identity were notions that 
did not have a grounding-could not be seen-in direct experience. For Hume, every 
real or determinate idea originates in some singular impression; but as the self, for 
example, is not any one impression but rather an inconceivably rapid succession of 
multiple, disparate, and perpetually fluctuating perceptions that pass before the theater 
of the mind, the idea of unified self, indeed of a self of any sort, is but a fiction, and 
hence could not be considered fiindamental to inquiry. For Hume, moreover, al1 the 
abstract ideas (e-g., relations, causality, necessity) that rvere presumed to be 
foundationai epistemological categories were redefined as particular images ("ideas") 
contingently gathered together according to principles of association. 
'' Quoted from Discoune on method 6.69. 
22 Ibid., 2-11 
1 recognize that ''the" Enlightenment is not a unitary phenomenon in the hiaory 
of ideas. Rather, Enlightenment is a complex and plural notion to which diverse 
meanings are aîîached-which may perhaps explain why we are still asking "What is 
Enlightenment?" (e.g., see Schmidt, 1996). In a recent work, Outrarn (1995) claims 
that rvhile historians have tended to acknowledge the ciifferences among individual 
Edightenment thurkers on particular issues, there has been a tendency to see the ideas of 
the Enlightenment as relatively hornogenous. In an effort to accornmodate the 
fbndamental diversity at the h a r t  of the notion of Enlightenment, Outram suggests 
that it be understood not as a completed project but rather as a process, as a series of 
probierns and debates that bore on social and poIitical developrnents and that took on 
different shapes and forms in particular social and cultural conte-. 
24 Quoted fiom An essav concemine human understanding, 1-4-23. 
It may reasonably be argued that Enlightenment period is both individualistic in 
the extreme highly social, valuing dialogue. As Outram (1995) notes, the 
EnIightenment saw the establishment of new forms of sociability for the discussion 
and transformation of opinions, Formal institutions, in which membership was 
controlled, inciuded masonic lodges and learned academies and societies. Informa1 
settings included public lectures, coffee houses, lending libraries, and bookselIers' 
shops-al1 commercial operations which, for a small fee (e-g, the price of a cup of 
coffee) provided access to p ~ t e d  matenal and aHowed people of different classes to 
be exposed to the same ideas. The emergence of this "public realm" suggests that the 
Enlightenment may be regarded as an agc of coIlaboration in knowledge. It should be 
noted, however, that while such collaboration offered a nutnent medium for the 
development, testing, and communication of ideas, it is questionable whether ideas 
themselves were considered constitutively social as opposed to being predicated of 
individual minds. 
26 Unlike many of his eighteenthcentury Enlightenrnent counterparts, Rousseau 
did not follow Descartes in defining humans as rational animaIs and in emphasizing 
the inbom fàculty of reason as the comerstone of individual autonomy. Where 
Descartes defines the self as a 'Vhg that thinks," Rousseau's account of human 
nature construes the self primanly as a "thing that feels." Despite being critical of the 
escesses of reason, however, Rousseau did not abandon the idea of reason, but rather 
idealized its union wïth matters of the heart. Rousseau follows Descartes in positing 
the power of autonomous reason to structure the world through its categories, but, as a 
reader of Locke, follows his sensationalism and empiricism as a counterpoint to 
Cartesian rationality. Such a synthesis of reason and feeling \vas in the service of 
reintegrating the individual and achieving a unified, unalienated consciousness- 
'' Rousseau (1979a) makes the distinction behveen dependence on things and 
dependence on wills or on others. Dependence on things is part of our naturd 
inheritance and, as such, neither compromises fieedorn nor encourages vices. In the 
state of nature, the individual knows only amour de soi, a natud self-love and self- 
esteem uncompted by dependence on others, and strengthened by dependence on 
things. Dependence on things teaches Emile to resign himself to necessity and thus 
keeps him within himself. In contrast, dependence on others' wills, which is a 
consequence of societal Iife, is both detrimental to individual autonomy and leads to 
vices; it divides the self and thus destroys the individual's natural wholeness and seff- 
sufficiency. According to Rousseau's account, history and cuIture have forced a 
division behveen this onginary amour de soi and a contingent amour Dropre, or pride, 
engendered by Our dependence on others. The goal of education, then, was to regain 
the self s natural wholeness by preventing amour de soi fiom devolving into amour 
proDer. 
'' Kant's (1986) essay hinges on the distinction between the private and the public 
use of reason. According to Kant, fieedom needs to be attached only to the latter. By 
the private use of reason, Kant did not mean solitary or individual reflection, but 
rather the reason practiced by those in specific civil posts--clergymen,  ta.^ officiais, 
officers. In the interests of preventing an outbreak of chaos, restrictions could be 
imposed on private reason; in other words, it could be subject to-indeed entailed the 
acceptance of-some form of extemal authority. In the private use of reason, as Kant 
says, one behaves reiatively passively, "with an artificiai unanimity" (p. 265) and with 
a view to advancing or defending certain "public ends": "here argument is not 
allowed-one must obey" (p. 265). Such constrahts and restrictions do not, however, 
compromise the goal of Enlightenment, which pertains to the public use of  reason. In 
contrast to private reason. the public use of reason refers to 'me use which a person 
makes of  it as a scholar before the reading public" (p. 265) and requires the rejection 
of extemal authority: 'The public use of  one's reason must always be free, and it 
alone can bring about enlightenment among men" (p. 265)- In advocating the fiee use 
of public reason (the freedorn of  wrîters and publishers), Kant is defending the 
practice of unconstrained communication and debate. According to O'Neill (1989), 
Kant's communicative ideal requires that each of us is fkee to speak in aur own voice: 
"othenrise understanding and agreement will be spurious, mere echoings of what the 
other or the many assent" (p. 46). In Kant's vie\\?' autonomy, intellectual 
independence, goes hand in hand with cornrnunity and public discussion-with the 
appeal, more specifically, to shared (universal), rational pnnciples which, in effect, 
are the foundation of cornmunity and cooperation. On the Kantian account, thinking 
for ourselves means thinking universally, fiorn the standpoint of everyone eke  (the 
"sensus cornmunis")-something that can be accomplished by unconstrained public 
discussion. Here, discussion and debate emerge as means of facilitating this rationa1 
impulse toward universalism-toward the abstract other ernbodied in the categorical 
irnperative' for example-and, correspondingly, of transporting the individual beyond 
the insidious grasp of particularity, prejudice, and habit. 
29 One of the central lessons of post-positive philosophy is that it is impossible to 
approach a phenornenon of interest fiom a neutral or objective standpoint, fiorn a 
standpoint outside of tirne and place, or outside of the discursive practices of a particular 
linguistic comrnunity. Gadameis (1989) ontological hemeneutics represents one such 
philosophy. Gadamer chdlenges the Eniightenment notion of presuppositionless 
understanding, a notion that re& on a belief in the powers of subjective reflection and 
individuaI self-awareness. in contrast to Enlightenment thought on the matter, Gadamer 
deemphasizes conscious reflection and stresses, instead, the importance for 
understanding of histoncal belongingness. According to Gadarner, every question we as k 
of our subject matter, every attempt to understand something-whether that something 
be a te* a cultural practice, another hurnan being, or one's self-ineluctably begins wïth 
pre-conscious anticipations and projections-"pre-judgrnents" or "prejudices," as 
Gadamer termed them-that predispose us to see the world in certain ways and that are 
rooted in Our cultural and historical tradition. These "pre-judgments" are not, as on the 
Enlightenrnent assurnption, impediments to understanding, but rather constitute the 
positive possibility of understanding anything at all. The central role of prejudice in 
hurnan understanding and, correlativel y, the limitations of subjectivity and self- 
awareness, are evident in Gadarner's c l a h  that 'The seif-awareness of the individual is 
only a flickering in the cIosed circuits of historical life. That is whv the ureiudices of the 
individual. fàr more tban his iudments, - constitute the historical realitv of his being. (pp. 
276-277). According to Gadamer, in its condemnation of prejudice, the Enlightenment 
exhibits its oivn overarching prejudice: namely, the "prejudice against prejudice itself' 
(p. 270)- The presupposition of Enlightenment thought is that reason, and not 
tradition, is the source of authority. Gadamer challenges this dualistic conception of 
authority and reason, He argues that authority rooted in tradition-and manifested in 
pre-judgments carried in language-is not invariably the site of false thinking, but 
rather is the site of our openness to esperience. For Gadamer, authority has Iess to do 
with obedience than blth knowledge-with the knowledge, more precisely, that one's 
own knowIedge may be limited and that others may know more or have a better 
understanding of the subject matter at hand. Accordingly, from a herrneneuticâl 
perspective, the Kantian injunction to "think for oneself' is ultimately rnisguided and, 
in any event, impossible. As Schmidt (1998) observes, "The irnperative 'think for 
yourself makes sense . . . only because those who heed Kant's cal1 are not thinking & 
thernselves. They are raîher thinking with others, as members of a particular tradition in 
which activities Iike 'critique' and 'reflection' have a meaning" (p. 20). However refined 
their sense of reason, then people are not fiee to disentangle themselves fiom the 
historical situation or tradition they inhabit. But this is not to suggest that tradition is a 
prison house. We can, through our dialogic encounters with histoncal and cultural others, 
corne to a more self-conscious appreciation of the presuppositions that underlie our view 
of the world and ourselves. However, such self-conscious reflection is only ever partial. 
WC cannot stand completely and disinterestedly outside of tradition in order to scrutinize 
it, like an object, in its entirety. Tradition, and hence we ourselves, are not so transparent. 
30 The Enlightenment emphasis on education as a means o f  inoculating the 
individual against prejudice and the uncritical acceptance of opinion and, more 
positively, of facilitating the development of critical reason and individual fieedom, 
would seem to be inconsistent with these claims regarding the individual subject's 
self-sufficiency. Locke (1913), for example, stresses the role o f  others in helping to 
constitute the child's personality development. In Locke's pedagogical model-no 
less than in Kant's (199 1) and Rousseau's (1979a)-the task of education is to realize 
the human potential for mord autonomy and epistemic agency. Paradoxicalfy, it 
would appear, we need others-tutors, for e-wple-to help us gain the road to self- 
reliance, to help us become what we already are, at Ieast in ~otentia .  Here, the control 
or influence of others is seen as a sort of social scaffolding that, once internalized- 
and hence transforrned into rational &f-control-stands to be dismantled. In short, 
while we need others (perspicacious tutors, brave teachers) to disseminate and 
consciously inculcate in us the spirit of autonomous reason, once we achieve rnahinty 
(in the Kantian sense) and are able to think for ourselves, others cease to exert a 
formative influence on our choices, beliefs, and so forth. 
'' n i e  emancipation tendencies of the Enlightenment extended to liberating 
reason fiom language. As Cloeren (1 98 8) notes, it \vas assumed that Ianguage \vas 
independent from philosophical and scientific thought, and 5om cognition more 
generally. 
" Quoted from An essav concernine human understanding, 3.2.2. 
33 Ibid., m. 9.6. 
" Quoted from Meditations on first ~hilosophv, 2.3 1-32. 
35 Rhetoric is generally taken to refer to the elaboration or embellishment of 
arguments or, more generally, any aspects, presentations, or  stylings of arguments that 
have the intended fiinction of persuading others of the correctness of an argument. 
Rhetonc is ofien regarded with considerable suspicion, especially in the scientific 
community, as a corruption of rationality and even morality. In pejorative terms, 
rhetoric is cailed sophistry, implying captious or fklIacious reasonîng in which 
rhetonc rises above al1 other features of an argument, To be seen to ernploy rhetoric is 
to be seen as insincere, manipulative, or deceptive. Rhetoric fell into especially Iow 
repute during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Mitchell, 1986). Locke 
(1997), for e?iample, referred to "rhetoric, that powerful instrument of error and 
deceit" (p. 452, 3.10.34). Note, however, that the plain style advocated by Locke is at 
root a counter rhetoric-sanctioned by the Royal Society-to that of scholastics and 
poets, and as such is other-oriented via the goal of persuasion (Easton, personal 
communication). 
36 According to the self-understanding of the modem p hilosophical perspective, 
the validity and evaluation of a knowledge daim can be established independently of 
the social, cultural, rhetorical context in which it is made (Toulmin, 1990). A 
proposition or thought ernbodies a tmth that is in essence repeatable, a tmth that 
exceeds the local, contingent circumstances of its production. In a world governed by 
such truths, "rhetoric \vas of course subordinate to logic: the validity and tmth of 
rational arguments is independent of & presents them, to whom, or in what 
context-such rhetorical questions wn contnbute nothing to the impartial 
establishment of human knowledge" (Toulmin, 1990, p. 75). 
" Rousseau's communicative ideal is expressed less directly in his pedagogical 
writings. In Emile, he \rites: 
The greatest harm fiom the hurry one is in to make children talk before the 
proper age is not that the first speeches one makes to them and the first words 
they say have no meaning for hem, but that they have another meaning than 
ours without our being able to perceive it; so that, appearing to answer us quite 
exactly, they speak to us \vithout understanding us and without our 
understanding them. h is ordinarily due to such equivocations that we are 
sometimes surprised by their rernarks, to which we lend ideas that they did not 
attach to them. This Iack of attention on our part to the true meaning which 
words have for children appears to me to be the cause of their first errors; and 
these errors, even after the; are cured of them, have an influence on their tum of 
mind for the rest oftheir liies. . . . Resirict, therefore, the child7s vocabulary as 
much as possible. It is a very great disadvantage for him to have more words 
than ideas, for him to know how to Say more things than he can think. (1979% p. 
73-74). 
" Bakhtin7s (1984) understanding of Socratic dialogue stands in contrast to the 
conventional view, according to which Socrates is seen as upholding a notion of 
autonomous knowers and as serving as a catalyst in the dialectical unfolding of an 
already-known truth. For Bakhtin, Socratic dialogues convey the notion that the 
detennining form of tmth is not dialectic, but rather dialogic interaction. Bakhtin 
argues that in Socratic dialogue, truth does not exist ready-made, simply awaiting 
discovery by some self-contained, fully autonomous subject. Moreover, he cautions us 
against conflating a Socratic conception of truth with Plato's monologization of 
Socratic dialogues in the seMce of the "Idea". in Plato, Bakhtin wams us, dialogues 
become dialogical in compositiona1 form only, with tnith simply unfoiding 
inescapably in a particular direction. As a result of this monologization, truth loses its 
processual, emergent quaIity. 
39 In Passions of the souI, Descartes (1988) wwites: "For there is within us but one 
soul, and this soul has within it no diversity of parts" (p. 236, 1.47). 
40 While not doubting that the Enlightenrnentys self-understanding and perception 
of the world is shaped by the discourses of cognitive and moral universalism, Vogel 
(2000) gathers evidence to suggest that such universalistic principles did not alwvays 
eventuate in irnmutable, dogrnatic beliefs about the unifonnity of human nature. More 
specifically, she examines the genre of the philosophical travet account, in which 
traveller-philosophers described hitherto unfamiliar regions of the wvorld. Vogel 
argues that this genre did not simply generate empirical, fachial descriptions of the 
world's diversity, but rather wvas also directed to how such diversity spoke to 
philosophical questions conceming the nature and moral constitution of  humans. In 
some cases, Vogel argues, the encounter with such difference became "the catalyst of 
a 'painful' enlightenment-of a critical self-reflection on Europe's own identity" 
(p.5). As an illustration of the self-doubt elicited by such encounters with c u h r a l  
otherness, Vogel cites the case of Diderot: "observations of sexual customs on Tahiti 
leci Diderot . . . to understand that sharne and guilt yere not, as assurned in the moral 
codes of  civilized natures, universally inscnbed in hurnan nature, but were products of 
social conventions" (p. 2 1). 
4 1 Outram (1995) observes that despite the Enlightenment's pretensions to 
universalism, women writers' status as producers of knowledge remained equivocal. 
Women were never tmly accepted as part of the "Repubiic of Lettersy-and indeed, 
their participation \vas seen as cornpromising its Iegitimacy. The independence and 
autonorny of women \vas considered to be compromised by their fàmily duties, and 
their lack of impartiality to be due to their emotionai natures. (On this point, see aiso 
Rousseau's (1979a) description of Emile's prospective mate, Sophie.) As Outrarn 
(1995) fùrther notes, ''the Enlightenment . . . often seemed to devote as rnuch energy 
to denigrating entire social groups, such as women or peasants, as impewious to the 
voice of reason, as it did to constructing a better world for human beings" (p. 24). 
" Bakhtin is not ascribing to a form of solipsisrn. Nor does he regard this essential 
otherness, this difference between self and other, as a lamentable state, an irnpediment 
to communication, akin perhaps to a distorting "egocentrism" as conceived, for 
example, along Piagetian lines. On the Piagetian account, the universal path of sociai- 
cognitive development involves the movement fiorn an autistic, egocentnc state to 
one in which mature, objective perspective-taking is possibIe. In this framework, 
taking the perspective of the other means overcoming the other's othemess, an 
achievement which, in Piaget's rationalist account, is enabled by the emergent ability 
to assume a perspective that is comrnon to all. 
" The sources on which Bakhtin's phenomenological argument relies are not 
clear. In any event, a discussion of  the varieties of phenomenological thought that may 
have influenced these earIy writings is sure to be comples enough to warrant a 
separate discussion. It should be noted, however, that Bakhtin himself refers to the 
phenomenological tradition as one of his sources (e.g., 1990, p. 188n). 
44 Bakhtin (1993) calls this legacy "theoreticism." (See aiso Chapter 3 .) 
45 Bakhtin (1990) also refers to this innermost mode of subjectivity as "spirit." 
46 On Bakhtin's (1990) view, there is no clear demarcation line between 
autobiography and biography: 'Weither in biography nor in autobiography does the 1- 
for-myself (my relationship with rnyself) represent the organizing, constitutive 
moment of form" (p. 15 1). 
47 3 n  the importance of others' stones about us, Bakhtin (1990) writes: 'Without 
these stones told by others, my life would not only lack fiillriess and c1a1-i~ in its 
content, but would also remain intemally dispersed, divested of any value-reiated 
biographical uni&" (p. 154). 
48 On the Bakhtinian fiamework, the others who author the self are conceived 
fairly uniformly in benevolent, quasi-religious terms. The form 1 receive fkom the 
other is likened to "the relationship of a gift to a need; of an act of fieely granted 
forgiveness to a transgression; of an act of grace to a sinner" (1 990, p. 90). As 
Emerson (1984) contends, the other in Bakhtin is not an alien menace but a "fnendly 
other, a living factor in the atternpts of the 1 toward self-definition" @- 302n). Bakhtin 
certainly does not seem to entertain the notion that the other may in fact want to 
destroy me (Emerson, 1988). Of course, it might be argued that the encounter mith an 
utterly alien and menacing other can be as productive for the self as an encounter with 
a fiendly other. Meeting up with a threatening, malevolent other can make me realize 
certain things about myself-even if only how vulnerabIe 1 am and what my escape 
options are. 
49 Bakhtin's allusion here to an authentic source of altenty implies that self- 
objectification cannot be accomplished by an abstract, discursive thought that 
abstracts me from the unique place I occupy in existence and places me on the sarne 
plane with al1 others. 
Nor can we cornprehend ourselves as a whole or see ounelves directly by 
Iooking into a mirror, for rnirrors affiord a poverty of othemess. According to Bakhtin 
(1986), "our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because 
they are Iocated outside us in space and because they are others" (p. 7). M e n  we look 
into a mirror, 
We see the reflection of our estenor, but not ourseIves in terms of our 
exterior. . . . Indeed, Our position before a mirror is always somewhat 
spurious, for since we lack any approach to ourselves fiom outside, in this 
case . . . we projece ourselves into a peculiarly indeterminate pcssible other, 
with whose help we then try to find an asiologicd position in relation to 
ourselves; in this case, too, we try to viviS. ourselves and give form to 
ourselves-out of the other. Whence that distinctive and unnatural expression 
of our face which we see on it in the mirror, but which we never have in our 
lived life. (Bakhtin, 1990, pp. 32-33) 
Bakhtin (1990) also refers to this component of the self as c'soul." 
'' The notion that the actual meaning of the casame" utterance changes each tirne 
that utterance is made seriously complicates the notion of a permanently existing idea 
that appears in the mind the same way on different occasions. Interestingly, James 
(1950a) addresses this issue in his claim that "it is certainiy . . . true that no two 
'ideas' are ever exactiy the same" (p. 235). He quotes Hodgson to the effect that 'The 
chain of consciousness is a sequence of differents" (p. 230)- EIaborating the HeracIitian 
nature of this argument, he fiirther observes that 
we should have to confess that, however we might in ordinary conversation 
speak of getting the sarne sensation again, we never in strict theoretic 
accuracy could do so; and that whatever was true of the river of life, of the 
river of elementary feeling, it would certainly be tnie to Say, like Heraciitus, 
that we never descend twice into the same Stream. (p. 233) 
And similarly in regard to thought: 
For there it is obvious and palpable that our state of mind is never precisely 
the same. Every thought we have of a given fact is, stnctly speaking, unique, 
and only bears a resemblance of kind with Our other thoughts of the same 
fàct.. When the identicai hct  recurs, we must think of it in a fiesh manner, see 
it under a somewhat different angle, apprehend it in different relations fkom 
those in which it last appeared. And the thought by which we cognize it is the 
thought of it-in-those-relations, a thought suffised tvîth the consciousness of al1 
that dim context, Often we are ourselves stmck at the strange differences in our 
successive views of the same thllig- (p- 233) 
Hence the reason that our thoughts about some issue are never, strict11 speaking, the 
same lies in the fact that on each successive occasion a thought is shrouded in a 
unique, once-occurrent set of vaguely apprehended relations. Against the idea o f  a 
completely rounded, bounded, hl ly deiimited thought--of a whole unto itself-James 
wmts to promote "the re-instatement of the vague to its proper place in our mental Life" 
(p. 254). Xnowledge about a thing," writes James, "is knowledge of its relations" @. 
259), and of rnost of these "we are oniy aware in the penumbral nascent way o f a  
'fiinge' of unarticulated affinities about it" @. 259) 
53 Also cnticd of the conventional, transmission mode1 of the communicative 
process as follo~vs, Demda (198 1) descnbes it in the following terms: 
communication . . . in efFect implies a transmission charged with making: pass, 
fiom one subiect to another. the identitv of a signified object, of a or 
of a concept rightflllly separate from the process of passage and fiom the 
signifying operation. Communication presupposes subjects (whose ideality 
and presence are constituted before the signi@ng operation) and objects 
(signified concepts, a thought meaning that the passage o f  communication 
will have neither to constitute, nor, by al1 nghts, to transforrn). A 
comrnunicates B to C. Through the sign the ernitter cornrnunicates something 
to a receptor, etc. (pp. 23-24). 
5.4 Merleau-Ponty (1973) espresses a similar view: "But 1 cannot even Say that 
speech rnay be "in me," since it is equally "in the listener." Speech is peculiarly my 
own, productivity, and yet speech is so only to make meaning out of my 
productivity and to cornmunicate that meaning. The other who M e n s  and 
understands joins with me in what is most singular in me" (p. 14 1). 
" Beneviste (1971) offers an account of the subject &ch, Iike Bakhtin's, posits 
the discursive production of selfhood. Beneviste argues that the reality to which the 
pronoun "I" refers is a "reality of discourse" (p. 218). '4" cannot be defined, like a 
noun, as a particularization of some objective, persistently identical notion-like 
"tree," for example. Unlike the uses of nouns, '1 cannot be defined except in terms of 
'locution.'. . .L signifies 'the person who is uttenng the present instance of  the 
discourse containing 1.' This instance is unique by definition and has validity only in 
its uniqueness" (Beneviste, p. 2 18). Each person constitutes or announces himself or 
herself as a subject by uttering "1." In this way, by saying "I," an individual speaker 
appropriates the resources of language toward the end of actualizing his or her 
subjectivity. Subjectivity on this view is &'the capacity of the speaker to posit himself 
as 'subject" (p. 224). Subjectivity is achieved in discourse by taking on the role of the 
"I" in that discourse. Moreover, in his claim that "I" functions dialogically with a 
"'you," Beneviste puts fonvard a relational conception of subjectivity. He ~vrites: 
Consciousness of self is only possible if it is experienced by contrast. I use 1 
only when I am speaking to someone who will be a in my address. It is 
this condition of dialogue that is constitutive of person, for it implies that 
reciprocally 1 becomes vou in the address of the one who in his turn 
designates himself as 1." (pp. 224-225). 
56 See Baumeister and Leary (1995) for a social-psychological discussion of "the 
need to belong" as a fiindamental human motivation. 
57 In contrast to this reading of Hegel, Williams (1992) argues that in his concept 
of "recognition" Hegel defends the value of otherness for subjectivis. On Williams' 
reading, HegeI does not reduce the other to the same, but rather preserves the sense of 
an ongoing, reciprocal dialectic between self and other. 
58 On a Gadamerian account, in a genuinely productive dialogue across 
differences, the horizons of self and other (of interpreter and text, more specifically) 
blend to create a new, shared tiorizon. Gadarner (1989) expresses this new, 
diaIogicalIy emergent understanding in terrns of a "fusion of horizons." That is, in 
articulating and testing our beliefs and practices in the contrastive liglit afforded by 
the other's horizon, 1 am involved in a sort of synthesizing process wherein a 
consensus (even if structured around disagreement) is dialogically forged. Here, 
Gadamer clearly betrays his indebtedness to Hegelian thinking, for the new 
understanding is conceived as reflecting a more sophisticated-differentiated, better 
articulated-form of knowledge, though to be sure, uniike Hegel, Gadarner does not 
envision this process in terms of a dialectical synthesis of opposites that issues 
inevitably and necessarily in the eradication of othemess- Still, for Gadarner, dialogue 
is successfiil only in the measure to which it eventuates in a substantial consensus-that 
is, the attainrnent of a greater degree of universality wïth regard to the subject matter at 
hand. 
In his defence of the ineradicable plurality of social languages and their 
corresponding ways of viewing the world, Bakhtin may be allied with contemporary 
postrnodern analyses of diflerence, and in particular with Lyotard's (1984) elaboration 
of the "postmodem condition." Just as Lyotard's postmodern "incredulity toward 
metanamtives" is rooted in his optimisrn regarding the cntical and ernancipatory 
force of srnall, local narratives-narratives whose complex i~  and diversity mirror 
social reality-so too does Bakhtin counterpose the multiple Ianguages of 
heteroglossia to the unifjing thmst of any given national language. See Carroll (1987) 
for a discussion of the political implications of difference in Bakhtin and Lyotard. 
Bakhtin's account of the process by which others' words come to populate our 
inner speech is admittedl y rather sketchy, and certainly less elaborated than the 
internalization theories advocated, for example, by Mead (1934) and Vygotsky 
(1987). Bakhtin seems most ofien to take as his point of departure a psyche already 
populated with words and voices. 
'' As an example of monologic literary works, Bakhtin (1984) cites Tolstoy's 
te.-: c'Tolstoy7s world is monoIithicalIy rnonologic; the hero's discourse is confined 
in the fised framework of the authcr's discourse about him" (p. 56). 
Higgins's (1987) selfaiscrepancy mode1 is notable in its attention to the role of 
the perceived evaluations of significant others on seIf-understanding. Higgins 
distinguishes between the actual self, the idea! self, and the ought self. The actual self 
is a representation of the attributes that you or another believe you actually possess. 
Ideal and ought selves, on the other hand, are what he calls self-guides, which pertain 
to hopes and aspirations regarding attributes you would ideally like to possess (the 
ideal self), and attributes that, out of duty or obligation, you think you ought to 
possess (the ought self). Like the actual self, these self-guides may involve both one's 
own standpoint or that of any number of significant others about the attributes one 
ideally or ought to possess, Higgins predicts that certain types of discrepancies 
between the actual sel f-concept and sel f-guides produce distinguis hab le affective 
responses. For esample, a discrepancy between one's actuai and ideal self gives rise to 
dejection-related emotions (e-g., disappointment, sadness); a discrepancy behveen 
one's actual self-concept and the self one beiieves another thinks one ought to possess 
gives rise to agitation-related emotions (e.g., fear, feeling threatened). From a 
dialogical perspective, what is significant about Higgins's theory is that it points up 
the complexity of the self, and in particular the role played by others' voices in the 
vicissitudes of self-understanding. While Higgins speaks of matches or mismatches 
behveen the self-concept and vanous self-guides (one's own and others'), we might 
equaIly speak of the dialogical interplay (e-g., agreement, disagreement) of the voices 
reflected in actual, ideai, and ought seIves. This dialogical rendering points up the 
dynarnic fashion in which these voices engage one another and their stniggle for 
influence over the individual. 
63 A second variant of single-voiced discourse is represented or objectified 
discourse, which refers primady to the direct speech of characters. It is discourse in 
which the character speaks in a direct, unmediated way, that is, in a way not shaped by 
an awareness of another discourse. Such speech is to be understood at  once in terms of 
what it says about its referential object and 'ks characteristic, typical, colorfiil 
discourse, a referential object toward which something is directed" (p, 187)- In other 
words, objectified discourse represents a character's words in object-like fashion for 
the audience. 
Indeed, it is these words and voices that ccrnstitute our particularly human 
habitat- "In al1 areas of life and ideological activity," writes Bakhtin (198 l), 
Our speech is filled to overflowing with other people's words. . . . We can go 
so far as to siy that in real life people talk most of al1 about what others talk 
about-they transmit, recall, weigh and pass judgment on other peopIeYs 
words, opinions, assertions, informati~n; people are upset by others' words, or 
agree nith them, contest them, refer to them and so forth. Were we to 
eavesdrop on snatches of rair dialogue in the street, in a crowd, in lines, in a 
foyer and so forth, we wouId hear how ofien the words 'he says,' 'people 
say,' 'he said ...' are repeated. (pp. 33 7-3 3 8) 
65 A more detaikd account of the dialogical conceptualization of change and 
rnatunty provided in the concluding chapter of the dissertation. 
See Baxter and Montgomery (1996) for a discussion of "dialogic complexity" 
as a constmct for understanding change in interpersonal relationships. 
" As Bakhtin (1984) notes in this regard: 
The weakening or destruction of a monologic contex? occurs only when there 
is a coming together of two utterances equally and directly oriented toward a 
referential object. Two discourses equally and directly oriented toïvard a 
referential object within the lirnits of a single context cannot exist side by side 
without intersecting dialogically, regardlas of whether they confirm, 
mutually supplement, or (conversely) contradict one another, or find 
themse1ves in some other dialogic relationship (that of question and answer, 
for esampIe). @p. 188-189) 
68 The ethical nature of dialogue is sure to be revisited and recontextualized in 
light of publication of Bakhtin's (1990, 1993) earliest tvritings. 
69 Pomio (1990) sees the developmental course of appropriation in the following 
terrns: "We finally amve at Our "own" discourse through an itinerary that goes fiom 
the repetition, imitation and stylization of the discourse of others to its ironization, 
parodization and criticism; an irinerary, that is, Ieading fkom the serious to the 
parodic" (p. 223;. 
70 The ethical ideal reflected in Bakhtin's notion of ideological becoming has 
much in common with the aims of what might be called herrneneutical education. The 
goal of such education is the never-completed cultivation of the "esperienced 
(gebildet) person. What makes a person expenenced is not so much the accumulation 
of knowledge but the openness to new experience. The telos of hermeneutical 
education is the recognition of the value of different perspectives. This openness can 
be understood as the readiness to enter into genuine dialogue with the other. 
7' The constitutive significance of outsideness for the self is a theme that Bakhtin 
defends throughout the course of his career and which, in one of his last pieces, takes 
up in the context of inter-cultural understanding. "In the reaim of culture," Bakhtin 
outsideness is a most powerfûl factor in understanding. It is only in the eyes 
of another culture that a foreign culture reveals itself h l l y  and profoundly. . . . 
A meaning only reveals its depths once it has encountered and corne into 
contact with another, foreign meaning; they engage in a kind of dialogue, 
which surmounts the closedness and one-sidedness of these particular 
rneanings, these cultures. We mise new questions for a foreign culture, ones 
that it did not raise itseif; we seek answers to our own questions in it; and the 
foreign culture responds to us by reveahg to us its new aspects and new 
semantic depths. Without one's own questions one cannot creatively 
understand anything other or foreign. . . . Such a didogic encounter of two 
cultures does not result in a merging or mising. Each retains its own unity and 
open totaiity, but they are rnutually e ~ c h e d ,  (p. 7) 
n Babcock's (1978) notion of "symboiic inversion" also captures this aspect of 
carnival. Syrnbolic inversion is "broadly defined as any act of expressive behavior 
which inverts, contradicts, abrogates, or in some fashion presents an alternative to 
comrnonly held cultural codes, values, and norms be they linguistic, literary or artistic, 
religious, or social and political" (p- 14). 
73 Interestingly, however, Greendd  concedes that, in the long nui, "the 
totalitan'an-ego biases are . . . disadvantageous" (p. 6 14) and that the "ego's biases 
will produce cognitive stagnation in a person who is capable of greater developmental 
achievement" (p. 6 14). 
74 Bakhtin (1986) wites: "the work cannot Iive in future centuries without having 
somehow absorbed past centuries as well. If it had belonged entirelv to today (that is, 
were a product only of its own time) and not a continuation of the past or essentially 
related to the past, it could not Iive in the fiiture. Everything that belongs only to the 
present dies along with the present" (p. 4). See also Gadamer's (1989) conception of 
"effective history." 
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